Congo (Brazzaville)

Politics:

• Analysis

  Congo (Brazzaville) politics: Quick View - Opposition calls for a national

  Event

  A group of Congolese opposition parties has published an open letter to the president, Denis Sassou Nguesso, calling for a national sovereign conference.

  Analysis

  The letter, published on October 29th, stated that "a national political convocation is the only way out of the current slump. Outside this way, there is no salvation for the Congo." The appeal seeks to provide a forum for dialogue between the political class and representatives of what they call the "lifeblood" of the country: civil society organisations, intellectuals, youth, women, artists, artisans and the Congolese diaspora. The 17-page letter explicitly states that the signatories have no intention of overthrowing the president.

  While this can be read as a subtle agreement not to try to force out Mr Sassou Nguesso as long as he respects the two-term limit, the opposition explicitly lay out their concerns. These include: human-rights abuses and the alleged systematic "violation" of local laws and regulations; the illegal prohibition of public meetings by the opposition; the arrest and arbitrary detention of opposition activists for "crimes of opinion"; and the use of state media as a propaganda mouthpiece by the president and the ruling Parti Congolais du Travail (PCT).

  On the economic front, they denounce the president's development strategy for not having delivered, while the agricultural and industrial sectors, despite being declared top priorities since 1982, have been systematically sidelined by the oil industry, which still dominates the economy. They also note that progress on business reform has been minimal, with Congo falling one place in the World Bank's Doing Business 2013 report, to 181st out of 185 countries surveyed.

  Meanwhile, an oil-funded budget that has ballooned from CFAfr675bn (US$1.4bn) in 2002 to CFAfr4trn in 2012 has neither translated into development nor reduced poverty. Around 70% of the population still live below the poverty line with only limited access to employment opportunities and basic services.

  November 06, 2012

• Background

  Congo (Brazzaville): Political forces

  Ethnic and regional divisions

  Congo is a highly politicised society with a strong tradition of intellectual and ideological debate. However, there are few real policy differences among political parties, and political alliances are largely based on ethnicity. Congo Brazzaville is the Sub-Saharan African country where civil conflict has been most closely associated with political parties since the democratic wave swept the continent in the 1990s. Most of the leading politicians were also active in the one-party system of the 1980s, and they have shifted camps and alliances frequently to suit the temper of the times.

  The PCT has not been able to obtain a majority

  The PCT is the strongest party, having benefited from its period of one-party rule—when it came to dominate both the state and society—and the material advantages of incumbency. Nonetheless, it has failed to gain a majority since multiparty democracy was introduced in the 1990s. Despite the uneven playing field under which elections have been held since Mr Sassou-Nguesso returned to power in 1997, the PCT has fallen short of gaining a majority in the National Assembly. This is because its natural support base is narrow, confined to the thinly populated Cuvette region in the north (the home of Mr Sassou-Nguesso's M'Bochi ethnic group), neighbouring parts of Plateaux region and the northern districts of Brazzaville, such as Ouenze and Talangai, where many migrants from northern rural areas have settled.

  PCT relies on pro-presidential coalition and independents

  As a result, the regime relies on the support of smaller pro-presidential parties. The FDU is a loose coalition of 30 such parties and includes politicians who have participated in various governments over the years. These parties have the support of smaller ethnic groups, especially in the regions of Cuvette-Ouest, Kouilou and Bouenza, and bring greater legitimacy to a regime that otherwise would be even more closely associated with northerners. In addition, the PCT can call on the support of the "independents" in the National Assembly, most of whom are sympathetic to Mr Sassou-Nguesso and who hold 38 seats following the 2007 election. Some of these so-called independents are PCT members who find it easier to be elected in opposition strongholds if they do not campaign under the party's banner. These three groups account for over 80% of the seats in the National Assembly. However, some members of the FDU have grown frustrated with their alliance with the president, believing that their loyalty has not been rewarded and that the PCT has monopolised most state positions.

  National Assembly election, 2007
  Party	No. of seats
  Parti congolais du travail (PCT)	46
  Mouvement congolais pour la democratie et le developpement integral (MCDDI)	11
  Mouvement Action et Renouveau (MAR)	5
  Mouvement pour la Solidarite et le Developpement (MSD)	5
  Other pro-presidential parties	20
  Independents	38
  Union panafricaine pour la democratie sociale (UPADS)	11
  Union pour la democratie et la Republique-Mwinda (UDR-Mwinda)	1
  Total	137
  Source: Economist Intelligence Unit.

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  Divisions mount within the PCT

  The PCT has long been divided along ethnic, regional and generational lines and between hardliners and moderates, although these cleavages can also be more simply seen as avenues for competition and ambition within the party, which is the primary source of power and resources in Congo. Over the past three years the president has attempted to push ahead with an initiative to merge the PCT with the FDU and "refound" it as a new party. Intended to broaden support for the regime, the move has been bitterly opposed by hardliners who believe it would dilute their influence. This has resulted in a highly divisive battle in which a large section of the party has openly defied the president's wishes. In October 2006 party conservatives convened a rebel session of the PCT's long-delayed party congress, aimed at preventing the merger. The proposal was subsequently withdrawn by Mr Sassou-Nguesso, representing a decisive defeat. Nonetheless, he is expected to continue to pursue other means to establish a broader and more durable party majority, recognising that the current support of the PCT is not sufficiently broad.

  The MCDDI gets closer to the regime

  The MCDDI, led by Mr Kolelas, became the main opposition party when multiparty politics was established in 1992. It was bitterly opposed to the then ruling party, the UPADS, but joined a government of national unity in 1995. Mr Kolelas was forced into exile when Mr Sassou-Nguesso took power by force in 1997. However, he returned to the country in 2005 following an amnesty. Since then, he has actively collaborated with the government to maintain the fragile peace agreement in the Pool region, which has brought the MCDDI closer to the regime. In 2007 the MCDDI and the PCT formed an alliance, in effect making the MCDDI a pro-presidential party. The party receives most of its support from the Bakongo, the largest ethnic group in the Pool region and south-western parts of Brazzaville. It became the second-largest party in the National Assembly after it obtained 11 seats in the 2007 legislative election.

  Opposition is marginalised

  Although several smaller opposition parties boycotted the legislative election, arguing that the necessary conditions for a free and fair election had not been met, their support is considered to be small. There are now two opposition parties represented in parliament, the UPADS and the Union pour la democratie et la Republique-Mwinda (UDR-Mwinda). The UPADS was the ruling party during 1992-1997, but it was weakened after it lost the civil war and its leader, Mr Lissouba, was forced into exile. Mr Lissouba, who remains in exile, has lost some control of the party to other leaders that want to regenerate it. Nibolek in the centre-south has traditionally been the home territory of the UPADS. Although the party failed to repeat in the 2007 election its strong showing in the country's first multiparty election, it still won 11 seats and is the main opposition force to the regime. The UDR-Mwinda has only one seat in parliament, partly as the illness and subsequent death of its leader, Andre Milongo, in June 2007 weakened its support base.

  The army

  Under one-party PCT rule, the military was central to Congo's political structure, providing three successive heads of state. The military was dominated by northerners with strong PCT loyalties, and when he became president in 1992 Mr Lissouba began to pension off pro-PCT officers and to integrate former militia fighters into the ranks. However, as this heavily favoured his own ill-disciplined Cocoye militia members, the action provoked tension. The army split along political and ethnic lines during the 1997 civil war, and the rump is now northern and loyal to Mr Sassou-Nguesso. Under the ceasefire accord, former army officers who joined the militias are to receive their old ranks back, although many have subsequently been retired. Of the militia forces, most of those who have reintegrated are from the pro-government Cobra militia. Although the agreement reached with Mr Ntoumi includes reintegration of Ninja rebels into the army, there is strong opposition among hardline elements in the military to do so.

  Religious groups and trade unions

  Trade unions have traditionally played a significant role in Congo. The most prominent is the Confederation syndicale des travailleurs congolais (CSTC), which is nominally allied to the PCT. The loyalty and power of the CSTC has been tested by continued economic hardship. There are other union groupings, notably the Confederation des syndicats du Congo (CSC), a trade union that was traditionally allied with Mr Lissouba's party and is still operational in Brazzaville. The unions have avoided any direct political role since the end of the war, focusing instead on basic issues for their members, such as payment of wage arrears and negotiation of redundancy assistance for public employees.

  Religious leaders—Roman Catholic, Protestant and Muslim—have been a respected non-partisan voice in favour of reform and stability. They were associated closely with the early campaign for democracy in the 1990s. Following the ceasefire agreement they have stressed the importance of national reconciliation as the foundation for sustainable peace, and have heavily criticised the government's controlled and contained form of political liberalisation. More recently they have spoken against the lack of transparency and accountability in the handling of state resources, particularly oil.

  September 03, 2007

• Structure

  Congo (Brazzaville): Political structure

  Official name

  République du Congo

  Form of state

  Unitary republic

  Legal system

  Based on French law

  National legislature

  The constitution of January 2002 provides for a 139-member National Assembly and a Senate with 72 members

  National elections

  June-August 2012 (legislative); July 2009 (presidential); next legislative election July 2017; next presidential election July 2016

  Head of state

  The president, elected by universal suffrage, may serve two seven-year terms

  National government

  The president heads an appointed government, last reshuffled in September 2009

  Main political parties

  The ruling Parti congolais du travail (PCT) increased its number of seats to 89 in the 2012 legislative election; the presidential alliance, the Rassemblement pour la majorité présidentielle (RMP), won a further 28. The largest of these parties, the Mouvement congolais pour la démocratie et le développement intégral (MCDDI), won seven seats; a further 12 were secured by independents sympathetic to the president. Only one opposition party is represented in parliament, the Union panafricaine pour la démocratie sociale (UPADS), which saw its seat count fall from 11 in 2007 to seven

  President: Denis Sassou-Nguesso

  Ministers of state

  Economy, finance, planning, & public portfolio integration: Gilbert Ondongo

  Industrial development & private sector: Isidore Mvouba

  Justice & human rights: Aimé Emmanuel Yoka

  Labour & social security: Florent Tsiba

  Transport, civil aviation & shipping: Rodolphe Adada

  Key ministers

  Agriculture & livestock: Rigobert Maboundou

  Civil service & state reform: Guy Brice Parfait Kolélas

  Construction, urban development & housing: Claude Alphonse Nsilou

  Energy & water: Bruno Jean Richard Itoua

  Fishing & aquaculture: Bernard Tchibambelela

  Foreign affairs & co-operation: Basile Ikouébé

  Health & population: François Ibovi

  Higher education: Ange Antoine Abena

  Infrastructure & public works: Emile Ouosso

  Interior & decentralisation: Raymond Zéphirin Mboulou

  Mines & geology: Pierre Oba

  Oil: André Raphaël Loemba

  Presidential office (defence): Charles Richard Mondjo

  Presidential office (planning): Jean Jacques Bouya

  Scientific research: Henri Ossebi

  Small & medium-sized enterprises, craftwork: Adélaïde Mougany

  Sustainable development, forestry & environment: Henri Djombo

  Technical education, training & employment: André Okombi Salissa

  Trade & supply: Claudine Mounari

  Governor of the regional central bank (BEAC)

  Lucas Abaga Nchama

  January 09, 2013

Economy:

• Background

  Congo (Brazzaville): Population

  A small and heavily urbanised population

  An accurate assessment of population and other demographic data is difficult, given the large-scale displacement of people during years of civil war and the general breakdown of public services and data collection. The UN Population Fund estimates that the population of Congo reached 4.2m in 2007, higher than the 3.7m estimated by the IMF for 2006. Population growth remains high and is expected to average 2.9% during 2005-10 on the back of a fertility rate of 6.3 children per woman. About 10,000 people are estimated to have died in the civil war in 1997 alone, and subsequent fighting until a ceasefire was brokered at the end of 1999 was equally devastating. The indirect effects of conflict have been far greater in terms of mortality caused by the collapse of basic services, which has resulted in a sharp deterioration in social indicators. Congo is an urbanised country by Sub-Saharan African standards, according to UN data, with 61% of its population living in towns and cities. This reflects decades of pro-urban, non-agricultural development bias and massive population displacements during the civil war, as people sought refuge in protected urban centres. The Wold Bank's Development Indicators estimate that gross income per head stood at US$950 in 2005. The 2006 UN Human Development Index ranked Congo 140th out of 177 countries, based on data from 2004, at the bottom of the medium development category.

  An ethnically mixed population

  The main ethnic group is the Kongo, concentrated in the south, particularly in the Pool and Kouilou regions and in Brazzaville itself, and also in neighbouring regions of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Angola. The Bateke live in the plateau areas north of the capital and across the border in Gabon. Pahouin groups also inhabit the border area. The Vili are concentrated in coastal Kouilou, while Cuvette, in the centre-north, is home to the M'Bochi and the Kourou. Oubanguien and Sangha ethnic groups largely populate the remote far north. Linguistic, cultural and familial structures are extremely complex; for example, there are ten different ethnic groups in Niari region alone. Many groups speak languages of Bantu origin, the most significant of which is Lingala, widely spoken throughout the Congo River basin. There is also a substantial Lebanese community, which dominates the commercial sector, and a small European population, predominantly French. Before the war the latter was estimated at 8,500, although it is not clear how many remain. Of the population, 86% are Christian—67% Catholic and 19% Protestant. Roughly 5% of the population are Muslim and 9% follow traditional faiths.

  September 03, 2007

• Structure

  Congo (Brazzaville): Economic structure

  Economic structure: Annual indicators

  	2008a	2009a	2010b	2011b	2012b
  GDP at market prices (CFAfr bn)	4,649	4,142	4,885	6,076	6,426
  GDP (US$ bn)	10.4	8.8	9.9	12.9	12.6
  Real GDP growth (%)	5.6	7.5	8.8a	4.5	4.5
  Consumer price inflation (av; %)	7.3	5.3	5.0a	1.3a	5.0
  Population (m)	3.8	3.9	4.0a	4.1a	4.2
  Exports of goods fob (US$ m)	8,038	5,933b	9,332	11,630	12,134
  Imports of goods fob (US$ m)	-2,905	-2,446b	-3,519	-5,023	-5,830
  Current-account balance (US$ m)	-205	-1,279b	-16	995	793
  Foreign-exchange reserves excl gold (US$ m)	3,872	3,806	4,447a	5,641a	6,086
  Exchange rate (av) CFAfr:US$	447.81	472.19	495.28a	471.87a	510.97
  a Actual. b Economist Intelligence Unit estimates.

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  Origins of gross domestic product 2010a	% of total	Components of gross domestic product 2010a	% of total
  Primary sector	68.3	Private consumption	28.5
  Oil	63.1	Government consumption	6.5
  Secondary sector	10.4	Gross domestic investment	57.8
  Tertiary sector	21.3	Exports of goods & services	86.5
  		Imports of goods & services	-79.3
  Exports 2010a	% of total	Imports 2010a	% of total
  Petroleum	91.5	Petroleum sector	43.1
  Timber	2.9	Non-petroleum private sector	56.9
  Sugar	0.2
  Destination of exports 2011b	% of total	Origin of imports 2011b	% of total
  China	39.3	France	14.6
  US	20.7	China	10.6
  Australia	6.5	India	8.0
  France	6.3	Italy	6.3
  a Banque de France, Zone franc: Rapport annuel. b IMF, Direction of Trade Statistics.

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  January 09, 2013

• Outlook

  Congo (Brazzaville): Country outlook

  Congo (Brazzaville): Country outlook

  FROM THE ECONOMIST INTELLIGENCE UNIT

  OVERVIEW: The president, Denis Sassou-Nguesso, will continue to dominate the political system despite questions over his regime's democratic credibility. The ruling Parti congolais du travail (PCT) now dominates the National Assembly, supported by the pro-presidential coalition, the Rassemblement pour la majorité présidentielle (RMP). Driven by infrastructure, manufacturing and mining investment that will compensate for waning oil production, real GDP growth will accelerate in the 2013-14 forecast period to average 5.6%. The trade surplus will narrow owing to lower oil output and prices. The current-account surplus is forecast to shrink in 2013, turning negative in 2014 as investment imports rise and oil output falls. With spending remaining relatively stable while revenue rises, the fiscal surplus is expected to average 16.4% of GDP in 2013-14. After spiking in 2012, annual inflation will ease, averaging 3.8%, as global food prices fall, and both government spending and the CFA franc stabilise.

  DOMESTIC POLITICS: Mr Sassou-Nguesso's controversial re-election in July 2009 fell far short of democratic standards and was marked by mass abstention, with turnout estimated at just 10-15%. The main opposition parties boycotted the poll or were barred from standing, so his presidency will remain overshadowed by questions about the legitimacy of his regime and his failure to resolve the divisions in the country that led to the civil war in 1997-99. The subsequent limited form of multiparty politics imposed by Mr Sassou-Nguesso was accepted initially as the price of peace. Little progress has been achieved since then and political tensions have intensified, although the regime's control of the army and the police will prevent open conflict. Most of what are termed opposition parties are simply politicians who compete for a share of the president's beneficence, rather than legitimately challenging the government. Periodic dialogue with political parties and civil society groups is largely for appearance purposes and does not result in any meaningful reform. The latest piece of reform, to revise the electoral roll, has been cautiously welcomed by opposition and civil society groups, but little is expected to change. The main risk to political stability would be Mr Sassou-Nguesso's sudden departure from power, as executive authority is concentrated heavily in his hands-he is both head of government and head of state-and Congo's elaborate patronage networks depend directly on him. Under the constitution, the president's current seven-year term is his last, although he has indicated that it could be extended. The successful candidacy of his son, Denis Christel Sassou-Nguesso, in the July 2012 legislative election is the strongest indication so far that he is being groomed for a more senior role. Should Mr Sassou-Nguesso leave office unexpectedly, however, a period of instability and possible violence would ensue. Domestic and international pressure to loosen the tight controls on political activity increased in the run-up to the July 15th legislative election, with modest effect. Despite the dialogue over electoral reform with opposition parties since November 2011, the initiative is not expected to result in concessions that are substantial enough to break the country's political deadlock and lead to free competition for power and an open democratic environment. Mr Sassou-Nguesso is expected to continue co-opting opposition politicians into the pro-regime movement, the RMP-a grouping of several dozen parties, most of which are merely vehicles for individual politicians. Despite this support, the president's PCT fielded candidates in all constituencies and subsequently won 89 seats in the 139-seat National Assembly, with the rest of the RMP taking a further 28, and sympathetic independents a further 12. The next election is not due until 2017. The refusal to establish an independent electoral commission or to revise and update properly the voters' register-which has been grossly inflated in the president's northern heartlands-indicates the regime's belief that it would not win an open democratic contest. The Mouvement congolais pour la démocratie et le développement intégral, the party that previously represented the country's main ethnic group, the Bakongo, will continue to decline into irrelevance, having lost vitality and direction.

  INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS: Relations with France-the government's strongest ally and source of significant business interests-will remain close, but may cool under French President François Hollande's policy to reset relations with Africa. Relations with China are deepening as it increases its stakes in the country's oil, forestry and mining sectors. Congo will continue to establish closer relations with other emerging economies, especially in Asia and Latin America, as investors from these regions are keen to explore business opportunities in the country, and the regime wishes to diversify its economic partners to make itself less dependent on France, the US and the EU. The regime's alliance with Angola, which intervened militarily in 1997 to install Mr Sassou-Nguesso, has weakened since that country's own civil war ended. Relations with the neighbouring Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) are broadly stable but not close. The tradition of dissidents seeking exile in either country, the capitals of which are next to each other, will ensure continued tensions, and the government also fears that instability in the DRC could encourage domestic unrest.

  POLICY TRENDS: Economic policy in 2013-14 will be guided by a reform programme to be agreed with the IMF. Congo's most recent arrangement with the Fund was a three-year Extended Credit Facility (ECF) that expired in July 2011. A new arrangement is expected to be negotiated that will continue the key aims of the ECF, most of which have been official policy for more than a decade, although progress has been halting. The programme will seek further progress towards fiscal sustainability as oil revenue begins to decline, requiring action to curb spending and raise non-oil revenue. It will also include reforms to improve oil sector governance, including measures to improve oil marketing. As part of a five-year development plan re-launched in June 2012, a higher proportion of spending is to be directed into "pro-poor" and "pro-growth" social programmes, in line with Congo's poverty-reduction strategy. The government will struggle to balance this with its interest in large-scale infrastructure projects, coveted by the elite for their prestige and opportunities for self-enrichment but which have little direct bearing on poverty reduction. Following debt relief in January 2010 under the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) Initiative, the main risk to economic policy is that this removal of external leverage will weaken the government's commitment to the reforms agreed with the Fund. However, the Fund is expected to take a flexible attitude towards unmet structural targets in order to retain influence and maintain some reform, a strategy that enabled Congo to reach HIPC completion despite the government's weak policy commitment and erratic performance. Other objectives of any Fund programme will include greater fiscal transparency, with a focus on improving the efficiency and supervision of public spending. Some progress has been made in this respect, although the limited reforms so far will have only a minor impact on corruption and patronage networks. Most of Congo's programmes with the Fund in the past decade collapsed because agreed reforms were not carried out, and there is a risk that the government will reverse reform policies now that it has received HIPC debt cancellation. Congo is gradually preparing for the time when oil runs out. Oil currently accounts for nearly 90% of exports, 80% of government revenue and around 65% of GDP, and the Fund estimates that oil production-excluding oil sands-will fall to one-sixth of its current value over the next 20 years. Diversifying the economy, to which the government has for years paid lip-service, will require significant (particularly overseas) investment, but efforts to improve Congo's business operating environment, which remains one of the worst in the world, will remain half-hearted. As part of the strategy for diversification and attracting foreign investment, the government is exploring the possibility of mineral exploration and creating four special economic zones. Fiscal reforms in 2013-14 are to focus on simplifying the tax regime, strengthening the capacity of institutions, reducing tax evasion and raising non-oil revenue, which will have to cover a rising share of government spending from 2013 as oil production begins to decline. The government will continue to spend its oil revenue windfall, and its commitment to save a portion of annual oil wealth in an escrow account is, as in previous years, unlikely to be met in full. Having risen in 2012 following a munitions explosion in the capital that led to higher spending to fund reconstruction of both civilian and military infrastructure, compensation to victims and their families, and also extra healthcare costs, spending is set to fall in 2013 according to the new budget, albeit by only 1%, to CFAfr3.03trn (US$6bn). Revenue is still set to rise overall, but oil revenue, the economy's cornerstone, is envisaged to fall in line with lower output and prices. Such restrained spending in the light of risks to revenue and the fact that much investment was brought forward to 2012 will see the surplus widen again, from an estimated CFAfr670bn (US$1.33bn) to CFAfr1.06trn in 2013. The surplus will narrow marginally in 2014 as spending rises faster than revenue. The authorities have been urged repeatedly to take action to lower the non-oil primary deficit and plan for the country's post-petroleum future as the decline in oil output accelerates over the next decade. Assuming slight progress in that direction, the Economist Intelligence Unit estimates that, excluding oil, the country will have posted a deficit of around one-third of non-oil GDP in 2012. We expect the overall surplus to rise from an estimated 10.4% of GDP in 2012 to an average of 16.4% in 2013-14.

  ECONOMIC GROWTH: With Congo being a poorly diversified commodity producer heavily dependent on oil, which accounted for an estimated 65% of GDP in 2012, fluctuations in real GDP growth are based largely on changes in the volume of oil production. Growth in 2013-14 will become decreasingly dependent on the energy sector: oil production is expected to dip in 2013 to around 275,000 barrels/day from an estimated 300,000 b/d in 2012, which may well prove to be Congo's peak year of production (notwithstanding new oil potentially coming on line beyond 2013-14). Real GDP growth is nevertheless expected to continue accelerating in 2013-14, averaging 5.6%, in part driven by ongoing reconstruction in the wake of the March 2012 explosion, but principally by expansion in non-oil sectors, itself largely funded by new loans from China. The non-oil economy, in which the vast majority of the population earn their livelihood, is forecast to grow at around 8% in 2013-14, supported by rising public spending, including capital-intensive infrastructure investment. However, the non-oil sector will be restrained by structural infrastructure bottlenecks, and will underperform despite its potential and importance in poverty reduction. The reforms needed to address these constraints, foremost among which is improving the business environment, have long been discussed but have received little support from senior levels of government. Mining exploration is booming, although production is some years away.

  EXTERNAL ACCOUNT: We estimate that Congo's oil-dominated exports will have risen to US$12.1bn in 2012, as the slight rise in global oil prices cushioned a slight fall in production. Oil output is expected to continue contracting in 2013-14; coupled with lower international prices, this will mean that exports fall to US$11.1bn by 2014, despite rising-but relatively minor-non-oil exports. Oil production may recover as soon as 2015 if new discoveries are developed and brought on stream by then, as prices continue to edge up. Nevertheless, on the back of rising foreign investment and the government's diversification strategy, non-oil exports, which had stagnated for years owing to lack of competitiveness, should comprise a rising proportion of the total, driven by timber and forest products and non-oil minerals. Mineral production may emerge as a key export sector by 2015 (beyond 2013-14) if several iron ore mining projects are brought into production by then, and electricity also has significant potential. Having risen in 2012, we forecast that the import bill will fall from an estimated US$5.83bn to US$5.7bn in 2013 as the beneficial fall in global food prices will be partially offset by robust capital imports. Rising investment in agriculture will take several years to lower the food import bill. Buoyant imports will also contribute to a wider services deficit in 2013-14. The income deficit, which mainly reflects profit repatriation by multinational oil companies, will dip slightly in line with oil exports. As a result of these trends, the overall current-account surplus is forecast to narrow as a proportion of GDP from an estimated 6.3% in 2012 to 1.2% in 2013, before dipping into a deficit of 1.5% of GDP in 2014.

  January 11, 2013

View detailed map

Country Briefing

Land area

342,000 sq km

Population

3.98m (IMF mid-year estimate, 2011)

Main towns

Population ('000; 2012 World Gazetteer estimates):

Brazzaville (capital): 1,557,533

Pointe-Noire: 822,850

Dolisie: 86,433

Nkayi: 76,491

Climate

Tropical: humid equatorial in the north; well-watered savannah, with dry season, in the south

Weather in Brazzaville (altitude 318 metres)

Hottest month, April, 22-33°C; coldest month, July, 17-28°C; driest months, July and August, 1 mm average rainfall; wettest month, November, 292 mm average rainfall

Languages

French (official), Lingala, Kikongo, other Bantu languages

Measures

Metric system

Currency

CFA franc (CFA stands for Coopération financière en Afrique centrale); fixed to the euro at a rate of CFAfr656:EUR1

Time

1 hour ahead of GMT

Public holidays

January 1st (New Year's Day), February 5th (President's Day), February 8th (Youth Day), March 8th (Women's Day), March 18th (Marien Ngouabi Day), May 1st (Labour Day), June 22nd (Army Day), July 31st (Revolution Day), August 15th (Independence Day), December 31st (Republic Day) and Roman Catholic holidays

January 09, 2013