Corruption in Brazil: A healthier menu
As the historic trial of those guilty of a legislative votes-for-cash scheme draws to a close, Brazilians digest the verdict
SO RARELY has political corruption led to punishment in Brazil that there is an expression for the way scandals peter out. They "end in pizza", with roughly the same convivial implication as settling differences over a drink. But a particularly brazen scandal has just drawn to a surprisingly disagreeable close for some prominent wrongdoers. The supreme-court trial of the mensalão (big monthly stipend), a scheme for buying votes in Brazil's Congress that came to light in 2005, ended on December 17th. Of the 38 defendants, 25 were found guilty of charges including corruption, money-laundering and misuse of public funds. Many received stiff sentences and large fines.
The supreme court must still write its report on the trial, and hear appeals--though it is unlikely to change its mind. So in 2013 Brazilians should be treated to an unprecedented sight: well-connected politicos behind bars. José Dirceu, who served as chief of staff to the former president, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, was sentenced to almost 11 years; Delúbio Soares, former treasurer of the ruling Workers' Party (PT), got almost nine. Under the penal code, at least part of such long sentences must be served in jail. The justices also decided that the three federal deputies found guilty will automatically lose their seats if and when those verdicts are confirmed.
Lula was not charged, and has always insisted he knew nothing of the scheme. But Marcos Valério, a former advertising man sentenced to 40 years, claims to have evidence that Lula knew what was going on, and that some of the dirty money paid his personal expenses. These allegations may be merely a desperate attempt by a condemned man to bargain down his jail term. The attorney-general characterised Mr Valério as a "player", and said his claims should be treated with caution. But if he has significant new evidence the mensalão may yet rumble on.
The trial, and its outcome, demonstrated the growing ability of police, prosecutors and courts to hold politicians to account. "The mensalão is a striking symbol of this change," says Carlos Melo, a political scientist at Insper, a São Paulo business school. "But it started some time ago." In recent years, Brazil has done better in the rankings of perceived corruption compiled by Transparency International, a Berlin-based watchdog. It is now the 69th-cleanest of 174 countries; in South America, only Chile and Uruguay are cleaner. But while its police, civil servants and judges compare well with those in the rest of the region, its politicians do not.
If the end of de facto impunity is not enough to encourage Brazil's politicians to mend their ways, the ficha limpa (clean record) law has added another weapon to the judges' anti-graft arsenal. Passed in 2010 after a public campaign, it bars from elected office anyone convicted of a wide range of offences, including vote-buying and illicit campaign-financing. October's municipal elections, the first under the new rules, saw hundreds of candidates ruled ineligible; others, including some who were elected, may yet be barred.
Dilma Rousseff, the president, wants a similar rule for public servants. That should help her to stem one of the remaining causes of corruption: discretionary appointments to public office. Brazilian presidents have almost 25,000 positions in their gift, including senior jobs in regulatory agencies and state-controlled firms. In recent years, many of these have gone to the politically well-connected or to the nominees of government allies.
Lula now faces questions about such practices when he was in power. On December 14th the public prosecutor's office said it was investigating claims of bribery and influence-peddling involving 24 people, including Rosemary de Noronha, a former bank teller who has been close to Lula since before he was president. In 2005 he made her head of a new "presidential office" in São Paulo. Investigators allege that during this time she took bribes to arrange forged permits for construction and transport projects with accomplices in regulatory agencies.
Back in 1992 Brazil's Congress impeached a president for corruption. But it is now prosecutors, the courts and the media that lead the fight to clean up public life. A congressional inquiry into the political ties of Carlinhos Cachoeira, who allegedly runs an illegal gambling business, illustrates the point. It failed to agree on a report by its end of year deadline, with its members protecting their allies and splitting along party lines. "This pizza was bigger than the oven," one politician lamented. Despite the mensalão verdicts, it has not disappeared from the menu altogether.
December 22, 2012
Political outlook: Political forces at a glance
Government: Brazil is a federal republic, composed of 26 states and the capital district of Brasilia, each with its own legislature and administration. The president, Dilma Rousseff of the left-wing Partido dos Trabalhadores (PT), began a four-year term in January 2011. She heads an unwieldy coalition that accounts for around 70% of seats in Congress and ranges across the political spectrum, including the centrist Partido do Movimento Democrático Brasileiro (PMDB), the largest party and the PT's main ally.
The opposition is in disarray: the centre-left Partido da Social Democracia Brasileira (PSDB) presidential candidate was defeated at the last election, and its main ally, the centre-right Democratas (DEM) has internal problems.
Next elections: Municipal elections (held every four years) are next due in October 2012; presidential, congressional and state elections (every four years) were last held in October 2010.
| Composition of Congress, 2012 | ||
| (no. of seats) | ||
| Chamber of Deputies | Senate | |
| Partido do Movimento Democratico Brasileiro (PMDB) | 79 | 19 |
| Partido dos Trabalhadores (PT) | 88 | 13 |
| Partido da Social Democracia Brasileira (PSDB) | 53 | 11 |
| Democratas (DEM) | 43 | 7 |
| Partido Progressista (PP) | 41 | 5 |
| Partido da Republica (PR) | 41 | 4 |
| Partido Socialista Brasileiro (PSB) | 34 | 4 |
| Partido Democratico Trabalhista (PDT) | 28 | 4 |
| Partido Trabalhista Brasileiro (PTB) | 21 | 6 |
| Partido Social Cristão (PSC) | 17 | 1 |
| Partido Popular Socialista (PPS) | 12 | 1 |
| Partido Verde (PV) | 15 | 0 |
| Partido Comunista do Brasil (PCdoB) | 15 | 2 |
| Partido Socialismo e Liberdade (PSOL) | 3 | 2 |
| Others | 23 | 2 |
| Total | 513 | 81 |
| Source: National Congress. | ||
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August 22, 2012
Official name
Federative Republic of Brazil
Form of state
Federative republic
The executive
The president, who is elected for a term of four years, chooses a cabinet, which he heads
Head of state
Elected president, who controls the budget
National legislature
Bicameral national Congress: 81-seat Senate (the upper house) with representatives of 26 states, plus the federal district of Brasília; 513-member directly elected Chamber of Deputies (the lower house). Each state and the district of Brasília has a legislature
Legal system
Each state has its own judicial system; the country has a system of courts for dealing with disputes between states and matters outside the jurisdiction of state courts
National elections
Municipal elections every four years (last held October 7th 2012; run-offs in municipalities without first-round winners due on October 28th); presidential, congressional and state elections every four years—last held on October 3rd 2010. A presidential run-off election was held on October 31st 2010, concurrently with run-off elections for some state governorships. Next presidential, congressional and state elections, October 2014
National government
Dilma Rousseff of the Partido dos Trabalhadores (PT) won the October 2010 presidential run-off election, giving the PT a third successive term, and took office on January 1st 2011
Main political organisations
Partido dos Trabalhadores (PT); Partido do Movimento Democrático Brasileiro (PMDB); Partido da Social Democracia Brasileira (PSDB); Partido Social Democrático (PSD); Democratas (DEM); Partido Progressista (PP); Partido Socialista Brasileiro (PSB); Partido Democrático Trabalhista (PDT); Partido da República (PR); Partido Comunista do Brasil (PC do B); Partido Socialismo e Liberdade (PSOL); Partido Verde (PV); Partido Trabalhista Brasileiro (PTB)
Key ministers
President: Dilma Rousseff
Vice-president: Michel Temer
Agriculture: Mendes Ribeiro
Civil chief of staff: Gleisi Hoffman
Communications: Paulo Bernardo Silva
Defence: Celso Amorim
Development, industry & trade: Fernando Pimentel
Education: Aloizio Mercadante
Environment: Izabella Vieira Teixeira
Finance: Guido Mantega
Foreign affairs: Antonio Patriota
Health: Alexandre Padilha
Justice: José Eduardo Cardozo
Labour & employment: Paulo Roberto dos Santos Pinto
Mines & energy: Edison Lobão
Planning, budget & management: Míriam Belchior
Science, technology & innovation: Marco Antonio Raupp
Social development: Tereza Campelo
Social security: Garibaldi Alves
Sports: Aldo Rebelo
Tourism: Gastão Vieira
Transport: Paulo Sergio Passos
Central Bank president
Alexandre Tombini
December 17, 2012
Outlook for 2013-17
Review
December 17, 2012
Fact sheet
| Annual data | 2011 | Historical averages (%) | 2007-11 |
| Population (m) | 192.8 | Population growth | 1.1 |
| GDP (US$ bn; market exchange rate) | 2,473.5 | Real GDP growth | 4.2 |
| GDP (US$ bn; purchasing power parity) | 2,295 | Real domestic demand growth | 5.7 |
| GDP per head (US$; market exchange rate) | 12,831 | Inflation | 5.2 |
| GDP per head (US$; purchasing power parity) | 11,905 | Current-account balance (% of GDP) | -1.5 |
| Exchange rate (av) R:US$ | 1.67 | FDI inflows (% of GDP) | 2.4 |
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Background: A new constitution was ratified in 1988 after more than 20 years of military rule ended. The government of Fernando Henrique Cardoso (1995-2002) ended hyperinflation and advanced reforms to liberalise the economy, but public debt indicators deteriorated amid low economic growth. The government of Dilma Rousseff is continuing the policies of the previous president, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, who was successful in consolidating macroeconomic stability, but made little progress on reforms. Weak political appetite in Congress precludes an ambitious reform agenda.
Political structure: The president executes policy approved by the 513-seat Chamber of Deputies (the lower house) and the 81-seat Senate (the upper house). Constitutional review is by an independent judiciary. Although the president can resort to temporary decrees to push through legislation, the 1988 constitution gives Congress ample capacity to frustrate the executive. A total of 21 political parties are represented in the lower house and party discipline has traditionally been weak.
Policy issues: After an aggressive easing cycle, the monetary authorities will hold the Selic policy rate at 7.25% for several quarters. Fiscal policy has also become more expansionary to support economic recovery amid a tepid global environment. Public debt is still high and political appetite for more conservative spending policies is lacking. Some progress is expected on streamlining the complex tax system, strengthening the regulatory framework and tackling labour informality. Her government will offer private concessions to help infrastructure upgrade. Exchange rate management has become more politicised, as policymakers curb the Real's strength to protect manufacturing.
Taxation: Brazil has a poorly structured revenue system characterised by a heavy tax burden, a narrow taxable base, complicated levies and widespread tax evasion. Companies, both foreign and domestic, employ tax professionals and devote considerable resources to managing their tax affairs. The corporate and indirect taxation systems are particularly complex, porous and unwieldy; the income tax system is considered to be relatively efficient, with a top rate of 27.5%.
Foreign trade: Strong external demand (from China) and a more active export policy have contributed to booming export earnings in recent years, swelling the trade surplus and transforming the current account from annual deficits into surpluses in 2003-07. Thereafter and despite favourable terms of trade, Brazil's trade surplus fell from US$46.5bn in 2006 to US$30bn in 2011, as imports surged owing to a strong currency. This also lifted the current-account deficit, to 2.1% of GDP in 2011.
| Major exports 2011 | % of total | Major imports 2011 | % of total |
| Primary products | 47.8 | Intermediate products & raw materials | 43.1 |
| Manufactured products | 36.0 | Capital goods | 20.2 |
| Semi-manufactured products | 14.1 | Consumer goods | 16.9 |
| Special operations | 2.1 | Fuels & lubricants | 15.3 |
| Leading markets 2011 | % of total | Leading suppliers 2011 | % of total |
| China | 17.3 | US | 15.9 |
| US | 10.1 | China | 15.2 |
| Argentina | 8.9 | Argentina | 7.8 |
| Netherlands | 5.3 | Germany | 7.1 |
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December 17, 2012
Data and charts: Annual trends charts
December 17, 2012
Brazil: Country outlook
FROM THE ECONOMIST INTELLIGENCE UNIT
POLITICAL STABILITY: Thanks to low unemployment and her firm stance on corruption, the president, Dilma Rousseff of the leftist Partido dos Trabalhadores (PT), has enjoyed record-high popularity ratings in her first two years in office, but recent developments threaten to weaken her position. Despite efforts since mid-2011 to stimulate the economy, Brazil's recovery has not responded as strongly as envisaged--third-quarter GDP results were surprisingly weak. Should the pick-up fail to materialise and the jobs market unexpectedly weaken, her government would risk looking ineffectual. Meanwhile, although the severe sentences that the Supreme Court has started to deliver (including to José Dirceu de Oliveira e Silva, civil chief-of-staff to the former president, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva) in the "mensalão" corruption scandal that erupted in 2005 did not initially seem to have tarnished the popularity of the PT or Ms Rousseff herself (she was not implicated in the scandal), the president is now facing the fallout from another corruption scandal that emerged in late November, involving the cabinet chief in the presidential office in São Paulo, Rosemary Noronha, a close personal ally of Lula. Ms Rousseff is also facing growing political opposition to her veto of parts of an oil royalties bill approved by Congress in November.
ELECTION WATCH: The victory of the PT candidate, Fernando Haddad, over José Serra of the Partido da Social Democracia Brasileira (PSDB) at the key municipal election in São Paulo (home to 20% of voters nationwide) boosted the PT, and Ms Rousseff remains well placed to win a second term in October 2014, barring a sharp rise in unemployment or a major split within her coalition (neither being part of the Economist Intelligence Unit's baseline scenario). If the president does encounter difficulties in 2013, we do not rule out a return by Lula, who remains highly active in politics behind the scenes. In the opposition camp, Aécio Neves (PSDB), a senator from Minas Gerais, has emerged as Ms Rousseff's main rival; not only did he manage to secure re-election of one of his allies in Belo Horizonte, but the defeat in São Paulo of his main rival within the party, Mr Serra, plays to his advantage. His success will depend on his ability to breathe new life into the PSDB, which has lost the last three presidential races. The PT and the PSDB have held the presidency for nearly two decades, but a successful bid by a candidate from a third party--such as Eduardo Campos, the charismatic Partido Socialista Brasileiro (PSB) governor of Pernambuco state, whose presidential credentials have been strengthened by the municipal elections--is possible in 2014 or (more probably) 2018.
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS: The president will continue to seek a growing international role for Brazil. This will include pursuing the long-standing aspiration to gain a permanent seat on an expanded UN Security Council and to strengthen the influence of emerging markets in global policymaking institutions. The president will adopt a generally pragmatic stance in Brazil's dealings with Western nations, as well as with regional neighbours (as seen in the Paraguayan political crisis, where Ms Rousseff pushed for political sanctions rather than the tougher economic sanctions for which some more leftist governments were calling). She will also refrain from adopting controversial policies, such as the ill-judged efforts of her predecessor to broker a deal over Iran's nuclear enrichment programme. This, in particular, has improved bilateral relations with the US, even if Ms Rousseff's overseas speeches highlight persistent differences (such as her repeated attacks on the "currency war"). The re-election of the incumbent US president, Barack Obama, will bring continuity in bilateral relations, but with no major new bilateral trade liberalisation initiative. Brazil's growing dependence on China as an export market will reduce the risk of radical protectionism against it, although some measures against surging imports from China have been taken and more can be expected. In general terms, in an effort to support its manufacturing sector, Brazil has increasingly been adopting a more protectionist stance.
POLICY TRENDS: Gradual changes in Brazil's macroeconomic policy framework that have emerged since mid-2011 will become more evident in the medium term. Inflation-targeting has become more flexible, allowing policy interest rates to fall to historically low levels, and the floating exchange-rate regime has become increasingly heavily managed. This has reflected the government's concerns over the excess liquidity created by the major central banks of the developed world as well as worries over competitiveness, particularly in the manufacturing sector. On the fiscal side, the authorities seem to be preparing a shift from targeting the primary surplus (the balance before debt interest payments) towards targeting the overall balance. The changes in the policy framework appear to be designed to support the government's new-found focus on competitiveness. To this end, the government has adopted measures aimed at removing infrastructure bottlenecks (with plans for private concessions for road and railways announced in August and for ports in December, and with another round of airports concessions to follow), lowering energy tariffs, reducing the tax burden on certain "strategic" manufacturing sectors and fostering innovation (with "Inovar Auto", a new autos regime for 2013-17).
ECONOMIC GROWTH: Third-quarter GDP results were surprisingly weak--with output expanding by only 0.6% over the previous quarter (lower than the rate of 1% we expected). Investment fell by 2% on a sequential basis, despite the government's efforts to boost it. Although manufacturing showed some reaction to the recent bout of stimulus measures, services (around two-thirds of GDP), were stagnant, reflecting a fall in financial services. Even though the latter was owing to one-off factors (and we still expect a 1% gain in the fourth quarter), the latest GDP results reduce the positive "carry over" into 2013 and, perhaps more significantly, together point to a softer medium-term growth dynamic in Brazil. As a result, we are revising our 2012 GDP growth estimate to 1% (down from 1.5% previously) and for 2013 to 3.5% (down from 4.2%, previously). An electoral cycle and Brazil's staging of the World Cup in 2014 should boost the economy, before it moderates thereafter. Hence, our forecasts for 2013-17 are weaker than in Brazil's 2004-10 growth spurt (when GDP growth averaged 4.5% per year), as several factors will be less supportive, including a deceleration in labour force growth and a tighter labour market, weaker Chinese growth (dampening the terms-of-trade gains Brazil has enjoyed in recent years), and slower credit growth. This leaves growth to be driven more by productivity gains, which Brazil will continue to struggle to generate despite some advances.
INFLATION: Disinflationary local and global conditions eased Brazil's annual inflation rate below 5% in June, but it has since picked up to 5.6% in November, despite a tepid economy. We expect inflation to remain around these levels in 2013 as stimulus measures boost demand and aggregate prices, although electricity tariff cuts will provide some respite. Owing to high indexation (including minimum wage rises linked to nominal GDP), a tight labour market, infrastructure bottlenecks and sticky services price inflation, overall consumer price inflation will remain above the 4.5% central target in 2014-17. Inflation will remain vulnerable to food supply shocks (food prices make up around one-quarter of the price basket) related to climatic conditions and fuel prices.
EXCHANGE RATES: In a context of exceptionally low interest rates in major economies, Brazil's exchange rate will continue to be heavily managed, through operations in the currency futures market and adjustments in taxes on capital inflows. These had to be eased however after the Real weakened beyond R2.1:US$1 in late November as the surprisingly-weaker third-quarter GDP results rattled confidence. These steps signal that the Banco Central do Brasil (BCB, the Central Bank) wants the Real to trade between R2.05-R2.1:US$1 for the time being. After weakening from R1.7:US$1 since March, policymakers are worried about the pass-through to inflation. Our forecasts assume that policymakers will seek to weaken the Real in nominal terms over the medium term to prevent higher relative inflation rates from eroding the exchange rate in real terms.
EXTERNAL SECTOR: We forecast the current-account deficit to average 3.3% of GDP in 2013-17 with import growth outpacing that of exports, and a consequent erosion of the large trade surplus registered for most of the previous decade. The trend will be accentuated by a still-strong currency, which will boost imports and impair export competitiveness, particularly of manufactured goods. The income deficit will amount to an annual average of 2.2% of GDP in 2013-17, while rising imports and net outward tourism (mitigated by visitors for the football World Cup in 2014 and the Rio 2016 Olympic Games) will lead to a widening services deficit. Attracting sufficient foreign capital should not prove problematic, as foreign investors will retain a positive view on Brazil's market opportunities, with foreign direct investment (FDI) forecast to average 2.9% of GDP (excluding reinvested earnings) annually in 2013-17. Reserves (US$379bn in mid-December, nearly double the levels before the 2009 financial crisis) will remain more than sufficient to cover Brazil's gross external financing requirement.
December 12, 2012
Country forecast overview: Highlights
Country forecast overview: Key indicators
| Key indicators | 2012 | 2013 | 2014 | 2015 | 2016 | 2017 |
| Real GDP growth (%) | 1.0 | 3.5 | 3.9 | 3.5 | 3.7 | 3.5 |
| Consumer price inflation (av; %) | 5.4 | 5.7 | 5.4 | 5.0 | 4.8 | 4.8 |
| Total public-sector budget balance | -2.9 | -2.3 | -1.8 | -1.7 | -1.6 | -1.5 |
| Current-account balance (% of GDP) | -2.8 | -3.5 | -3.3 | -3.2 | -3.0 | -3.2 |
| SELIC overnight rate (av; %) | 8.5 | 7.3 | 8.3 | 8.5 | 8.2 | 7.8 |
| Exchange rate R:US$ (av) | 1.95 | 2.12 | 2.17 | 2.22 | 2.25 | 2.29 |
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December 17, 2012
Land area
8,547,400 sq km, of which around 44% is suitable for agriculture
Population
192.8m (2011)
Main cities
Population at last census (2010 official estimate, m)
São Paulo: 11.3
Rio de Janeiro: 6.3
Salvador: 2.7
Brasília: (capital) 2.6
Fortaleza: 2.5
Belo Horizonte: 2.4
Climate
Mainly tropical and sub-tropical; mild on the southern coast and in the higher regions
Weather in São Paulo (altitude 760 metres)
Hottest month, December, 23-30°C; coldest month, June, 15-22°C, average monthly minimum and maximum; driest month, August; wettest month, February
Language
Portuguese
Measures
Metric system
Currency
Real (R); average exchange rates in 2011: R1.67:US$1
Time
The states along the coast, and eastern Pará, Brasília-DF, Minas Gerais, Goiás and Tocantins, are three hours behind GMT (official time in Brazil); the states of Mato Grosso do Sul, Mato Grosso, Rondônia, most of Amazonas, Roraima and western Pará are four hours behind GMT; the states of Acre and the south-western part of Amazonas are five hours behind GMT
Public holidays
January 1st; January 20th (Rio de Janeiro city only); January 25th (São Paulo city only); Carnival (unofficial holiday, two days usually in February, if not in March); Good Friday; April 21st; April 23rd (Rio de Janeiro city only); May 1st; Corpus Christi; July 10th (São Paulo state only); September 7th; October 12th; November 2nd and 15th; November 20th (Rio de Janeiro state only); December 25th
March 01, 2012