Gambia

Politics:

• Analysis

  Gambia politics: Quick View - Drugs smoked

  Event

  More than two tonnes of cocaine worth about US$1bn seized in The Gambia in 2010 was destroyed on March 4th at a public event in the presence of local and international government officials and diplomats from the UK, the US, France and Taiwan.

  Analysis

  The British ambassador, having donated an incinerator for drug destruction, praised the government for taking bold steps towards addressing the scourge of illegal drug-smuggling that has blighted West Africa, a transit point for onward transport from South America to Europe. The 2.2 tonnes of cocaine-a record for a single haul-had been seized in a joint operation between Gambian forces and the UK Serious Organised Crime Agency in 2010. Eight smugglers, all foreign (four Venezuelan, two Dutch, one Nigerian and one Mexican) were sentenced in October 2011 to 50 years each in prison.

  By burning the seizure with huge publicity, the president, Yahya Jammeh, is attempting to show the country's commitment to fighting drug-trafficking. The event will also help rebuild the country's relations with overseas donors following a bitter diplomatic spat in January over the execution of prisoners and the president's refusal to abolish the death penalty. The Gambia has introduced tough laws concerning the drug trade, including the death penalty for anyone convicted of possessing more than 250 g of cocaine or heroin. In May 2012 the government set up a new task force, Operation Bulldozer, to address criminality and corruption in the country, which has been rising in recent years, in large part owing to the growing drug economy. However, there have been several cases of drug seizures and millions of dollars in recovered drug money in government custody disappearing, and it remains to be seen how effective Operation Bulldozer will be.

  There is rising belief that that the armed forces, police and border guards have been co-opted by traffickers to provide free passage for drugs to pass through the country. Local players are often paid in cocaine, which has flooded domestic markets, causing local drug use and associated criminality such as theft and gang violence to rise. According to the UN Office on Drugs and Crime, West Africa has a drug consumption prevalence rate of 12.4% among people aged 15-64, the highest in the world.

  March 14, 2013

• Background

  Gambia: Political forces

  The military remains the pivotal force

  Mr Jammeh's regime has in many respects retained the characteristics of a police state. The army remains the president's most important political constituency. As commander-in-chief, Mr Jammeh has kept a close grip on military leaders, promoting some and dismissing others. However, coup attempts in November 1994, January 1995, November 1996, July 1997, and allegedly in January and July 2000 and March 2006, demonstrate the difficulty of the exercise. Morale in the country's 800-strong army seems fragile, and it is clear that Mr Jammeh's repeated shake-ups of the army leadership has fuelled rivalry and resentment among officers. On a day-to-day basis, the National Intelligence Agency (The Gambia's secret service) and the police force guarantee that Mr Jammeh remains firmly in control of the state apparatus.

  The ruling party

  The APRC holds 47 seats in parliament (out of a total of 53), and was created in order to "civilianise" the military regime. The party remains under the president's control, and there is little room for debate within its leadership. Core APRC supporters have been accused of acting as a pro-Jammeh vigilante group by persistently harassing the opposition. The party is trying to broaden its appeal by drawing opposition members and independents into the party through a combination of patronage and intimidation. As a result, there were a number of high-profile defections to the APRC before the 2006 and 2007 elections.

  A traditionally weak opposition

  For the most part the opposition has been fragmented, poorly organised and underfunded, and has posed little threat to APRC hegemony since 1994. Most of the parties are based around the personality of their leader rather than any underlying ideology, and this has hindered attempts to form a coalition to remove the APRC from power. Until the 2002 legislative election, the UDP and a smaller grouping, the NRP, led by Hamat Bah, were the main protagonists in opposition politics, but the UDP's decision to boycott the 2002 legislative election cost it dearly—it lost six seats in parliament and in the process most of its political leverage.

  The establishment of the NADD (see Recent political developments), a coalition consisting of the UDP, the NDAM, the NRP and PDOIS opposition parties, created the first viable alternative to the APRC since 1994. However, after attracting a healthy amount of support from the electorate during the course of 2005, the UDP and NRP left the coalition in February 2006—effectively erasing the possible threat it could have been to the APRC. As a result of the divided opposition, both parties were soundly beaten by the APRC in the 2007 parliamentary election.

  April 30, 2007

• Structure

  Gambia: Political structure

  Official name

  Republic of The Gambia

  Form of state

  Unitary republic

  Legal system

  Based on English common law; some aspects of traditional law and sharia (Islamic law) also apply, although sharia does not apply to non-Muslims without their consent

  National legislature

  National Assembly, installed in April 2012; 53 members, 48 elected by universal suffrage, five nominated by the president; all serve a five-year term

  National elections

  November 2011 (presidential) and March 29th 2012 (legislative); next elections due in 2016 (presidential) and 2017 (legislative)

  Head of state

  President, elected by universal suffrage for a five-year term; no term limit

  National government

  The president and cabinet; most recent cabinet reshuffle was in February 2012

  Main political parties

  The Alliance for Patriotic Reorientation and Construction (APRC), the ruling party, which has 47 seats in parliament; the People's Democratic Organisation for Independence and Socialism (PDOIS); the National Democratic Action Movement (NDAM); the United Democratic Party (UDP); the National Reconciliation Party (NRP); The Gambia Party for Democracy and Progress (GPDP); The Gambia Moral Congress (GMC); and the People's Progressive Party (PPP)

  Key ministers

  President, commander in chief of the armed forces & minister of defence,: Yahya Jammeh

  Vice-president & minister for women's affairs: Isatou Njie Saidy

  Secretary-general & head of the civil service: Njogou L Bah

  Agriculture: Solomon Owens

  Basic & secondary education: Fatou Lamin-Faye

  Energy: Vacant

  Finance & economic affairs: Abdou Kolley

  Fisheries & water resources : Mass Axi Gai

  Foreign affairs, international co-operation & Gambians abroad: Susan Waffa-Ogoo

  Forestry & the environment: Fatou Ndeye Gaye

  Health & social welfare: Bala Garba-Jahumpa

  Higher education, research, science & technology: Mamadou Tangara

  Information & communications: Vacant

  Interior: Ousman Sonko

  Justice & attorney-general: Lamin Jobarteh

  Local government, lands & traditional rulers: Lamin Waa Juwara

  Petroleum: Teneng Mba Jaiteh

  Regional administrations, lands & traditional rulers: Momodou Aki Bayo

  Tourism & Culture: Fatou Jobe-Njie

  Trade, regional integration & employment: Kebba Touray

  Works, construction & infrastructure: Francis Liti Mboge

  Youth & sports: Alieu Jammeh

  Central Bank governor

  Amadou Colley

  January 10, 2013

Economy:

• Background

  Gambia: Economic background

  Main economic indicators, 2006
  Real GDP growth (%)	6.5(a)
  Consumer price inflation (%)	2.0(a)
  Population (m)	1.5(b)
  Current-account balance (% of GDP)	-13.9(a)
  Total external debt (US$ m)	671.7(b)
  Average exchange rate (D:US$)	28.1(c)
  (a) Economist Intelligence Unit estimate. (b) 2005. (c) Actual.
  Source: Economist Intelligence Unit.

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  April 30, 2007

• Structure

  Gambia: Economic structure

  Economic structure: Annual indicators

  	2008a	2009a	2010a	2011b	2012b
  GDP at market prices (D bn)	23.0	25.8	28.7b	27.9	29.9
  GDP (US$ m)	1,035.5	968.7	1,025.0b	946.6	965.5
  Real GDP growth (%)	6.3	7.1	4.9	-4.0a	2.5
  Consumer price inflation (av; %)	4.5	4.6	5.0	4.8a	4.7
  Population (m)	1.6	1.7	1.7	1.8	1.8
  Exports of goods fob (US$ m)	91.2	94.8	98.2	104.4	104.8
  Imports of goods fob (US$ m)	274.6	297.3	313.1	328.4	360.6
  Current-account balance (US$ m)	-111.4	-97.1b	-118.8b	-125.0	-164.8
  Foreign-exchange reserves excl gold (US$ m)	116.5	224.2	201.6	223.2a	243.5
  Exchange rate (av) D:US$	22.19	26.64	28.01	29.46a	31.00
  a Actual. b Economist Intelligence Unit estimates.

  Download the numbers in Excel

  Origins of gross domestic product 2010a	% of total	Components of gross domestic product 2009a	% of total
  Agriculture	28.5	Private consumption	77.5
  Industry	12.3	Government consumption	16.3
  Services	59.2	Gross domestic investment	26.3
  		Exports of goods & services	32.3
  		Imports of goods & services	54.3
  Principal exports 2007b	US$ m	Principal imports 2007b	US$ m
  Re-exports	78.9	Food & beverages	74.2
  Groundnut products	5.8	Machinery & transport equipment	62.8
  Fish & fish preparations	3.4	Minerals & fuel	49.9
  		Manufactures	35.5
  Main destinations of exports 2011	% of total	Main origins of imports 2011	% of total
  China	41.8	China	29.2
  India	20.8	Brazil	10.1
  France	10.4	Senegal	8.7
  UK	6.3	India	5.5
  Indonesia	3.9	Netherlands	4.1
  a World Bank. b IMF and Central Bank of The Gambia.

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  Download text file (csv format)

  January 10, 2013

• Outlook

  Gambia: Country outlook

  The Gambia: Country outlook

  FROM THE ECONOMIST INTELLIGENCE UNIT

  OVERVIEW: The president, Yahya Jammeh, and the ruling party, the Alliance for Patriotic Reorientation and Construction (APRC), are expected to retain a firm grip on power over the 2013-14 forecast period through a combination of patronage and repression. Relations with Senegal will remain volatile owing to ongoing instability in Senegal's Casamance region (notwithstanding some signs of progress there), but are not expected to break down entirely. The broad direction of policy will remain market-oriented and seek to attract foreign investment. Real GDP growth is estimated to have recovered to 2.5% in 2012, following failed harvests in 2011 and sluggish tourism growth. It is forecast to rebound to 9% in 2013 as agriculture recovers, stabilising at 6% in 2014. As global non-oil commodity prices fall in 2013-14, average inflation is set to ease from an estimated 4.7% in 2012 to 4.2% in 2014.

  DOMESTIC POLITICS: Mr Jammeh and the APRC, which dominates the National Assembly following the election in March 2012, are expected to retain a firm grip on power 2013-14. The president has ruled the country since coming to power in a coup in 1994, and his latest victory highlights the APRC's powers of patronage and its repression of the opposition. This will remain the case in 2013-14, and the administration does not seem concerned by the establishment in September 2012 of a parallel "government" calling itself the National Transitional Council of The Gambia (NTCG) in Dakar, the capital of neighbouring Senegal. Mr Jammeh will continue to reshuffle his cabinet regularly to prevent potential rivals from building political support bases, and is expected to remain firmly in control of the APRC. The regime's censorship of the media will continue and critics of the president will not be tolerated. The weakened opposition will continue to lack a sufficient presence in either parliament or local government to influence policy. Nevertheless, the risk of a popular uprising remains low. There have been no public protests in The Gambia in the wake of the popular uprisings during the Arab Spring. This is partly because the country does not have the kind of large, vocal middle class that played a crucial role in other countries and partly because the security forces, over which the president retains a firm influence, actively repress any sign of discontent that could threaten the stability of the regime. Despite the presidential and legislative elections being condemned by international and regional observers as neither free nor fair, there were no major protests or demonstrations. Indeed, protests around the world against Mr Jammeh's execution of death-row prisoners in August 2012 were not mirrored domestically. Despite the shrinking space for democratic opposition, the risk of a coup remains low, although it has been reported in the Senegalese media that some elements of the army are sympathetic to the NTCG. Arrests in recent years have meant that almost everyone with the political influence and financial backing to carry out a coup-including the former heads of the army, the navy and the national intelligence agency-is in jail or in exile. Moreover, Mr Jammeh retains a close relationship with the military and will continue to ensure that military personnel are well paid and that incentives for loyalty remain in place; he will also remove from power any officers whom he deems to offer even the slightest threat. Nevertheless, unexpected changes could occur on this front, as highlighted by a foiled coup attempt in 2009 led by Lieutenant-General Lang Tombong Tamba, the then head of the armed forces. The next presidential and parliamentary elections are not due until 2016 and 2017 respectively. Local government elections in early 2013 are likely to deliver clear majorities for the APRC.

  INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS: The Gambia's relations with Senegal will remain volatile but are not expected to break down entirely, despite vocal condemnation of the prisoner executions from Senegal's president, Macky Sall. Two issues have historically been a source of animosity: Senegal's allegations that The Gambia supports a Casamance-based rebel group, and The Gambia's accusations that Senegal harbours Gambian dissidents, although the situation has warmed with The Gambia's help in the release of eight Senegalese prisoners by Casamance separatists in December 2012. Relations will be underpinned by the two countries' economic interdependence: Senegal needs access to Gambian territory to curtail the costs of trade between its north and south, and re-exports to Senegal are an important source of income for The Gambia. Mr Jammeh will also continue to court Taiwan, Cuba and Venezuela, all of which give generous development assistance to the country. Meanwhile, relations with the West will be strained by the regime's human rights violations and some donors having already withheld aid, although supporting Western efforts against regional drug-trafficking will buy Mr Jammeh some leeway. Relations with international donors, strained in the wake of the prisoner executions, will take time to normalise if the death penalty is not abolished, as the donors demand.

  POLICY TRENDS: The government will broadly maintain its commitment to macroeconomic stability, and this will be complemented by support from the IMF, which in May 2012 renewed an Extended Credit Facility worth US$28.3m for another three years. In 2013-14 the policy agenda will also be guided by the new Programme for Accelerated Growth and Employment (PAGE; 2012-15), launched in December 2011. The PAGE prioritises agriculture and infrastructure, and the government hopes to attract private participation to fund some of the investments under it. The government will continue to offer fiscal incentives to investors outside greater Banjul and the town of Brikama in "priority sectors" such as agriculture, tourism and manufacturing, and to investors in the country's Export Processing Zones. These will mitigate the impact of the high effective tax rate, which the World Bank reports as the second-highest in the world and which is likely to remain uncompetitive despite some recent improvement being noted in the Bank's latest Doing Business publication. Foreign investors will continue to face almost no restrictions on market entry and the repatriation of profits, although bureaucratic challenges will continue to hinder private investors. Limited progress will be made in implementing structural reforms in 2013-14. The government has said that it will simplify customs procedures in order to restore The Gambia's competitiveness as a route for transit traffic in the region, but has yet to announce a timeline for implementation. Measures to entrench the independence of the Central Bank of The Gambia (CBG) and to reform parastatals-particularly the National Water and Electricity Corporation, which provides some of the most expensive electricity on the continent-will take even longer to implement. The prospect of substantial public-spending reforms is similarly slim. Although new systems may be put in place with the Fund's help, public spending will remain opaque, with substantial funds redirected at the whim of the president, frequently for political patronage. Political interference in the award of government contracts is also likely to remain commonplace. The outlook for banking is more positive. The minimum capital requirement for commercial banks rose from D90m (US$3.2m) in 2011 to D200m in 2012; the sector exceeds all domestically set minimum ratio requirements and non-performing loans are falling. The CBG's supervisory capacity is expected to improve with help from the Fund. The Gambia will seek to narrow its fiscal deficit over the outlook period in order to reduce domestic borrowing. The 2013 budget targets a 31.8% increase in revenue to D7.61bn (US$235m), while spending is budgeted to rise by a more modest 23.5%, to D8.32bn, driven by growth in capital spending, as current spending is expected to remain broadly unchanged. However, the government's implementation of the PAGE development plan will increase spending pressure and cause actual spending to exceed budgeted expenditure. The 2013 budget assumptions may be optimistic, but in 2013-14 domestic revenue collection is expected to improve, owing to improved tax collection, efficiency gains and broad tax reforms called for by the Fund, including the introduction of value-added tax in January 2013. Lower income and payroll tax rates are designed to encourage greater employment and consumer spending. Nevertheless, revenue will still probably fall short of government expectations. The deficit will continue to narrow from an estimated 3.1% of GDP in 2012, reaching 2.1% of GDP in 2013 and 2% of GDP in 2014. The deficit will be covered by borrowing, most of which will be financed by short-term Treasury bills; the domestic debt stock, which amounts to an estimated 25% of GDP, will remain a cause for concern. The Economist Intelligence Unit expects interest payments on total debt to continue to consume more than 20% of government revenue each year in 2013-14.

  ECONOMIC GROWTH: Having staged a modest recovery in 2012 to reach an estimated 2.5% (following a sharp contraction of 4% in 2011, resulting from bad weather affecting harvests), real GDP is expected to rebound strongly by 9% in 2013. Assuming favourable weather, agricultural output-which comprises around one-third of GDP-could recover by 20-30%, especially as the sector is being prioritised under the PAGE. There remains much untapped potential in the sector, as less than one-half of arable land is cultivated and yields for most crops are well below the global average; for example, yields for the country's main cash crop, groundnuts, are just over one-half of the global average, according to the UN. Tourism, which accounts for around one-fifth of GDP, will continue to suffer, as we expect economic growth in the EU, the main source of tourists to The Gambia, of just 0.1% during 2013, rising to 1.3% in 2014. Growth in the country's construction sector (and other services) is expected to pick up in 2013-14 as public investment increases under the PAGE. Manufacturing, which accounts for less than 5% of GDP, will remain small and uncompetitive, partly because of poor infrastructure. As a result of continued weak growth in the tourism sector and the base effects of the growth spike in 2013, real GDP growth should slow in 2014, albeit to a still robust 6%.

  EXTERNAL ACCOUNT: The recovery in groundnut production during the latter part of 2012, following poor rains at the end of 2011, prevented a fall in exports, which were further cushioned by high international groundnut prices. Export volumes are expected to rebound in 2013-14, albeit mitigated by slightly lower agricultural prices. Re-exports, which account for almost 80% of goods exports, are expected to improve, in line with trends in the volume of trade passing through Senegal, which is the main market for re-exports. Capital imports to support the expanded public investment programme will continue to rise (as will industrial materials prices), but this will be offset by lower oil and agricultural prices and reduced demand for food imports as output recovers. Services exports will follow trends in re-exports; tourism will make little additional contribution, as growth remains weak in the EU-the main source of tourists to The Gambia. Services imports will grow in line with goods imports. Overall, the current-account deficit is forecast to fall from an estimated peak of 17.1% of GDP in 2012 to 12.8% in 2014, as exports rebound and current transfers continue to grow, offsetting growth in imports. The deficit will be financed primarily by foreign direct investment and loans from bilateral and multilateral creditors.

  January 11, 2013

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Country Briefing

Land area

11,295 sq km

Population

1.8m (2012 Economist Intelligence Unit estimate)

Population by city

Population (2012 World Gazetteer estimates):

Serrekunda: 415,962

Brikama: 101,119

Bakau: 72,039

Lamin: 39,112

Nema Kunku: 36,069

Banjul (capital city): 31,834

Brufut: 31,692

Farafenni: 28,588

Gunjur: 27,340

Basse Santa Su: 18,370

Climate

Tropical

Weather in Banjul (altitude 27 metres)

Hottest month, June, 23-32°C; coldest month, January, 15-23°C. Driest months, March, April, 1 mm average rainfall; wettest month, August, 500 mm average rainfall

Languages

English, Mandinka, Wolof, Fula and other local dialects

Measures

UK imperial system, with increasing use of metric system

Currency

Dalasi (D)

Time

GMT

Public holidays

Fixed: January 1st (New Year's Day), February 18th (Independence Day), May 1st (Labour Day), July 22nd (coup anniversary), December 25th (Christmas Day)

Variable: Eid al-Adha, Prophet's Birthday, Good Friday, Easter Monday, Eid al-Fitr

January 10, 2013