Cuba

Politics:

• Analysis

  Cuba politics: Quick View - Venezuelan president's latest treatment raises

  Event

  Just nine weeks after being re-elected for a new six-year term, Venezuelan president Hugo Chavez has admitted that the cancer he claimed to have beaten has returned and that he needs to undergo further treatment in Cuba.

  Analysis

  Mr Chavez has admitted for the first time that he might not survive or be fit to continue in the presidency, and designated vice-president Nicolas Maduro to succeed him if required. Mr Chavez's electoral victory in October was welcomed in Cuba as it was presumed it would provide the island with a measure of economic stability over the medium term. That has now been cast into doubt again. Cuba's dependence on Venezuela has increased sharply since 2004, when Venezuela accounted for around 10% of total trade (goods and services). It now accounts for around 40%, according to our estimates, and supplies most of Cuba's fuel imports on subsidised terms.

  Under Venezuela's constitution, if Mr Chavez should die or fail to appear to be sworn in as president on January 10th it would trigger another election. Should he be forced to step down in the first four years of his term, fresh elections must be held. This would open the door for a further challenge by opposition candidate Henrique Capriles, who has been shown in past polls to be capable of beating Partido Socialista Unido de Venezuela (PSUV) candidates other than Mr Chavez.

  Political uncertainty in Venezuela will transpose itself to Cuba and again raise the spectre of an erosion of Venezuelan support. A lack of information on Mr Chavez's condition makes assessing the gravity of his cancer impossible. However, were he not to serve out a full term, the possibility remains that power would be transferred smoothly to Mr Maduro. In such an event, support for Cuba would not be significantly affected. In the event of the opposition gaining power, we would still not expect an immediate and complete termination of bilateral relations. For political reasons, it is likely that the removal of the Cuban medical professionals, who are staffing much of Venezuela's public health service as part of the oil deal, would be gradual. Cuba would therefore have some time to redeploy them, partly offsetting the lost income.

  December 14, 2012

• Background

  Cuba: Key figures

  Raúl Castro Ruz

  Raúl Castro had served as deputy to his older brother, Fidel, for 30 years before becoming president in February 2008, when Fidel announced his retirement. At 81, Raúl can be considered only a temporary successor. Lacking his brother's charisma and unquestionable authority, he has adopted a more collegiate style of leadership, with broader public debate and efforts to strengthen state institutions. He has replaced most ministers since he assumed office in February 2008.

  Fidel Castro Ruz

  After leading the country for almost 40 years, Fidel Castro formally relinquished the presidency in early 2008 and confirmed that he had ceased to be First Secretary of the PCC in early 2011, although Raúl had been deputising in both roles since 2006. He is physically weak, and rarely makes public appearances, but continues to grant audiences to favoured foreign leaders. For as long as his health permits, he will influence policy discussions through informal channels and articles in the official press.

  José Ramón Machado Ventura

  Mr Machado Ventura became first vice-president in February 2008, and second secretary of the PCC in April 2011, making him the official deputy to Raúl Castro in both posts. He was trained as a medical doctor before joining the guerrilla campaign that culminated in the 1959 revolution. As he is 81 years old, he may be replaced in 2012-16.

  Ricardo Alarcón de Quesada

  Mr Alarcón de Quesada has served as Cuba's ambassador to the UN and he is now president of the National Assembly. He has proved to be a political survivor and has considerable authority, but his age (75) reduces the chance of him assuming the presidency.

  Marino Murillo Jorge

  Mr Murillo, who is a generation younger than the old guard, has been one of the most rapidly-promoted figures in the government since Raúl Castro assumed the presidency. He was appointed minister of the economy and planning, and a vice-president of the Council of Ministers in March 2009. He also has responsibility for oversight of implementing the guidelines for economic policy approved at the April 2011 congress. To free him up for this task, he was replaced by his deputy (Adel Yzquierdo Rodríguez) as economy and planning minister. At the Congress he also became a member of the PCC's Politburo (executive body).

  Gladys Bejerano Portela

  In December 2009 Ms Bejerano was made the first female vice-president of the Council of State since 1959. She had assumed the new post of comptroller-general in August 2009, having previously headed the Ministry of Audit and Control. In the context of the intensified effort to improve accountability and tackle corruption, her role has become increasingly powerful. Ms Bejerano, who is in her mid-60s, has been working in related fields for many years, and is regarded as a competent and effective administrator. Since she took the job she has overseen investigations into a series of high-level corruption scandals that have resulted in convictions. Her international profile has grown in recent months, as she has begun to appear at international events as the government's representative, and in June 2011 she assumed the presidency of the Organisation of Latin American and Caribbean Supreme Audit Institutions (OLACEFS).

  Dissidents

  Each of the most prominent dissidents heads a separate organisation: Laura Pollán is leader of the Damas de Blanco (Ladies in White), a group representing the families of political prisoners; Elizardo Sánchez heads the Comisión Cubana de Derechos Humanos y Reconciliación Nacional (Cuban Commission of Human Rights and National Conciliation); Osvaldo Payá the Movimiento Cristiano por la Liberación (Christian Liberation Movement) and Proyecto Varela (Varela Project); Marta Beatriz Roque the Instituto Cubano de Economistas Independientes (Institute of Independent Economists); Vladimiro Roca the Asamblea para la Promoción de una Sociedad Civil Alternativa (Assembly for the Promotion of an Alternative Civil Society); Hector Palacios the Partido Liberal; Eloy Gutiérrez, Cambio Cubano (Cuban Change); Óscar Elías, the Fundación Lawton por los Derechos Humanos (Lawton Foundation for Human Rights); and Manuel Cuesta, the Partido Arco Progresista (Progressive Arch Party). Other notable dissidents include Darsi Ferrer, a doctor, Guillermo Fariñas, a journalist, Óscar Espinosa Chepe, an economist, and Yoanni Sánchez, a blogger. While these figures are well-known outside Cuba, they are unlikely to assume prominent national roles in the medium term.

  July 27, 2012

• Structure

  Cuba: Political structure

  Official name

  Republic of Cuba

  Form of government

  Centralised political system, with close identification between the PCC and the state

  Head of state

  The president, Raúl Castro, took over from his brother, Fidel, on February 24th 2008

  The executive

  The Council of Ministers is the highest executive body; its Executive Committee is composed of the president, the first vice-president and the vice-presidents of the Council of Ministers

  National legislature

  National Assembly of People's Power; 614 members elected by direct ballot; the Assembly meets twice a year, and extraordinary sessions can be called

  Legal system

  A People's Supreme Court oversees a system of regional tribunals; the Supreme Court is accountable to the National Assembly

  National elections

  Provincial and national assemblies: last elections January 20th 2008; next elections due in January 2013

  National government

  The organs of the state and the PCC are closely entwined, and power devolves principally from the Executive Committee of the Council of Ministers

  Main political organisation

  The Partido Comunista de Cuba (PCC) is the only legal political party. Official "mass organisations" (including labour unions and organisations for students, women and farmers) are a feature of the Cuban political system

  President of the councils of state & ministers: Raúl Castro Ruz

  First vice-president: José Ramón Machado Ventura

  Vice-president of the Council of Ministers: Marino Murillo Jorge

  Secretary of the Council of Ministers: José Amado Ricardo Guerra

  President of the National Assembly: Ricardo Alarcón de Quesada

  Key ministers

  Agriculture: Gustavo Rodríguez Rollero

  Communications & information: Medardo Díaz Toledo

  Culture: Rafael Bernal Alemany

  Defence: Leopoldo Cintra Frías

  Economy & planning: Adel Yzquierdo Rodríguez

  Energy & mines: Tomás Benítez Hernández

  Finance & prices: Lina Pedraza Rodríguez

  Foreign relations: Bruno Rodríguez Parrilla

  Foreign trade & investment: Rodrigo Malmierca Díaz

  Higher education: Rodolfo Alarcón Ortíz

  Industry: Damar Maceo Cruz

  Interior: Abelardo Colomé Ibarra

  Justice: María Esther Reus González

  Labour & social security: Margarita Marlene González

  Public health: Roberto Morales Ojeda

  Science, technology & the environment: Elba Rosa Pérez

  Sugar: Celso García Ramírez

  Tourism: Manuel Marrero Cruz

  Transport: César Ignacio Arocha Masid

  Central Bank president

  Ernesto Medina Villaveirán

  December 13, 2012

• Outlook

  Cuba: Key developments

  Outlook for 2013-17

  • A change of leadership is highly likely in the forecast period. The Economist Intelligence Unit expects the handover to be relatively smooth, but there is no obvious presidential successor among the younger generation of politicians.
  • The re-election of Barack Obama as US president reduces the risk of a sharp deterioration in US-Cuban relations. However, we expect relations with the US to stagnate, given the Republican Party's still-strong presence in Congress.
  • Liberalising reforms will continue, aimed at reducing the state payroll by over 1m workers, expanding private-sector activity, tackling widespread low-level corruption, raising productivity and gradually eliminating the ration system.
  • In the context of weak global growth, and given the expectation that the positive impact of economic reforms will take some time to materialise, we expect real GDP growth to be moderate in 2013-17, averaging 4.4% per year.
  • We expect the authorities to begin the process of realignment of the official and unofficial CUP:CUC exchange rates in early 2013, to integrate the domestic-currency (CUP) and hard-currency (CUC) areas of economic activity.
  • We expect Cuba's moderate current-account deficit to widen during the forecast period (from 0.6% of GDP in 2013 to 1.3% of GDP in 2017) as import spending outstrips export growth.

  Review

  • EU foreign ministers stated they would examine relations with Cuba, raising the possibility of an improvement. However, we do not expect the EU's common position to change over the medium term.
  • Although Barack Obama's re-election as US president was a cause for great relief within Cuba, it will change very little in US-Cuban relations, given the Republican Party's continued congressional strength.
  • Investment by a Brazilian company, Odebrecht, in a sugar mill in the province of Cienfuegos is expected to help to revive the industry, by modernising technology and management techniques.
  • Hopes for an offshore oil discovery in Cuban waters faded in early November, as another well turned out to be dry, and reports suggested that the oil platform used could be moved from Cuban waters by the end of 2012.
  • The damage caused by Hurricane Sandy was worse than initially estimated, as Santiago de Cuba was left for weeks without power, and more than 188,000 homes and 100,000 ha of agricultural land were damaged.
  • Production has restarted at a nickel plant in Holguín province after it was halted in order for repairs to be carried out following Hurricane Sandy.

  December 13, 2012

Economy:

• Background

  Cuba: Country fact sheet

  Fact sheet

  Annual data	2011a	Historical averages (%)	2007-11
  Population (m)	11.2	Population growth	0.0
  GDP (US$ m; market exchange rate)	60,794	Real GDP growth	3.6
  GDP (US$ m; purchasing power parity)	120,370	Real domestic demand growth	1.9
  GDP per head (US$; market exchange rate)	5,406	Inflation	3.2
  GDP per head (US$; purchasing power parity)	10,704	Current-account balance (% of GDP)	-0.6
  Exchange rate (av; official) CUP:US$	0.98	FDI inflows (% of GDP)	–
  a Economist Intelligence Unit estimates.

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  Background: Cuba gained independence from Spain in 1899. The first constitution in 1901 gave the US strong influence over the island, as well as control over the Guantánamo naval base, which it retains today. Following the overthrow of the military government of Fulgencio Batista by a revolution led by Fidel Castro in 1959, relations with the US quickly turned sour, and Cuba joined the Soviet bloc. Since 1990 Cuba has reintegrated into the global economy, but unilateral US economic sanctions remain in place. Fidel Castro stepped down from the presidency for health reasons in July 2006 and in February 2008 the National Assembly confirmed his deputy and brother, Raúl, as his replacement.

  Political structure: The Partido Comunista de Cuba is the only legal political party and the leadership remains dominated by the individuals who led the 1959 revolution. Opposition activists face harassment and are prosecuted for a range of offences. The government describes the political system as a “participatory democracy”, with a range of official “mass organisations”, as well as a system of elected national, regional and local government assemblies.

  Policy issues: The economy has been predominantly state-owned since the 1960s, with private-sector activity limited to agriculture, a limited range of small service businesses and foreign participation in joint ventures. Since 1990 major changes have expanded the role of markets and in 2010 a strategy for expanding the private sector was unveiled. There is a dual currency system in place: the Cuban peso (CUP) is used for most domestic transactions and the convertible peso (CUC) for transactions in the tourism and domestic retail sectors, but a wide gulf between the official and unofficial rates has fuelled a large informal economy, which includes an extensive black market in stolen goods. The government continues to resist pressure for a “transition” to a market economy, but has begun a process of gradual and partial economic liberalisation.

  Taxation: In line with an economy that is predominantly state-owned, the tax system is unorthodox. Only the small private sector and those earning hard currency (or convertible pesos) pay income taxes. Sales in convertible-peso outlets are subject to a high retail margin, which amounts to a sales tax. State enterprises and joint ventures are subject to social security contributions and profit taxes (between 30% and 50%, but with exemptions). State companies pay aportes, the equivalent to dividends on profits payable to the state as owner, set at the discretion of the planning authorities.

  Foreign trade: Foreign trade is conducted entirely through state entities or joint ventures. The Economist Intelligence Unit estimates that, after small surpluses in 2009-10 as a result of a sharp drop in imports, the current account slipped back into deficit (equivalent to 0.3% of GDP) in 2011.

  Major exports 2010	% of total	Major imports 2010	% of total
  Nickel	25.8	Fuel	42.5
  Medicines	10.7	Food	15.3
  Oil products	40.9	Machinery & equipment	15.7
  Sugar and sugar products	5.8	Chemicals	9.1
  Leading markets 2010	% of total	Leading suppliers 2010	% of total
  China	14.7	Venezuela	40.4
  Netherlands	7.8	China	11.5
  Canada	13.9	Spain	7.4
  Venezuela	37.6	Brazil	4.2

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  December 13, 2012

• Structure

  Cuba: Economic structure

  Data and charts: Annual trends charts

  
  

  

  December 13, 2012

• Outlook

  Cuba: Country outlook

  Cuba: Country outlook

  FROM THE ECONOMIST INTELLIGENCE UNIT

  POLITICAL STABILITY: Political uncertainty is on the rise, as an increasing role for private enterprise and free markets for goods and some services imply major adjustments to Cuba's institutional structure, at the same time as power begins to shift to a younger generation of political leaders (the president, Raúl Castro, is 81). A change of leadership in 2013-17 is likely. This is expected to entail the promotion of younger politicians, rather than large-scale changes to the tightly controlled political system. Measures to strengthen institutions and further stamp out corruption are also expected. This reflects the fact that, whoever takes over the presidency, political institutions will be more important than they have been under the unchallenged authority of the Castro brothers. Although these reforms will be implemented in a gradual and controlled manner, they nevertheless raise the level of uncertainty, particularly as political changes will follow from the government's continuing to introduce far-reaching economic reforms. The Economist Intelligence Unit's forecast is based on the assumption that the transfer of power will be relatively smooth, as was the handover from the former president, Fidel Castro, to his younger brother, Raúl, in 2006-08. However, with a less centralised power structure, there will be greater potential for factionalism in the longer term.

  ELECTION WATCH: Identifying future leadership candidates is notoriously difficult, owing to Cuba's closed system of governance. However, Raúl Castro's preference for efficient operators and his trust in the armed forces makes former army officers who now hold government positions--such as the defence minister, Leopoldo Cintra Frías, and the interior minister, Abelardo Colomé Ibarra--likely contenders. Elections for the national and provincial assemblies are held every five years, and are due in January 2013. Up to eight candidates are nominated for each seat, and the eventual appointee is selected through a system of nominations and meetings. In the absence of multiparty alternatives, voters accept the official candidate list (a "united vote"); select some candidates and not others (a "selective vote"); post a spoiled or blank ballot; or abstain. The turnout and the proportion choosing a united vote (97% and 91%, respectively, in 2008) are seen as signs of confidence in the electoral process, and so the authorities strive to persuade people to vote, both before the elections and on polling day. We do not expect a major overhaul of the electoral system in 2013-17.

  INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS: The re-election of Barack Obama as US president in November 2012 reduces the risk of a sharp deterioration in US-Cuban relations. However, with the Republican Party retaining its majority in the US House of Representatives (the lower house), prospects for a further relaxation of sanctions are dim. Cuba's rejection of US conditions for the removal of sanctions will further hinder any softening of US policy, as will an influential US-based anti-Castro lobby. Support from Venezuela, primarily through the supply of subsidised oil in exchange for the services of Cuban doctors, will remain vital to the Cuban economy. However, the recurrence of Venezuelan president Hugo Chávez's cancer in December raises the risk of a change of leadership in 2013-17, which could jeopardise future Venezuelan subsidies. Partly to mitigate this risk, Cuba is strengthening ties with China (already an important trade partner and creditor). EU foreign ministers showed an increased willingness in recent months to examine ways of improving relations with Cuba, with a view eventually to restoring official co-operation. However, an easing of the EU's "common position"--which makes official co-operation conditional on political reform--is unlikely in 2013-17, given strong resistance from individual member states (the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland). Some scope will remain to improve bilateral relations with individual members, particularly if their companies have business interests in Cuba. However, as with the US, we expect relations with the EU to stagnate in 2013-17.

  POLICY TRENDS: Liberalising economic reforms should provide support to the economy in the medium to long term. Major restructuring aims to reduce the state payroll by over 1m workers, expand private-sector activity, tackle widespread low-level corruption, boost productivity and gradually eliminate the ration system. This has been accompanied by reforms to foster private enterprise by expanding co-operatives outside the agricultural sector, as well as the introduction of a legal car and housing market. Nevertheless, progress remains uneven and other reforms (such as improved credit provision and closer alignment of the dual exchange rates) have lagged. We expect a gradual improvement in bank lending and greater scope for private enterprise and foreign investment, although Cuba's infrastructure deficiencies will remain significant. Cuba's main external vulnerabilities lie in its reliance on Venezuelan subsidies and nickel exports as a source of foreign exchange. Although we expect nickel prices to fall in 2013, the decline will not be as sharp as in 2009--when a slump in prices forced fiscal retrenchment, import compression and delays in debt repayments--and so the authorities should not have to resort to dramatic adjustment measures.

  ECONOMIC GROWTH: There is huge scope for catch-up in terms of economic efficiency and development of new private-sector activities. However, in the context of persistent weakness in the global economy and the expectation that the positive impact of economic reforms will take some time to materialise, we expect real GDP growth to be moderate in 2013-17, averaging 4.4%, up from an estimated 3% in 2012. This remains well below the levels that prevailed before the 2008 global financial crisis. We do not expect damage from Hurricane Sandy to impact negatively on growth over the short term, as key infrastructure around Santiago, such as the oil refinery, was not severely affected. Furthermore, additional government spending on repairs is likely to stimulate the economy, neutralising the storm's effect.

  INFLATION: The government will continue to influence inflation directly (by using price controls and regulating the limited areas of free-market activity) and indirectly (by controlling monetary emission), but, as goods are removed from the ration system, the rate of inflation will rise, at least in the short term. The creation of new businesses will exert downward pressure on prices, but this will be offset by the gradual removal of subsidies, which will increase the average cost of basic goods. The official inflation index currently fails to reflect fully the rise in the cost of living as a result of the shift away from rationed supplies to a greater reliance on markets. Assuming that the consumer price basket is changed to reflect this shift, inflation will rise in 2013 to an average of 6% as the process of currency adjustment starts. We then expect inflation to fall, to an annual average of 4.3% in 2014-17, as the effects of currency adjustment subside, competition intensifies and output expands. This benign scenario could be threatened if competitive markets fail to emerge, if the adjustment process is prolonged or if the government is forced to raise sales taxes to compensate for a shortfall in direct taxes.

  EXCHANGE RATES: Efforts have been under way for some time to improve integration between the hard-currency (CUC) and domestic-currency (CUP) areas of economic activity, as part of a strategy to unify the two currencies. Our forecast assumes that the realignment of the official and unofficial CUP:CUC exchange rates will begin in 2013. Currently, the CUP can be exchanged for the CUC only at the unofficial, or Cadeca, rate for personal transactions. Furthermore, neither unofficial nor official exchange rates, which are widely divergent, are close to purchasing power parity level (the real exchange rate, adjusted for local price variations). This distorts the labour market and creates an obstacle to the integration of the domestic and external economies, acting as a barrier to the growth of the economy. Our forecast assumes that the revaluation process will occur in stages, but sudden unification is also possible. This would create adjustment difficulties in the short term, but would improve dynamism in the domestic economy in the long term.

  EXTERNAL SECTOR: We expect a moderate current-account deficit in 2013-17 (averaging 1% of GDP) as import spending outstrips export growth. However, the need to build up reserves for eventual exchange-rate unification will ensure that the government keeps the deficit at a manageable level. The goods trade deficit is forecast to fall marginally as a share of GDP, from 12.4% of GDP in 2012 to 11% of GDP in 2017, reflecting both a rise in domestic productivity and greater export capacity (particularly of nickel, the largest foreign-exchange earner). The services surplus will fall in 2013 as tourist arrivals weaken, before picking up firmly from 2014. Although falling marginally as a percentage of GDP, it will remain large, owing partly to sustained earnings from the export of medical services to Venezuela. The current transfers surplus is forecast to rise in line with increasing US remittances, compensating for a larger income deficit related to growing profit repatriation as nickel exports rise from 2013. Inward foreign direct investment (FDI) is expected to rise from an estimated US$740m in 2011 to a peak of US$800m in 2015. This will remain well below potential, owing to strict regulation by the authorities. There are no official data on international reserves, but we assume that they will rise firmly.

  December 03, 2012

• Forecast

  Cuba: Country forecast summary

  Country forecast overview: Highlights

  • Given the age (81) of the president, Raúl Castro, the administration will focus on ensuring a smooth succession to a younger generation of leaders. Significant changes are expected within the forecast period, although a lack of an obvious candidate to take over from Mr Castro increases uncertainty.
  • The Economist Intelligence Unit expects a certain amount of adjustment in the power structure, with some decentralisation of authority as the old guard is replaced. However, despite reforms to the economy, we do not anticipate any sudden, radical transformation of the political system.
  • There is huge scope for catch-up in terms of economic efficiency and development of new private-sector activities, particularly in the services sector. However, given the persistent weakness in the global economy and expectations that the positive impact of economic reforms will take some time to materialise, we forecast growth to average only a moderate 4.4% per year in 2013-17.
  • Unemployment has traditionally been very low (owing to a commitment by the government to reach "full" employment), but as large numbers of public-sector jobs are shed, the unemployment rate will rise. We expect that emigration, mostly to the US, will continue at current levels of around 30,000 per year.
  • As subsidies are gradually removed, consumer price inflation will rise, although the creation of new businesses will exert some downward pressure on prices. The government will continue to attempt to influence inflation directly (by using price controls and by regulating the limited areas of free-market activity) and indirectly (by controlling monetary emission).
  • Domestic consumer demand will grow modestly, in line with the expansion of the private sector and increased use of incentive payments for state employees. Investment spending will pick up from its current low level, as a result of increased capital spending in the public sector and in the emerging private sector. This will provide new trade opportunities for foreign businesses, although state controls will continue to inhibit foreign private investors and hamper Cuba's integration into international markets.
  • The current account registered surpluses in 2009 and 2010 but will remain in deficit in 2013-17, as import spending outstrips export growth. Rising inflows of external financing are likely to push up the stock of external debt. Economic prospects remain exposed to commodity price shocks, owing to Cuba's dependence on imports of food and fuel, and exports of nickel. Close ties with Venezuela leave Cuba exposed to the repercussions of events there, particularly the withdrawal of generous subsidies on oil purchases.

  Country forecast overview: Key indicators

  Key indicators	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017
  Real GDP growth (%)	3.0	4.6	4.1	4.4	4.3	4.4
  Consumer price inflation (av; %)	5.5	6.0	4.8	4.4	3.9	4.2
  Budget balance (% of GDP)	-3.6	-3.6	-3.4	-3.3	-3.3	-3.1
  Current-account balance (% of GDP)	-0.3	-0.6	-0.8	-1.1	-1.2	-1.3
  Official exchange rate CUP:US$ (av)	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00
  Official exchange rate CUP:€ (av)	1.28	1.26	1.25	1.24	1.26	1.26

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  December 13, 2012

View detailed map

Country Briefing

Land area

110,000 sq km (mainland 105,000 sq km; Isle of Youth 2,000 sq km; keys 3,000 sq km)

Population

11.2m (December 2010)

Climate

Sub-tropical; average temperature 25°C, average relative humidity 81%

Weather in Havana (altitude 24 metres)

Hottest month, August, 24-32°C (average monthly minimum); coldest months, January and February, 18-27°C; driest months, January and February, 38 mm average rainfall; wettest month, September, 183 mm average rainfall

Weights and measures

Metric system; also old Spanish units. Sugar is often measured in Spanish tonnes of 2,271 lbs and there is a Cuban quintal of 101.4 lbs made up of 4 arrobas. For area measurement, one Cuban caballería equals 13.4 ha or 33.16 acres

Currency

There are two domestic currencies: the Cuban peso (CUP), in which prices and wages are denominated within the domestic economy; and the convertible peso (CUC), used in "hard-currency" retail outlets. One peso (Cuban or convertible)=100 centavos (Cuban or convertible). The official exchange rates, used in national income, fiscal and enterprise accounting aggregates are CUP1:CUC1 and CUC1:US$1. An "unofficial", but legal, CUP:CUC exchange rate is used for personal transactions. This rate is supposed to be freely floating, but has de facto become pegged. At the end of 2011 this rate was CUP24:CUC1. US dollars exchanged for convertible pesos within Cuba are subject to a 10% commission charge; there is no such charge for the conversion of other currencies into convertible pesos. Since 2002 euros have been accepted in some tourist resorts

Time

5 hours behind GMT (April-October, 4 hours behind GMT)

Public holidays

January 1st; May 1st; July 26th-27th; October 10th; December 25th

March 27, 2012