Gambia

Politics:

• Analysis

  Gambia politics: Quick View - The outgoing chief justice returns to Nigeria

  Event

  The outgoing chief justice has sought to defend his reputation and has taken a swipe at the government.

  Analysis

  Returning to Nigeria, The Gambia's outgoing chief justice, Akomaye Agim, has been a divisive figure during his six-year tenure. While he has been credited with some reform, such as reducing the backlog of cases and introducing elements of sharia (Islamic law) into the mainstream justice system, he has been denounced by critics as being a puppet of the president, Yahya Jammeh.

  His earlier criticism of the independence of the Gambian Bar Association could have been a launch pad for further reform, but only served to invite questions over his own independence as a foreigner seeking to curry favour with his host authorities through the emasculation of the association.

  In one of his last official interviews, with a local newspaper, Mr Agim denied many of the controversies surrounding him, and criticised the perpetual in-fighting within the government and those individuals who sought to undermine him. While Mr Agim denies that relations with the president have soured, his statement can be understood as a criticism of the country's leadership in general.

  Aside from more salacious allegations, his supposed closeness with the president earned him vigorous criticism for allowing political interference in the judicial system, based on a number of high-profile cases which he decided in favour of the government. These included sanctioning the death sentence against a former chief of defence staff, for treason, and a former secretary-general of the civil service (although the president pardoned the latter in September under international pressure). Furthermore, the authorities continued to harass and persecute critical journalists under Mr Agim's watch.

  But while such decisions have been seized upon by a vocal and often polemical opposition media, his record has proved to be more balanced than his critics credit him for. One example is the acquittal in 2011 of two female activists, Isatou Touray and Amie Bojang-Sissoho, for alleged corruption involving the funding of their NGO, which campaigns against female genital mutilation-a practice that Mr Jammeh supports.

  December 07, 2012

• Background

  Gambia: Political forces

  The military remains the pivotal force

  Mr Jammeh's regime has in many respects retained the characteristics of a police state. The army remains the president's most important political constituency. As commander-in-chief, Mr Jammeh has kept a close grip on military leaders, promoting some and dismissing others. However, coup attempts in November 1994, January 1995, November 1996, July 1997, and allegedly in January and July 2000 and March 2006, demonstrate the difficulty of the exercise. Morale in the country's 800-strong army seems fragile, and it is clear that Mr Jammeh's repeated shake-ups of the army leadership has fuelled rivalry and resentment among officers. On a day-to-day basis, the National Intelligence Agency (The Gambia's secret service) and the police force guarantee that Mr Jammeh remains firmly in control of the state apparatus.

  The ruling party

  The APRC holds 47 seats in parliament (out of a total of 53), and was created in order to "civilianise" the military regime. The party remains under the president's control, and there is little room for debate within its leadership. Core APRC supporters have been accused of acting as a pro-Jammeh vigilante group by persistently harassing the opposition. The party is trying to broaden its appeal by drawing opposition members and independents into the party through a combination of patronage and intimidation. As a result, there were a number of high-profile defections to the APRC before the 2006 and 2007 elections.

  A traditionally weak opposition

  For the most part the opposition has been fragmented, poorly organised and underfunded, and has posed little threat to APRC hegemony since 1994. Most of the parties are based around the personality of their leader rather than any underlying ideology, and this has hindered attempts to form a coalition to remove the APRC from power. Until the 2002 legislative election, the UDP and a smaller grouping, the NRP, led by Hamat Bah, were the main protagonists in opposition politics, but the UDP's decision to boycott the 2002 legislative election cost it dearly—it lost six seats in parliament and in the process most of its political leverage.

  The establishment of the NADD (see Recent political developments), a coalition consisting of the UDP, the NDAM, the NRP and PDOIS opposition parties, created the first viable alternative to the APRC since 1994. However, after attracting a healthy amount of support from the electorate during the course of 2005, the UDP and NRP left the coalition in February 2006—effectively erasing the possible threat it could have been to the APRC. As a result of the divided opposition, both parties were soundly beaten by the APRC in the 2007 parliamentary election.

  April 30, 2007

• Structure

  Gambia: Political structure

  Official name

  Republic of The Gambia

  Form of state

  Unitary republic

  Legal system

  Based on English common law; some aspects of traditional law and sharia (Islamic law) also apply, although sharia does not apply to non-Muslims without their consent

  National legislature

  National Assembly, installed in April 2012; 53 members, 48 elected by universal suffrage, five nominated by the president; all serve a five-year term

  National elections

  November 2011 (presidential) and March 29th 2012 (legislative); next elections due in 2016 (presidential) and 2017 (legislative)

  Head of state

  President, elected by universal suffrage for a five-year term; no term limit

  National government

  The president and cabinet; most recent cabinet reshuffle was in February 2012

  Main political parties

  The Alliance for Patriotic Reorientation and Construction (APRC), the ruling party, which has 47 seats in parliament; the People's Democratic Organisation for Independence and Socialism (PDOIS); the National Democratic Action Movement (NDAM); the United Democratic Party (UDP); the National Reconciliation Party (NRP); The Gambia Party for Democracy and Progress (GPDP); The Gambia Moral Congress (GMC); and the People's Progressive Party (PPP)

  Key ministers

  President, commander in chief of the armed forces & minister of defence: Yahya Jammeh

  Vice-president & minister for women's affairs: Isatou Njie Saidy

  Secretary-general & head of the civil service: Njogou L Bah

  Agriculture: Solomon Owens

  Basic & secondary education: Fatou Lamin-Faye

  Energy: Vacant

  Finance & economic affairs: Abdou Kolley

  Fisheries & water resources: Vacant

  Foreign affairs, international co-operation & Gambians abroad: Mamadou Tangara

  Forestry & the environment: Fatou Ndeye Gaye

  Health & social welfare: Fatim Badji

  Higher education, research, science & technology: Mariama Sarr-Ceesay

  Information & communications: Vacant

  Interior: Ousman Sonko

  Justice & attorney-general: Lamin Jobarteh

  Local government, lands & traditional rulers: Lamin Waa Juwara

  Petroleum: Teneng Mba Jaiteh

  Tourism & Culture: Fatou Jobe-Njie

  Trade, regional integration & employment: Kebba S Touray

  Works, construction & infrastructure: Francis Liti Mboge

  Youth & sports: Alieu Jammeh

  Central Bank governor

  Amadou Colley

  October 19, 2012

Economy:

• Background

  Gambia: Economic background

  Main economic indicators, 2006
  Real GDP growth (%)	6.5(a)
  Consumer price inflation (%)	2.0(a)
  Population (m)	1.5(b)
  Current-account balance (% of GDP)	-13.9(a)
  Total external debt (US$ m)	671.7(b)
  Average exchange rate (D:US$)	28.1(c)
  (a) Economist Intelligence Unit estimate. (b) 2005. (c) Actual.
  Source: Economist Intelligence Unit.

  Download text file (csv format)

  April 30, 2007

• Structure

  Gambia: Economic structure

  Economic structure: Annual indicators

  	2008a	2009a	2010a	2011b	2012b
  GDP at market prices (D bn)	23.0	25.8	26.8b	29.7	32.0
  GDP (US$ m)	1,035.5	968.7	957.1b	1,007.1	1,048.5
  Real GDP growth (%)	6.3	7.1	4.9	4.8a	-1.7
  Consumer price inflation (av; %)	4.5	4.6	5.0	4.8a	4.7
  Population (m)	1.6	1.7	1.7	1.8	1.8
  Exports of goods fob (US$ m)	91.2	94.8	98.2	104.4	105.0
  Imports of goods fob (US$ m)	274.6	297.3	313.1	328.4	361.1
  Current-account balance (US$ m)	-111.4	-97.1b	-125.0b	-118.7	-155.3
  Foreign-exchange reserves excl gold (US$ m)	116.5	224.2	201.6	223.2a	229.0
  Exchange rate (av) D:US$	22.19	26.64	28.01	29.46a	30.50
  a Actual. b Economist Intelligence Unit estimates.

  Download the numbers in Excel

  Origins of gross domestic product 2010a	% of total	Components of gross domestic product 2009a	% of total
  Agriculture	28.5	Private consumption	83.0
  Industry	12.3	Government consumption	17.4
  Services	59.2	Gross domestic investment	28.2
  		Exports of goods & services	34.7
  		Imports of goods & services	58.2
  Principal exports 2007b	US$ m	Principal imports 2007b	US$ m
  Re-exports	78.9	Food & beverages	74.2
  Groundnut products	5.8	Machinery & transport equipment	62.8
  Fish & fish preparations	3.4	Minerals & fuel	49.9
  		Manufactures	35.5
  Main destinations of exports 2011	% of total	Main origins of imports 2011	% of total
  China	41.8	China	29.2
  India	20.8	Brazil	10.1
  France	10.4	Senegal	8.7
  UK	6.3	India	5.5
  Indonesia	3.9	Netherlands	4.1
  a World Bank. b IMF and Central Bank of The Gambia.

  Download the numbers in Excel

  Download text file (csv format)

  October 19, 2012

• Outlook

  Gambia: Country outlook

  The Gambia: Country outlook

  FROM THE ECONOMIST INTELLIGENCE UNIT

  OVERVIEW: The Gambian president, Yahya Jammeh, and the ruling party, the Alliance for Patriotic Reorientation and Construction (APRC), are expected to retain a firm grip on power over the 2013-14 forecast period through a combination of patronage and repression. Relations with Senegal will remain volatile owing to ongoing instability in Senegal's Casamance region, but are not expected to break down entirely. The broad direction of policy will remain market-orientated and seek to attract foreign investment. Real GDP growth is estimated to have contracted by 1.7% in 2012, following failed harvests and sluggish growth in the tourist sector. It is forecast to rebound to 9% in 2013 as agriculture recovers, stabilising at 5% in 2014. As global non-oil commodity prices fall during 2013-14, average inflation is set to ease from an estimated 4.7% in 2012 to 4.4% in 2014. After widening in 2012 to 14.8% of GDP, the current-account deficit is forecast to narrow to an annual average of 13% of GDP in 2013-14 as exports rebound and current transfers resume their upward trend, offsetting growth in imports.

  DOMESTIC POLITICS: Mr Jammeh won a landslide victory in a controversial presidential election in November 2011, securing 72% of the vote. Mr Jammeh and the APRC-which dominates the National Assembly following the election in March 2012-are expected to retain a firm grip on power during 2013-14. Mr Jammeh has ruled the country since coming to power in a coup in 1994, and his latest victory highlights the APRC's powers of patronage and its repression of the opposition. This will remain the case in 2013-14, and the administration does not seem concerned by the establishment in September 2012 of a parallel "government" calling itself the National Transitional Council of The Gambia in Dakar, the Senegalese capital. Mr Jammeh will continue to reshuffle his cabinet regularly to prevent potential rivals from building political support bases, and is expected to remain firmly in control of the APRC. The regime's censorship of the media will continue and critics of the president will not be tolerated. The weakened opposition will continue to lack a sufficient presence in either parliament or local government to influence policy. Nevertheless, the risk of a popular uprising remains low. There have been no public protests in The Gambia in the wake of the popular uprisings during the Arab Spring. This is partly because The Gambia does not have the kind of large, vocal middle class that played a crucial role in other countries and partly because the security forces, over which the president retains a firm influence, actively repress any sign of discontent that could threaten the stability of the regime. Despite the presidential and legislative elections being condemned by international and regional observers as neither free nor fair, there were no major protests or demonstrations. Indeed, protests around the world against Mr Jammeh's execution of death-row prisoners in August 2012 were not mirrored domestically.

  INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS: The Gambia's relations with Senegal will remain volatile but are not expected to break down entirely, despite vocal condemnation by Senegal's president, Macky Sall, of the prisoner executions. Two issues have historically been a source of animosity: Senegal's allegations that The Gambia supports a Casamance-based rebel group, and The Gambia's accusations that Senegal harbours Gambian dissidents. Despite this, a fragile peace will be maintained. This will be underpinned by the two countries' economic interdependence: Senegal needs access to Gambian territory to curtail the costs of trade between its north and south, and re-exports to Senegal are an important source of income for The Gambia. It will also be underpinned by the threat that each country would support the other's dissidents if ties were to break down. Mr Jammeh will continue to cultivate closer relations with other anglophone countries in West Africa, particularly Nigeria. He will also continue to develop lucrative relationships with Taiwan, Cuba and Venezuela, all of which give generous development assistance to the country. Meanwhile, relations with the West will be strained by the regime's human rights violations, although most transgressions will continue to be overlooked, especially if Mr Jammeh is seen to remain compliant with Western efforts to tackle drug-trafficking through West Africa. Relations with international donors have become strained in the wake of the prisoner executions and will take time to normalise if the death penalty is not abolished, as they demand.

  POLICY TRENDS: The broad direction of policy will remain market-orientated. The government will maintain its commitment to macroeconomic stability, and this will be complemented by support from the IMF, which in May 2012 renewed an Extended Credit Facility worth US$28.3m for another three years. In 2013-14 the policy agenda will also be guided by the new Programme for Accelerated Growth and Employment (PAGE; 2012-15), launched in December 2011. The PAGE prioritises agriculture and infrastructure, and the government hopes to attract private participation to fund some of the investments under it. The government will continue to offer fiscal incentives to investors in the "priority sectors" (these include agriculture, tourism and manufacturing) on all investments outside greater Banjul and the town of Brikama, and to investors in the Export Processing Zones. These will mitigate the impact of the high effective tax rate, which the World Bank says is the second-highest in the world and which is likely to remain uncompetitive despite some recent improvement noted in the Bank's latest Doing Business publication. Foreign investors will continue to face almost no restrictions on market entry and the repatriation of profits, although institutional bottlenecks will continue to hinder private investors. Limited progress will be made in implementing structural reforms in 2013-14. The government has said that it will simplify customs procedures in order to restore The Gambia's competitiveness as a route for transit traffic in the region, but is yet to announce a timeline for implementation. Measures to entrench the independence of the Central Bank of The Gambia (CBG) and to reform parastatals-particularly the National Water and Electricity Corporation, which provides some of the most expensive electricity on the continent-will take even longer to implement. The prospect of substantial public-spending reforms is similarly slim. Although new systems may be put in place with the Fund's help, public spending will remain opaque, with substantial funds redirected at the whim of the president, frequently for political patronage. The minimum capital requirement for commercial banks has risen from D90m (US$3.2m) in 2011 to D200m in 2012; the sector exceeds all domestically set minimum ratio requirements, and non-performing loans are falling. The CBG's supervisory capacity is expected to improve with help from the Fund.

  ECONOMIC GROWTH: Having eased slightly in 2011 to 4.8%, real GDP is estimated to have contracted in 2012-by 1.7%-as a result of poor growing conditions leading to a cut in agricultural output, which comprises around one-third of GDP. Agricultural output is expected to recover in 2013; assuming favourable weather and a return to trend output, overall GDP could bounce back by around 9%, especially as the agriculture budget has been further increased, with the sector being prioritised under the PAGE in 2012-13. There remains much untapped potential in the sector, as less than one-half of arable land is cultivated and yields for most crops are well below the global average (yields for the country's main cash crop, groundnuts, are just over one-half of the world average, according to the UN). Tourism, which accounts for around one-fifth of GDP, will continue to suffer, as the Economist Intelligence Unit expects only marginal economic growth of 0.4% during 2013 in the EU, the main source of tourists to The Gambia, rising to 1.4% in 2014. Growth in The Gambia's construction sector (and other services) is expected to pick up in 2013-14 as public investments increase under the PAGE. Manufacturing, which accounts for less than 5% of GDP, will remain small and uncompetitive, partly because of poor infrastructure. As a result of continued poor growth in the tourism sector and the base effects of the growth spike in 2013, real GDP growth should slow in 2014, albeit to a still robust 5%.

  EXTERNAL ACCOUNT: Groundnut production has been hit by the poor rains in late 2011 and early 2012, reducing export volumes in 2012. The impact on export receipts was only marginally ameliorated by better weather conditions during the second half of the year, together with high international groundnut prices and increased public spending on agriculture. Export volumes are expected to rebound in 2013-14, mitigated by slightly lower agricultural prices. Re-exports, which account for almost 80% of goods exports, are expected to improve in 2013-14, in line with trends in the volume of trade passing through Senegal, which is the main market for re-exports. Capital imports to support the expanded public investment programme will continue to rise (as will industrial materials prices), but this will be offset by lower oil and agricultural prices and reduced demand for food imports as output recovers. Services exports will follow trends in re-exports; tourism will make little contribution, as growth remains weak in the EU-the main source of tourists to The Gambia. Services imports will grow in line with goods imports. Overall, the current-account deficit is forecast to fall from an estimated peak of 14.8% of GDP in 2012 to 12.3% of GDP in 2014, as exports rebound and current transfers continue to grow, offsetting growth in imports. The deficit will be financed primarily by foreign direct investment, and loans from bilateral and multilateral creditors.

  October 25, 2012

View detailed map

Country Briefing

Land area

11,295 sq km

Population

1.8m (2012 Economist Intelligence Unit estimate)

Population by city

Population (2012 World Gazetteer estimates):

Serrekunda: 415,962

Brikama: 101,119

Bakau: 72,039

Lamin: 39,112

Nema Kunku: 36,069

Banjul (capital city): 31,834

Brufut: 31,692

Farafenni: 28,588

Gunjur: 27,340

Basse Santa Su: 18,370

Climate

Tropical

Weather in Banjul (altitude 27 metres)

Hottest month, June, 23-32°C; coldest month, January, 15-23°C. Driest months, March, April, 1 mm average rainfall; wettest month, August, 500 mm average rainfall

Languages

English, Mandinka, Wolof, Fula and other local dialects

Measures

UK imperial system, with increasing use of metric system

Currency

Dalasi (D)

Time

GMT

Public holidays

Fixed: January 1st (New Year's Day), February 18th (Independence Day), May 1st (Labour Day), July 22nd (coup anniversary), December 25th (Christmas Day)

Variable: Eid al-Adha, Prophet's Birthday, Good Friday, Easter Monday, Eid al-Fitr

July 13, 2012