Comoros

Politics:

• Analysis

  Comoros politics: Quick View - General Amiri is cleared of complicity in mu

  Event

  General Salimou Mohamed Amiri, a former army chief of staff who faced charges of complicity in the murder of Colonel Combo Ayouba, a senior military official, has been acquitted.

  Analysis

  After two years of judicial twists in a highly sensitive and political case, the Moroni Assizes on November 2nd acquitted General Amiri on a lack of evidence. Colonel Ayouba was known to be an ally of the former Union president, Ahmed Abdallah Sambi, and his assassination occurred at a time of high political tensions-soon after Mr Sambi had tried to delay Union elections until November 2011-and intense power struggles within the army. The relations of General Amiri, the then army chief of staff, with Mr Sambi were notoriously poor, as he had several times stood up against the former president. General Amiri enjoyed and still enjoys strong popularity within the army and the population, where he is considered a hero for his role in the military intervention on Anjouan in 2008.

  The acquittal, which came as a surprise, was welcomed with popular acclaim. General Amiri's lawyers declared that "justice was born" in the Comoros. However, given the judiciary's record, other motivations may lie behind the judge's decision. The judgement could be interpreted as another signal on the part of the current Union president, Ikililou Dhoinine, of his emancipation from his predecessor, following the replacement of key military staff in October 2012. The acquittal indeed discredits Mr Sambi (who had demoted General Amiri and forced him into retirement before any trial was initiated) to the point that he published a video statement in which he denied any involvement in Colonel Ayouba's murder. Meanwhile, Mr Dhoinine acknowledged the court's decision and called on the judiciary to bring the real murderers to justice.

  Although the case may remain unsolved, a new investigation may stoke some simmering tensions within the civil and military elites. At this stage, Mr Sambi stands out as having lost the most political credit from the whole affair.

  November 15, 2012

• Background

  Comoros: Political forces

  The military is the prime force

  Comorian politics has long been characterised by a large number of political factions and parties, mainly based on community or personal loyalties (and to some extent on economic interests) rather than ideology. The army has long been the prime political force in Comoros, but its reputation is likely to have been damaged by its defeat at the hands of the Anjouanese defence forces—albeit in a comparatively small-scale encounter—in mid-2007.

  October 08, 2007

• Structure

  Comoros: Political structure

  Official name

  The Comorian Union

  Form of state

  Federal Islamic republic

  Legal system

  Based on the Napoleonic code and sharia (Islamic law), the constitution was approved in outline by referendum in late 2001

  National legislature

  Each of the three islands, Grande Comore, Anjouan and Mohéli, has an individual parliament, with different numbers of seats, which are elected directly; the Union has a legislative assembly with 33 members: 24 members of parliament are elected by direct universal suffrage and nine are appointed by the three islands

  Head of state

  President

  National government

  Ikililou Dhoinine won the December 2010 presidential election with 61% of the vote, making him the first Mohélian to hold the presidency. This is in line with the 2000 Fomboni Accord under which the presidency rotates between Comoros's three islands

  National elections

  Elections for Union president and the governors of the three islands were held simultaneously in late 2010; the transfer of power to the president-elect took place on May 26th 2011; legislative elections took place in December 2009

  Main political parties

  Comoros has a weak party structure; the political landscape consists of a large number of parties, mainly based on personal loyalties; political alliances are, similarly, typically geared towards supporting a particular leader; the president, Ikililou Dhoinine, is supported by a grouping of parties called the Baobab coalition; the Baobab coalition secured 19 out of 24 seats in the 2009 election to the Union parliament

  Union government

  Union president: Ikililou Dhoinine

  Vice-president for production, environment, energy, industry & handicrafts: Fouad Mohadji

  Vice-president for finance, economy, budget, investment, trade & privatisation: Mohamed Ali Soilihi

  Vice president for land planning, urbanism, & housing: Nourdine Bourhane

  Key ministers

  Education, research, culture, arts, youth & sport: Mohamed Issimaila

  Employment, labour & women's entrepreneurship: Siti Kassim

  External relations & co-operation: Mohamed Bakri

  Health, solidarity, social cohesion & gender promotion: Moinafouraha Ahmed

  Interior, information & decentralisation: Abdalla Hamada

  Justice, civil service, administrative reform, human rights & Islamic affairs: Ahmed Anliane

  Telecommunication, transport & tourism: Mouhidine Rastami

  Governors of the islands

  Anjouan (Nzwani): Anissi Chamisidine

  Grande Comore (Ngazidja): Mouigni Baraka Said Soilihi

  Mohéli (Mwali): Mohamed Ali Said

  Central bank governor

  Abdoul Majid Mohamed Chafiou

  December 03, 2012

Economy:

• Background

  Comoros: Economic background

  Main economic indicators, 2006(a)
  Real GDP growth (%)	1.3
  Consumer price inflation (%; av)	3.4
  Current-account balance (incl official transfers; US$ m)	-17.6
  External debt (US$ m)	271.4
  Exchange rate (Cfr:US$; av)	392.2
  (a) Economist Intelligence Unit estimates.
  Source: Economist Intelligence Unit.

  Download text file (csv format)

  October 08, 2007

• Structure

  Comoros: Economic structure

  Economic structure: Annual indicators

  	2008a	2009a	2010a	2011b	2012b
  GDP at market prices (Cfr bn)	178.1	189.6	201.0	215.9	215.3
  GDP (US$ bn)	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.6	0.6
  Real GDP growth (%)	1.0	1.8	2.1	2.2	2.5
  Consumer price inflation (av; %)	4.8	4.8	3.8	1.8	6.0
  Population (m)	0.7	0.7	0.7b	0.8	0.8
  Exports of goods fob (US$ m)	6.5	11.9	20.6	25.2	27.6
  Imports of goods fob (US$ m)	175.9	169.6	180.1	206.6	207.3
  Current-account balance (US$ m)	-58.6	-46.5	-46.6	-60.4	-48.8
  Foreign-exchange reserves excl gold (US$ m)	112.2	150.3	145.3	155.2a	171.0
  Exchange rate (av) Cfr:US$	335.9	354.1	371.5	353.9a	383.2
  a Actual. b Economist Intelligence Unit estimates.

  Download the numbers in Excel

  Origins of gross domestic product 2009ab	% of total	Components of gross domestic product 2009a	% of total
  Agriculture, fishing & forestry	51.9	Private consumption	105.8
  Industry	13.6	Government consumption	15.3
  Services	46.6	Gross domestic investment	12.4
  		Exports of goods & non-factor services	14.7
  		Imports of goods & non-factor services	48.2
  Principal exports 2010c	Cfr bn	Principal imports 2010c	Cfr bn
  Cloves	3.1	Petroleum products	13.3
  Ylang-ylang	0.9	Vehicles and spare parts	8.7
  Vanilla	0.3	Rice	5.9
  Main destinations of exports 2011d	% of total	Main origins of imports 2011d	% of total
  Singapore	36.0	Pakistan	15.8
  Turkey	23.7	France	16.0
  France	10.5	UAE	9.6
  Netherlands	7.9	Turkey	1.6
  a World Bank. b Shares do not add to 100% because of a large statistical discrepancy. c Banque de France, Rapport annuel de la zone franc 2009. d IMF, Direction of Trade Statistics.

  Download the numbers in Excel

  Download text file (csv format)

  December 03, 2012

• Outlook

  Comoros: Country outlook

  Comoros: Country outlook

  FROM THE ECONOMIST INTELLIGENCE UNIT

  OVERVIEW: Comoros' political stability outlook remains fragile despite improvements following the smooth transfer of power to the current federal president, Ikililou Dhoinine. Inter-island disputes still pose a threat to political stability, and the risk of a coup cannot be ruled out amid ongoing power struggles within the military. Economic policy will be guided by completion-point triggers under the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) Initiative and by the Extended Credit Facility (ECF) with the IMF. After ticking up to an estimated 2.5% in 2012, economic growth will accelerate to 3% in 2013 and 3.3% in 2014, underpinned by a recovery in agriculture, foreign direct investment (FDI) from the Middle East and aid inflows. Inflation is expected to moderate from an estimated 6% in 2012 to 3% in 2013, thanks to improved harvests and lower global rice and fuel prices, before edging back up to 4% in 2014, in line with international oil prices. Driven by rising public transfers and resilient remittances, the current-account deficit is forecast to narrow from an estimated 8.7% of GDP in 2012 to 8.1% of GDP in 2014.

  DOMESTIC POLITICS: Political stability in Comoros has improved markedly following the smooth transfer of power to Mr Dhoinine. His candidature was backed by the former federal president, Ahmed Abdallah Sambi, as well as his Baobab coalition, which holds a majority in the legislature. Nonetheless, Mr Dhoinine seems to be willing to reduce his predecessor's influence, having appointed his own allies to key posts, including in the military. Inter-island disputes, a recurring theme in Comorian politics, are expected to persist, as highlighted by the unilateral suspension of the state monopoly on rice imports in Anjouan in October 2012, in open contradiction of federal laws. Unrest could also occur on Mohéli, Comoros's smallest and most marginalised island, to which the presidency has rotated for the first time in Comoros's history. (Under the 2001 constitution, the federal presidency rotates between the three islands every five years.) Mr Dhoinine hails from the island, but Mr Sambi was not popular there and the opposition won three out of four seats in the parliamentary election in late 2009. Inter-island rows have provoked no major unrest so far, but this could change if the federal government's allocation of resources to the three islands is perceived as unfair by any of the three island administrations. Power struggles and divisions within the military will continue to pose a threat to political stability, and the risk of a coup-a lingering possibility in a country that has experienced 21 coups and attempted coups since gaining independence in 1975-cannot be ruled out. Mr Dhoinine's recent changes to military personnel and the Moroni Assizes' decision to clear the former head of the army, General Salimou Mohamed Amiri, of complicity in the murder of a senior army officer, Lieutenant-Colonel Combo Ayouba, are likely to reshape power balances in the military and alter its relationship with the government. However this unfolds, Mr Sambi-who hoped to remain a pivotal figure despite relinquishing power to Mr Dhoinine-is likely to lose most as he will witness his influence over the army shrink and General Amiri, with whom he had notoriously poor relations, return to the stage. Parliamentary elections, due in 2014, will be divisive and tense, albeit less so than the presidential election. The new federal parliament is likely to be dominated by supporters of Mr Dhoinine from the Baobab coalition.

  INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS: Comoros-a former French colony-will retain strong ties with France, its main bilateral donor and trading partner. These will be underpinned by France's importance for Comorian economic policy (the French Treasury guarantees the Comorian franc) and the military co-operation pact between the two countries, under which France is committed to building military capacity in Comoros. Mr Dhoinine is likely to pursue his predecessor's open-door foreign policy, cultivating ties with any country that is willing to provide it with aid or investment. This policy has led to growing commercial and diplomatic ties with Qatar, Dubai (United Arab Emirates), Kuwait, China and both the US and Iran. It has also resulted in Comoros joining the Indian Ocean Rim Association for Regional Co-operation, an organisation that seeks to strengthen trade and investment links between coastal states bordering the Indian Ocean. Assuming that the recent generous pledges of aid and investment are upheld, ties with the Middle East in particular are likely to stay strong. Comoros is also expected to remain on good terms with other countries in the region, underpinned in part by its membership of the African Union and the 19-member Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa. Although to date there have been no extreme Islamist threats and no known establishment of terrorist cells in Comoros concerns remain that the country could become a staging post for extremists.

  POLICY TRENDS: The government's determination to reach the completion point under the HIPC initiative, which is conditional upon the implementation of a series of policy and structural reforms, will guide economic policy in the short term. A Fund mission to Comoros in October 2012 urged the authorities to proceed with the privatisation of water, electricity, oil and telecommunications utilities. As the process faces strong domestic resistance and strategic partners are difficult to find, the Economist Intelligence Unit expects that the reaching of the HIPC completion point, initially expected in December 2012, could be delayed until early or mid-2013. Full HIPC debt relief will provide the government with fiscal space to set out policies aimed at reducing poverty, developing the private sector and improving infrastructure. An ambitious five-year infrastructure investment programme (2011-15) that encompasses the country's roads, ports and airports is under way. In addition, the government will try to build on recent improvements in political stability to attract FDI, particularly in tourism, infrastructure, agriculture and fishing. The government also plans to establish a one-stop business licensing window to lighten the regulatory burden on investors, which remains onerous (Comoros ranks 168th out of 185 countries in the "starting a business" category of the World Bank's Doing Business index for 2013). Complementary reforms are required to improve the efficiency of public institutions that interface with the private sector and the judiciary. Delays in implementing reforms are almost certain. Shortfalls in the supply of skilled workers will persist and capacity in the civil service will remain weak. However, some progress is still expected in macroeconomic management, which is underpinned by the country's membership of the Franc Zone (which anchors inflation) and the Fund's 2009-12 ECF, which has been extended until late 2013. The government will face pressure to improve the management of the public finances and reduce the domestic primary fiscal deficit (excluding grants and capital expenditure) under the country's ECF programme with the Fund. However, it will find it difficult to lower the wage bill significantly in the face of strong union pressure, the high cost of running parallel islands and federal administrations, and the difficulties of reducing overstaffing, given that unemployment is already high and there is little formal employment outside the public sector. It will also face difficulties in improving revenue collection and expanding the tax base, in view of the poor efficiency of the customs and tax administration and the high cost of the fuel price subsidy. Taking these trends into account, we expect only a small improvement in the fiscal balance in 2013, with the deficit narrowing to 0.4% of GDP from an estimated 0.7% of GDP in 2012. Modest improvements in tax administration under the ECF and rising investment will boost public revenue. In 2014, however, the deficit will widen to 0.9% of GDP owing to a pick-up in oil prices and election-related spending. A virtually stagnant economy and dependence on loans for nearly all capital expenditure have boosted external public debt as a proportion of GDP to almost 50%, and the Fund has pronounced Comoros at risk of debt distress. Provided that progress with the privatisation process is made, we expect Comoros to get full HIPC debt relief from 2013 onwards, which would reduce the net present value of debt as a proportion of GDP to below 20% and restore debt sustainability.

  ECONOMIC GROWTH: After expanding by an estimated 2.5% in 2012, driven by aid-funded public works and an upturn in foreign investment, the economy is forecast to grow by 3% in 2013 and 3.3% in 2014. Agricultural output should be higher than in 2012, when floods caused widespread crop damage. If political stability remains intact and some progress is made in improving the business environment, FDI from the Middle East should rise, donor engagement would be sustained and the development of tourism-which has been shackled by chronic political instability and poor infrastructure-could begin (albeit slowly). Provided that Comoros reaches the HIPC completion point, which we expect to occur in the first half of 2013, fiscal space will be freed for additional public investment. Even this modest forecast is subject to risks, however: growth would weaken in the event of political instability, ineffectual leadership or the continuation of adverse weather conditions. Higher growth will be difficult to achieve over the short term because of the country's geographic isolation, its small domestic market and its limited supply of fertile land. However, if the government is successful in entrenching political stability and attracting investment, there is a chance that growth will rise above our forecast.

  EXTERNAL ACCOUNT: We have lowered our current-account deficit estimate for 2012 to 8.7% of GDP (11.7% of GDP previously), following reports of an upsurge in transfer inflows, including those under the economic citizenship programme. In 2013 and 2014 we expect the current-account deficit to fall further, to 8.3% of GDP and 8.1% of GDP respectively. Goods exports, which consist predominantly of cloves, ylang-ylang and vanilla, will continue to be dwarfed by goods imports, although slightly lower oil prices than in 2012 will ease the import bill. Conditional upon political stability and upon completion of major rehabilitation works on some of the archipelago's tourism infrastructure, services exports will start to grow more rapidly. However, the services account will remain in deficit, as services imports are set to increase in line with foreign investment and goods imports. Income credits and debits will remain insignificant. After surging in 2012 because of resilient remittances and rising grants from Arab states, current transfers will remain high in US dollar terms but fall as a proportion of GDP, resulting in a narrowing of the current transfers surplus from 29.6% of GDP in 2012 to 26.6% of GDP in 2014. The deficit will be financed largely by FDI.

  December 04, 2012

View detailed map

Country Briefing

Land area

1,862 sq km, excluding Mayotte (374 sq km)

Population

773,000 (2012; UN estimate, excluding Mayotte)

Main towns

Population in 2012 (World Gazetteer estimates)

Moroni (capital; Grande Comore): 50,721

Mutsamudu (Anjouan): 26,469

Fomboni (Mohéli): 18,277

Climate

Tropical; hot and humid in November-May; cooler and drier in May-October; weather at Moroni (altitude 59 metres): hottest month, March, 24-31°C; coldest month, August, 19-27°C; driest month, October, 84 mm average rainfall; wettest month, January, 424 mm average rainfall

Languages

French, Arabic, Comorian (derived from Swahili and Arabic)

Religion

Over 95% of the population is Muslim (mostly Sunni)

Measures

Metric system

Currency

Comorian franc (Cfr) = 100 centimes; pegged to the euro at Cfr492:€1

Time

Three hours ahead of GMT

Public holidays

May 1st (Labour Day); July 6th (Independence Day); November 27th (anniversary of President Abdallah's assassination); all Islamic holidays are observed in accordance with the lunar calendar; this may mean that the following dates are approximate: Mawlid al-Nabi (the birthday of the Prophet) February 5th, Eid al-Fitr (end of Ramadan) August 19th, Eid al-Adha (Feast of the Sacrifice) October 26th, Islamic New Year November 15th

March 01, 2012