Central African Republic

Politics:

• Analysis

  Central African Republic politics: Quick View - Truce ends

  Event

  Seleka, a coalition of rebel groups, has officially taken up arms again, effectively putting an end to a three-month interlude in its conflict against the regime of François Bozizé in the Central African Republic (CAR).

  Analysis

  Seleka's termination of the ceasefire and vow to resume fighting does not come as a surprise. From the outset, the Libreville peace deal of January 11th appeared shaky, failing to address the complexities of the CAR's chronic instability. Despite joining a government of national unity in February, Seleka retained control over large swathes of the country, while Mr Bozizé dawdled on the implementation of the peace deal and kept using provocative rhetoric. Seleka fighters, had in effect already broken the ceasefire by conquering several towns close to the border with the Democratic Republic of Congo on March 11th. On March 17th they gave Mr Bozizé three days to comply with a series of rather unrealistic demands, including the immediate integration of 2,000 fighters into the army, and the release of all political prisoners.

  As fighting is set to resume, a crucial question is whether Seleka has the capacity to conquer the capital, Bangui, which is now its objective. Given its apparent lack of leadership and coordination, as well as uncertainties regarding its financial strength, Seleka appears ill-equipped to fight against the myriad of international troops-including from France, South Africa and FOMAC, a regional peace consolidation force established in 2008 consisting predominantly of Chadian soldiers-that are posted in and around Bangui. That said, foreign countries may be unwilling to engage actively in combat on Central African soil. France has remained remarkably discreet since the beginning of the insurgency and publicly refused to "interfere with a country's domestic politics" in December 2012. For its part, South Africa appears reluctant to live up to its role of regional leader in the CAR. Despite recent calls for action from the UN special representative to the CAR, Margaret Vogt, the international community, currently focused on Mali, has given little attention to a perennial and immensely complex conflict in the CAR.

  March 21, 2013

• Background

  Central African Republic: Political forces

  2005 legislative election results
  Parties	Seats
  Convergence nationale Kwa Na Kwa	42
  Mouvement pour la liberation du peuple centrafricain (MLPC)	11
  Rassemblement democratique centrafricain (RDC)	8
  Parti social democratique (PSD)	4
  Front patriotique pour le progres (FPP)	2
  Alliance pour la democratie et le progres (ADP)	2
  Association Londo	1
  Independents & others	35
  Total	105
  Source: www.electionworld.org.

  Download text file (csv format)

  September 20, 2008

• Structure

  Central African Republic: Political structure

  Official name

  République centrafricaine

  Form of state

  Unitary republic

  Legal system

  Based on the 1995 constitution; major amendments to the constitution were passed in December 2004

  National legislature

  National Assembly, presided over by a former prime minister, Célestin Gaombalet

  National elections

  Presidential and legislative elections took place in early 2011; the next presidential elections are scheduled for 2016; according to a peace deal signed in January 2013 legislative elections will be held in early 2014; municipal elections, which were scheduled for 2009, have been postponed indefinitely

  Head of state

  President, François Bozizé, who took power in a military rebellion in March 2003 and won the presidential elections in 2005 and 2011

  National government

  The 105-member National Assembly and the cabinet are overseeing the day-to-day running of the country; the government formed in April 2011 was replaced by a government of national unity in February 2013

  Main political parties

  The pro-Bozizé Kwa Na Kwa (KNK) has a majority in the National Assembly; Mouvement pour la libération du peuple centrafricain (MLPC) is split into two factions, one regrouping former supporters of the late Ange-Félix Patassé, president between 1993 and 2003, and another supporting his former prime minister, Martin Ziguélé; the MLPC has support from the Parti libéral démocrate (PLD) and other small parties; other parties include Rassemblement démocratique centrafricain (RDC), Alliance pour la démocratie et le progrès (ADP), Front patriotique pour le progrès (FPP), Mouvement pour la démocratie et le développement (MDD), and Forum démocratique pour la modernité (Fodem)

  President: François Bozizé

  Prime minister: Nicolas Tiangaye

  1st deputy prime minister & defence minister: Michel Nondroko Djotodia

  2nd deputy prime minister & foreign affairs minister: Colonel Anicet Parfait Mbaye

  Ministers of state

  Planning, the economy & international cooperation: Enoch Dérant Lakoué

  Key ministers

  Civil service, labour & social security: Sabin Kpokolo

  Education & scientific research: Marcel Loudégué

  Geology, mining & hydrology: Herbert Gontan Djono Ahaba

  Justice : Jacques Mbosso

  Postal services, telecoms & new technologies: Henri Pouzere

  Public health, population & AIDS: Marie Madeleine Koué Konet

  Public works & equipment: Crépin Mboli Ngoumba

  Rivers, forests, hunting, fishing & the environment: Mohamed Moussa Dafhane

  Rural development: Dorothé Aimé Malenzapa

  Security, immigration, emigration & public order: Josué Binoua

  Territorial administration & decentralisation: Léon Diberet

  Trade & industry: Amalas Amias Haroun

  Transport & civil aviation: Théodore Jousso

  Governor of the regional central bank (BEAC)

  Lucas Abaga Nchama

  March 12, 2013

Economy:

• Background

  Central African Republic: Population

  Population
  (m unless otherwise indicated)
  	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007
  Population	4.06	4.12	4.19	4.26	4.34
  % change	1.5	1.5	1.7	1.7	1.9
  Source: IMF, International Financial Statistics.

  Download text file (csv format)

  • The country is sparsely populated. According to UN estimates, in 2007 the population of the Central African Republic (CAR) was 4.3m, with a growth rate of 1.9% per year. The population density is just 6.9 inhabitants per sq km, but given the relatively high urbanisation rate, estimated at 38% in 2007, the population is spread extremely thinly in rural areas. This has been exacerbated by the proliferation of armed groups, banditry and armed incursions from neighbouring countries, which have forced much of the rural population to flee over the border into Chad and Cameroon, or into the main cities. Given the massive displacement of the population, it will be years before accurate population data are available.
  • An ethnically diverse country. Like many African countries, the CAR is ethnically diverse. There are more than 70 ethnic groups, but the main distinction is between the savannah peoples of the north—such as the Sara, Mbum, Gbaya and Banda—and inhabitants of the lush southern river valleys—including the Yakoma and Oubanguiens. Several thousand Ba'Aka (pygmies) live in the south-western rainforest. Various African languages are spoken, but Sango is the most widely understood. French is the language of administration. About one-half of the population is Christian and around one-fifth is Muslim. Traditional beliefs also retain wide adherence.
  • Rivalry between northern and southern tribes is intense. As fishermen and traders, the southern tribes were the first to come into contact with the French colonisers and to gain access to money and influence. Better educated and holding positions requiring technical expertise, the southerners dominated government from independence until 1993, when Ange-Felix Patasse became the first northern president. Mr Patasse was not able to fill the civil service with his clansmen to the same degree as his predecessors, given the lack of educated northerners. The current president, Francois Bozize—for the same reason—has struggled to fill key posts with members of his northern Gbaya tribe.
  • Health indicators are poor. The 2007/08 human development index (HDI) of the UN Development Programme (UNDP) ranked the CAR 171st out of 177 countries, behind both Chad and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). According to the UN, average life expectancy was 39.3 years in 2007, compared with a regional average of 44.4. Mortality rates for the under-fives were estimated at 94 per 1,000 live births in 2007, while maternal mortality was 1,100 for every 100,000 live births. Public spending on health is low, reaching just 1.5% of GDP in 2004, according to the UNDP. As a result, the World Bank estimates that only 50% of the population has access to basic healthcare. Malaria is the main cause of death, followed by HIV/AIDS, polio and sleeping sickness. The rate of HIV infection was estimated at 10.7% in 2005, the tenth-highest in the world and almost double the average for Sub-Saharan Africa. The CAR's northern regions have been worst affected owing to their military occupation and isolation during the conflict. According to a UN Children's Fund (UNICEF) study, 15% of the adult female population in northern CAR has been raped, contributing to a surge in HIV/AIDS.

  September 20, 2008

• Structure

  Central African Republic: Economic structure

  Economic structure: Annual indicators

  	2008a	2009a	2010a	2011a	2012b
  GDP at market prices (CFAfr bn)	888.1	935.7	983.6	1,035.6	1,132.0
  GDP (US$ m)	1,983	1,982	1,986	2,195	2,217
  Real GDP growth (%)	2.0	1.7	3.0	3.3	3.8
  Consumer price inflation (av; %)	9.3	3.5	1.5	1.3	5.0
  Population (m)	4.24	4.32b	4.40b	4.49b	4.58
  Exports of goods fob (US$ m)	150.3	123.9	139.1	186.3b	209.2
  Imports of goods fob (US$ m)	300.4	270.9	305.1	319.8b	332.3
  Current-account balance (US$ m)	-197.0	-181.9	-204.1	-191.4b	-163.0
  Foreign-exchange reserves excl gold (US$ m)	121.8	210.6	181.2	154.5	202.6
  Exchange rate (av) CFAfr:US$	447.8	472.2	495.3	471.9	510.5
  a Actual. b The Economist Intelligence Unit estimates.

  Download the numbers in Excel

  Origins of gross domestic product 2011a	% of total	Components of gross domestic product 2011b	% of total
  Agriculture	52.9	Private consumption	91.1
  Industry	13.5	Government consumption	7.9
  Services	33.6	Gross domestic investment	12.4
  		Exports of goods & services	11.9
  		Imports of goods & services	-23.3
  Principal exports 2011a	US$ m	Principal imports 2011a	US$ m
  Timber	86.0	Petroleum products	85.2
  Diamonds	62.9	Public investment programme	24.2
  Cotton	14.8
  Main destinations of exports 2011c	% of total	Main origins of imports 2011c	% of total
  Belgium	29.1	South Korea	45.6
  China	16.4	Netherlands	8.8
  Morocco	7.6	France	7.1
  Democratic Republic of Congo	7.6	Cameroon	5.1
  France	6.8	Turkey	3.9
  a Banque des Etats de l'Afrique centrale official estimates. b World Bank World Development Indicators. c Drawn from partners' trade returns, subject to a wide margin of error.

  Download the numbers in Excel

  Download text file (csv format)

  March 12, 2013

• Outlook

  Central African Republic: Country outlook

  Central African Republic: Country outlook

  FROM THE ECONOMIST INTELLIGENCE UNIT

  OVERVIEW: The political outlook for the Central African Republic (CAR) is in flux after Seleka, a rebel coalition, conquered parts of the country in a swift offensive in December 2012 before signing a peace deal in January 2013 and joining a national unity government, which will exist for one year. The president, François Bozizé, is likely to remain in his post. He could gradually regain control, as his new government "partners" lack unity and coherence, although there is a risk of renewed fighting. After accelerating to 3.8% in 2012, real GDP growth will fall back to 2.5% in 2013, as insecurity will undermine agriculture, aid and investment. Assuming some stabilisation, growth will edge back up to 4% in 2014. Average inflation will surge from 5% in 2012 to 8% in 2013, as trade disruptions and a lower harvest will result in high food prices. The Economist Intelligence Unit expects inflation to moderate to 3.5% in 2014, as food availability gradually improves. The current-account deficit will narrow from 7.4% of GDP in 2012 to 6.2% of GDP and 6.3% of GDP in 2013 and 2014, respectively, helped by resilient diamond exports and a decline in investment-driven imports of goods and services.

  DOMESTIC POLITICS: The political stability and security outlook for the CAR in the 2013-14 forecast period is highly uncertain following the insurgency by Seleka. Seleka claimed that Mr Bozizé had reneged on the terms of peace deals signed between 2007 and 2011, according to which former combatants were to be disarmed and given economic opportunities. After capturing several cities in northern and central CAR during a four-week campaign, Seleka only stopped its advance 75km north of the capital, Bangui, near the town of Damara, where Chad had posted troops in support of the CAR's crumbling government forces. Following hasty negotiations mediated by neighbouring countries, a peace deal was signed, after which Mr Bozizé appointed Nicolas Tiangaye, a long-standing opponent, as prime minister of a government of national unity in February 2013. The cabinet consists of supporters of Mr Bozizé, representatives of Seleka and members of the political opposition. The immediate threat to Mr Bozizé's position has receded and our core forecast is that he will remain president throughout 2013-14. The peace deal entitles him to stay in his post until the end of his term, in 2016, when he has pledged to step aside. Furthermore, Mr Bozizé seems to have had the upper hand in the formation of the new cabinet: Seleka members have bemoaned the duplication of various ministerial posts, which they fear will enable the president to retain control over key areas of government. Finally, Mr Bozizé's opponents are weakened by sharp disagreements between the former political opposition and the Seleka rebels. Seleka itself is a poorly co-ordinated and heterogeneous grouping. Its various leaders and representatives, driven partly by opportunistic ambitions, regularly display internal divisions. There is a strong likelihood, however, that the peace deal will not hold. Seleka controls swaths of the country, and some of its members have threatened not to disband unless the government releases its prisoners from the alliance, which it is unlikely to do. The government's unity will also be tested in the run-up to legislative elections, which under the terms of the peace accord must be organised by early 2014. Some coalition members are likely to walk away from the government and could take up arms again. However, a repeat of the December 2012 episode is unlikely provided that the regional military force, Force multinationale d'Afrique centrale (FOMAC), and other international troops remain deployed. Our 2012 democracy index ranks the CAR 157th out of 167 countries, placing it in the "authoritarian" regimes category. The new government will face tremendous challenges in trying to maintain stability, restoring security and rebuilding trust in the state. We do not expect much improvement as long as rebels' enduring grievances regarding the lagging disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) process remain unaddressed. If DDR stalls, which is likely given the government's current weakness and scant financial means, the emergence of new dissident groups remains a risk throughout the forecast period. Likewise, the possibility of a coup attempt cannot be ruled out. Against a backdrop of political instability and weak state control over the CAR's territory, criminal and rebel activity will continue to undermine security, especially around the country's porous borders. The Lord's Resistance Army (LRA), a rebel group of Ugandan origin believed to be operating in the CAR, has reportedly been terrorising local populations in the south-east. Poor co-ordination, limited resources and a low prioritisation mean that international efforts are unlikely to deal a decisive blow against the highly mobile and elusive rebel group. Finally, the political gridlock and its adverse economic consequences will add to popular frustrations and could trigger social unrest, especially in Bangui. However, this represents less of a threat to overall stability than the existence of disgruntled youth in more remote areas, who could become fighters for current or future rebel groups.

  INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS: The CAR's international relations are set to evolve following recent political developments. France will remain a key development partner. However, that country's refusal to intervene against Seleka-contrary to its stance on previous rebel threats-suggests that its backing of Mr Bozizé is not unconditional. Although some humanitarian aid will continue to flow into the country, donors are likely to be cautious about full re-engagement: some had only just resumed co-operation following the approval of a new three-year Extended Credit Facility (ECF) programme with the IMF in mid-2012. Therefore, amid renewed instability, we expect donor support to be tentative throughout the forecast period. France will continue to maintain a few hundred troops in Bangui under a defence agreement. Although it had started to withdraw ahead of the end of its term in December 2013, FOMAC increased its presence during the December conflict; Chad's president, Idriss Déby, suggested that it would remain deployed until 2014. South Africa has also reportedly strengthened its presence to protect Bangui from Seleka attacks. Uganda still leads a mission aimed at stopping the LRA. Mr Bozizé is likely to be beholden to his neighbours and other international actors that helped him to stay at the helm. Chad, in particular, will retain a strong influence in the CAR. Mr Déby's motives and the nature of the alliance are unclear, but the two countries reached a trade agreement for refined oil products in 2012. Gabon, which mediated the peace negotiations, will also have increasing weight. The CAR will remain the weakest element of the poorly functioning Economic and Monetary Community of Central Africa, within which disagreements over governance and the pace and form of integration will prevent dramatic improvements in regional co-operation.

  POLICY TRENDS: The new ECF programme has given economic policymaking fresh impetus. However, even minor reform gains risk being jeopardised by political instability. Under the new ECF, the authorities' objective is to strike a balance between necessary fiscal consolidation and the imperative of poverty reduction. Fiscal consolidation will require the improvement of domestic revenue mobilisation and donor relations, as well as the bolstering of public financial management, governance, transparency and fiscal discipline. Although some easy gains on the revenue mobilisation side are possible, this would require an improvement in the political situation and the basic functioning of state institutions. We do not expect progress on expenditure control and fiscal sustainability. In addition, any donor re-engagement would be tentative and constrained by domestic budgetary austerity measures. In this context, policy implementation-as planned under the second-generation Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper for 2011-15-will be slow and partial at best. Reforms aimed at improving the environment for businesses and investors, strengthening competitiveness and boosting financial intermediation will also be limited, meaning that the CAR is unlikely to move up much in the World Bank's annual Doing Business rankings, in which it is currently placed last. Despite persistent weaknesses in expenditure management, we estimate that the fiscal deficit came in at 0.7% of GDP in 2012, compared with 2.4% of GDP a year earlier, on the back of resumed donor support and revenue mobilisation efforts under the ECF. Considering changes in the political context, we have revised up our fiscal deficit forecast for 2013. Against a backdrop of political tensions, donor re-engagement may be suspended temporarily. Barring a return to stability, revenue collection will be undermined by lower economic performance and disruption to the functioning of the administration. Public investment will drop, but some high functioning costs and inflation will weigh on expenditures. The building up of arrears is likely. Overall, we forecast a new deterioration in the fiscal situation during 2013, with the deficit widening to 1% of GDP. Provided that stability returns, the fiscal deficit could narrow again in 2014, to 0.7% of GDP. A sharp deterioration in the fiscal balance seems unlikely given the government's limited domestic and external financial capacity.

  ECONOMIC GROWTH: Real GDP growth accelerated in 2012, helped by the resumption of aid inflows, a pick-up in public investment and solid performance in the diamond and cotton export sectors. These sectors will drive economic growth further in 2013-14. We have, however, revised down our forecast for GDP growth in 2013 and 2014 to 2.5% (previously 4.1%) and 4% (previously 4.5%) respectively, factoring in the consequences of the recent surge in political instability. It reportedly affected crop sowing, especially in the northern regions, which is likely to undermine output from a sector that accounts for more than one-half of the country's GDP. With many roads still blocked despite the peace deal, transport, trade and other businesses will also be curtailed. The CAR's risky investment environment will continue to discourage foreign companies. In 2012 the French nuclear giant, Areva, suspended its uranium project at Bakouva, for security concerns among other reasons. Provided that stability returns, we expect some investment in the natural resources and mining sector (especially diamonds and gold), as well as the coming on stream of a 10-mw hydropower plant at Boali, probably in 2014. Likewise, stability would provide an aid-driven boost to the economy. It will also be essential for consolidating recovery in the agricultural sector, which employs rudimentary techniques, as well as encouraging the return of plantation farmers and members of the local business community who have fled because of the armed conflicts that have troubled the CAR since the mid-1990s. Our forecast is highly dependent on weather conditions, to which agriculture is obviously highly sensitive.

  EXTERNAL ACCOUNT: We still expect exports to increase in 2013-14, albeit more moderately, helped by resilient diamond and timber exports. Imports, which are oil-dominated, will continue to dwarf exports. However, we have slightly lowered our import forecast in tandem with a downward revision to our outlook for aid and investment inflows. The trade deficit will therefore fall to an average of 5.1% of GDP in 2013-14, compared with 5.6% of GDP in 2012. The deficit on the services account will level off at 4.2% of GDP a year, from 5.3% of GDP in 2012, reflecting an ongoing need for import-related services as well as high transport costs resulting from poor infrastructure. The income deficit will remain tiny and more or less constant, at 0.4% of GDP. After picking up to 3.9% of GDP in 2012 on the back of a resumption of aid inflows, the transfers surplus is set to recede to 3.4% of GDP on average in 2013 and 2014, as some donors are likely to withhold disbursements amid prolonged political instability. Overall we expect a modest narrowing of the current-account deficit, from 7.4% of GDP in 2012 to 6.2% of GDP in 2013, followed by a marginal increase back up to 6.3% of GDP in 2014. The deficit will be financed by foreign borrowing and foreign investment inflows.

  March 13, 2013

View detailed map

Country Briefing

Land area

622,984 sq km

Population

4.8m (World Gazetteer 2012 estimate)

Main towns

Population ('000, 2012 estimates)

Bangui (capital): 734

Bimbo: 250

Berbérati: 105

Carnot: 55

Kaga Bandoro: 28

Mbaiki: 25

Bozoum: 22

Climate

Tropical; savannah in the north, equatorial in the south; the dry season runs from November to March

Weather in Bangui (altitude 387 metres)

Hottest month, February, 21-34°C; coolest months, July and August, 21-29°C; driest month, December, 5 mm average rainfall; wettest month, July, 226 mm average rainfall

Languages

French (official language), Sango (national language), other African languages

Measures

Metric system

Currency

CFA franc (CFAfr); fixed to the euro at CFAfr655.96:€1

Time

1 hour ahead of GMT

Fiscal year

January 1st-December 31st

Public holidays

Fixed holidays: January 1st (New Year's Day); March 29th (Boganda Day); May 1st (Labour Day); June 30th (National Prayer Day); August 13th (Independence Day); August 15th (Assumption); November 1st (All Saints' Day); December 1st (Proclamation of the Republic); December 25th (Christmas)

Moveable holidays: Easter Monday, Ascension, Whit Monday

March 07, 2012