Burkina Faso

Politics:

• Analysis

  Burkina Faso politics: Quick View - Survey finds more support for democracy

  Event

  The Afrobarometer survey of public opinion in 35 African countries has released the preliminary findings of its latest poll in Burkina Faso. It found that popular support for democratic rule is deepening, and that a significant majority favours retention of a term limit on the presidency.

  Analysis

  The latest round of the Afrobarometer survey was carried out in Burkina Faso on December 3rd-17th 2012, immediately after the most recent legislative and local government elections. The poll was co-ordinated by two respected and non-partisan research centres and covered 1,200 adult men and women selected randomly from all regions. It was only the second time that Burkina Faso had been included in the survey, and revealed notable shifts in public attitudes.

  Most strikingly, in the previous survey in 2008 only 58% of those polled considered a democratic system to be preferable (one of the lowest rates in Africa at the time), with notable minorities favouring single-party rule or a military intervention under certain circumstances. However, in 2012 the proportion that preferred democracy had risen to 72%, while those who might consider a military intervention desirable fell from 39% to 24%. The widespread army mutinies of 2011, which included looting and attacks on civilians, probably contributed to this shift.

  While stronger public support for democracy is encouraging for the long-term health of the political system, it is not so comforting for the current regime. Fully one-third of those polled believed that Burkina Faso's electoral democracy has major problems or is not democratic at all. The proportion expressing dissatisfaction with the system increased between 2008 and 2012, from 38% to 43% (rising to more than 60% in urban areas in 2012). Most pointedly, the percentage favouring retention of the current presidential term limit increased from 53% to 64%, and those opposed to modifying the constitutional clause on term limits rose from 46% to 54%. At a time when some supporters of the president, Blaise Compaoré, continue to propose extending his stay in office beyond the end of his current mandate in 2015, the survey confirms the extent of public hostility to such an option.

  March 05, 2013

• Background

  Burkina Faso: Political forces

  Many political parties, but only one centre of power

  Mr Compaore has shown skill in deflecting or co-opting political opposition. He has built up a powerful coalition of state bureaucrats, former military officers, favoured businessmen and traditional chiefs, organised around the CDP. His authority was seriously weakened for a time by the agitation that followed the assassination of the journalist, Norbert Zongo, but in the end Mr Compaore and the CDP were able to recover enough to win the presidential election in 2005, the municipal elections in 2006 and the legislative election in 2007. The CDP remains strong because its access to state resources enables it to sustain patronage networks, particularly in more isolated rural areas.

  In the May 2002 legislative election, the Alliance pour la democratie et la federation-Rassemblement democratique africain (ADF-RDA) emerged as the main parliamentary opposition force. However, the party split in June 2003 when Hermann Yameogo broke away to form the Union nationale pour la democratie et le developpement (UNDD). Gilbert Ouedraogo, the new head of the ADF-RDA, gave his party's support to Mr Compaore in the presidential election in 2005, although the party subsequently challenged the CDP in the 2006 municipal elections and 2007 legislative election, coming a strong third and second respectively in the polls.

  Unions and students are politically significant

  Although salaried workers make up only a small fraction of Burkina Faso's economically active population, they have a disproportionate influence on the country's politics owing to their extensive unionisation and location in the main administrative and commercial centres. But because of the division of the union movement into several federations and many autonomous unions, it can make its political weight felt only when members are united around a common goal or grievance, such as opposition to privatisation or discontent over pay. All the major unions organised four general strikes in 2005, and again in May and September 2006, demanding salary increases and better working conditions.

  Secondary school and university students have also been a significant political force. They played an active part in the demonstrations and strikes that shook the country after Mr Zongo's assassination, and the 1999/2000 academic year was invalidated after students refused to return to classes. Protests by students from both the universities and secondary schools have erupted sporadically in subsequent years.

  The army's influence has waned

  With the transition to civilian rule and the decision by Mr Compaore and a number of his senior colleagues to shed their uniforms, the direct political role of the military has faded considerably. But parts of the military remain highly politicised, including the presidential guard, Regiment de securite presidentielle (RSP), which was implicated in the assassination of Mr Zongo. Latent tensions also persist within the military. Discontent over corruption within the officer class and opposition to the government's overall political direction emerged in the testimony of soldiers tried in April 2004 for plotting a coup in October 2003. In December 2006 soldiers clashed with police and gendarme units in the capital, Ouagadougou, exchanging gunfire with automatic weapons and heavy guns, following the death of a soldier in a brawl with the riot police, Compagnie republicaine de securite (CRS). The outbreak of violence reflected latent tensions between different branches of the armed forces, and the simmering discontent in the army's rank-and-file at working conditions. Order was restored after the government agreed to make economic concessions to the army, but fresh outbreaks of violence could occur if the government fails to deliver on its promises.

  June 08, 2007

• Structure

  Burkina Faso: Political structure

  Official name

  République démocratique du Burkina Faso

  Form of state

  Unitary republic

  Legal system

  Based on a constitution adopted by referendum in June 1991 and amended in 2002

  National legislature

  National Assembly of 111 deputies elected for a five-year term by universal suffrage

  National elections

  May 2007 (legislative) and November 2010 (presidential); next elections due on December 2nd 2012 (legislative and local) and November 2015 (presidential)

  Head of state

  President, elected for a five-year term by universal suffrage

  National government

  Council of Ministers, appointed by the prime minister, who is appointed by the president; cabinet most recently reshuffled in April 2011

  Main political parties

  Congrès pour la démocratie et le progrès (CDP; the governing party, with 73 seats in the National Assembly); Alliance pour la démocratie et la fédération-Rassemblement démocratique africain (ADF-RDA; 14 seats); Union pour la République (UPR; 5 seats); Union pour la renaissance-Mouvement sankariste (Unir-MS; 4 seats); Convention des forces démocratiques du Burkina (CFD-B; 3 seats); Parti pour la démocratie et le socialisme (PDS; 2 seats); Parti pour la démocratie et le progrès-Parti socialiste (PDP-PS; 2 seats); Rassemblement pour le développement du Burkina (RDB; 2 seats); Union des partis sankaristes (UPS; 2 seats); Parti de la renaissance nationale (Paren; 1 seat); Rassemblement populaire des citoyens (RPC; 1 seat); Union pour la démocratie et le progrès social (UDPS; 1 seat); Parti africain de l'indépendance (PAI; 1 seat); Alliance pour la mouvance présidentielle (AMP) is a pro-government alliance including the CFD-B, UPR, RDB and RPC; Unir-MS has merged with the UPS and a faction of the Front des forces sociales (FFS) to form a new party, Union pour la renaissance-Parti sankariste (Unir-PS)

  President & minister of defence: Blaise Compaoré

  Prime minister: Luc Adolphe Tiao

  Minister of state

  Relations with parliament & political reform: Bongnessan Arsène Yé

  Key ministers

  Agriculture & water: Laurent Sédégo

  Civil service, labour & social security: Soungalo Ouattara

  Culture & tourism: Baba Hama

  Economy & finance: Lucien Marie Noël Bembamba

  Foreign affairs & regional co-operation: Djibril Bassolet

  Health: Adama Traoré

  Housing & urban development: Yacouba Barry

  Human & civil rights: Albert Ouédraogo

  Industry, trade & handicrafts: Patiendé Arthur Kafando

  Infrastructure & regional development: Jean Bertin Ouédraogo

  Justice: Salamata Sawadogo

  Mines, quarries & energy: Salif Kaboré

  Primary education & literacy: Koumba Boly

  Scientific research & innovation: Gnissa Isaïe Konaté

  Secondary & tertiary education: Moussa Ouattara

  Territorial administration, decentralisation & security: Jérôme Bougouma

  Transport: Gilbert Ouédraogo

  Youth & employment: Achille Tapsoba

  Governor of the regional central bank (BCEAO)

  Tiémoko Meyliet Koné

  November 01, 2012

Economy:

• Background

  Burkina Faso: Population

  Population, mid-2007
  Population (m)	14.8
  Age profile (% of total population, 2005)
  0-14	46.2
  15-59	49.4
  60+	5.2
  Median age	16.8
  Urban population (% of total population, 2005)	18.6
  Population density (per sq km, 2005)	51
  Population growth (2005-10; %)	2.89
  Fertility rate (2005-10; %)	6.00
  Source: UN Population Division.

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  A mainly rural population of 13m

  According to the UN, Burkina Faso's population was estimated at 14.8m in mid-2007, with a growth rate of 2.9% per year. The overall population density is 51 inhabitants per sq km, but the population is spread unevenly, the northern and eastern areas of the country being sparsely populated. The population is extremely young—46% are under 15 years old. Although the population is predominantly rural—only an estimated 19% live in towns—the urban population has been growing at an average annual rate of 5.1% since 2000, and is forecast to reach 33% of the population by 2030.

  An ethnically diverse country

  Like many African countries, Burkina Faso is ethnically diverse. Much of the territory was governed in pre-colonial days by the Mossi empire, and the Mossi remain the single largest group, accounting for around one-half of the population. There are scores of other ethnic groups, the most significant being the Gurmanche (closely related to the Mossi); the Gurunsi in the south; the Bwa, Bobo, Lobi, Senufo, Marka and Samo in the west; and the Fulfulde (also known as Peulh or Fulani) in the north. Despite a past history of Mossi political and military domination, relations among the groups are fluid and relaxed, although there have been outbreaks of violence in recent years in some areas between Peulh cattle herders and their farming neighbours.

  According to Banque de France, in 2005 84% of the labour force was employed in agriculture, 5% in industry and 11% in services. Large numbers of Burkinabe travel to take up seasonal or permanent employment in neighbouring countries, although Cote d'Ivoire, the most popular destination, has been less welcoming in recent years owing to the protracted civil war.

  June 08, 2007

• Structure

  Burkina Faso: Economic structure

  Economic structure: Annual indicators

  	2008a	2009a	2010a	2011b	2012b
  GDP at market prices (CFAfr bn)	2,957.6	4,021.3	4,333.0	4,575.7a	5,336.6
  GDP (US$ bn)	6.6	8.5	8.7	9.7a	10.4
  Real GDP growth (%)	5.8	3.0	7.9	4.2a	6.2
  Consumer price inflation (av; %)	10.7	2.6	-0.8	2.8a	4.5
  Population (m)	15.5	16.0b	16.5b	17.0	17.5
  Exports of goods fob (US$ m)	851.7	883.6b	1,585.4b	2,206.2	2,432.5
  Imports of goods fob (US$ m)	-1,748.0	-1,381.2b	-1,724.7b	-2,241.7	-2,711.2
  Current-account balance (US$ m)	-1,248.0	-410.0b	-205.7b	-156.4	-583.2
  Foreign-exchange reserves excl gold (US$ m)	927.6	1,295.8	1,068.2	957.0a	1,335.4
  Total external debt (US$ bn)	1.7	1.8	2.1	2.3	2.4
  Debt-service ratio, paid (%)	3.9	3.7b	2.4b	3.4	3.0
  Exchange rate CFAfr:US$ (av)	447.8	472.2	495.3	471.9a	511.0
  a Actual. b Economist Intelligence Unit estimates.

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  Origins of gross domestic product 2011	% of total	Components of gross domestic product 2011	% of total
  Agriculture	34.6	Private consumption	66.3
  Industry	23.3	Government consumption	17.5
  Services	42.1	Gross domestic investment	22.0
  		Exports of goods & services	23.3
  		Imports of goods & services	-29.3
  Main exports 2011	US$ m	Main imports 2011	US$ m
  Gold	1595.0	Capital goods	779.8
  Cotton	282.5	Petroleum products	653.3
  Shea butter	46.8	Food	177.6
  Destination of exports 2011a	% of total	Origin of imports 2011a	% of total
  China	20.9	Côte d'Ivoire	17.4
  Turkey	16.8	France	15.0
  Singapore	8.3	Ghana	5.0
  Indonesia	6.6	Togo	4.6
  a Derived from partners' trade returns.

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  November 01, 2012

• Outlook

  Burkina Faso: Country outlook

  Burkina Faso: Country outlook

  FROM THE ECONOMIST INTELLIGENCE UNIT

  OVERVIEW: Public anger over widespread corruption and the high cost of living will continue to threaten political stability in Burkina Faso, particularly around the December elections, which the current regime is expected to win. Any attempt to alter the constitution to permit the president, Blaise Compaoré, to run for a fifth term in office is likely to trigger popular protests and could lead to further unrest. The government is likely to struggle to meet its policy goals of increasing public investment while maintaining budgetary prudence and reducing social tensions by offering sweeteners. The fiscal deficit is forecast to narrow to 3.7% of GDP in 2013 and 3.3% of GDP in 2014 as revenue collection improves and proceeds from the mining sector grow. Real GDP growth should quicken on the back of rising mining output and increased public investment, to 6.5% in 2013 and 6.9% in 2014, although the threat of further social unrest poses downside risks to this scenario. Inflation is forecast to ease to 2.8% in 2013 as food prices moderate, before rising to 2.9% in 2014. The current-account deficit will narrow to an average of 4% of GDP in the 2013-14 forecast period owing to rising gold and cotton exports.

  DOMESTIC POLITICS: After more than 25 years in power the president is coming under increasing pressure. Since a wave of protests, strikes and destructive rampages by army units throughout the first half of 2011, the government has appeared to be on the defensive. The overall political situation may have calmed considerably since then but social tensions persist: public anger over the cost of living and inadequate government services remains high, and local outbursts are common across the country. The police, who once were quick to beat, shoot or detain protesters, now tread lightly, as some have faced criminal charges and other disciplinary action. Faced with the risk of seeing its credibility erode, the regime has taken steps to implement some political reforms, including the creation of a Senate, which, once it is set up in 2013, is expected to strengthen the role of the legislature against the powerful presidency. However, the reforms, particularly the granting of amnesty to the president, have been criticised by the opposition and civil society groups for merely seeking to maintain the president's overwhelming influence over the political scene, and more progress is needed in order to soothe popular discontent. With parliamentary and local government elections coming up in December, the various opposition parties may be tempted to try to boost their credentials by urging aggrieved voters to take to the streets, particularly if the election process is seen as biased towards the incumbent regime. Even without politicians' encouragement, popular anger over widespread corruption and difficult economic and social conditions, combined with the heightened partisan tensions surrounding the polls, could bring outbursts of instability. Although this may ultimately jeopardise Mr Compaoré's political future, the Economist Intelligence Unit expects him to remain in office throughout 2013-14. The next elections are set for December 2nd 2012, combining the legislative and local government polls. The ruling Congrès pour la démocratie et le progrès (CDP) party's election campaign got off to a shaky start as competing factions protested over the lists of candidates for the upcoming elections. The electoral commission resisted pressure and invalidated the ruling party's lists of candidates in one constituency over irregularities, showing promising signs of independence. The waning popularity of the CDP and the recent sweeping changes in its leadership leave the party uncertain as to whether it can retain its sizeable majority in the National Assembly (it currently holds 73 out of 111 seats). In the run-up to the poll there have been signs of internal party tensions that could hurt its credentials and boost the chances of opposing parties, at least in some constituencies. However, rivalry among the many opposition parties and the CDP's efforts to foment divisions will fragment their vote, and the CDP's control of the state bureaucracy will work to its advantage. Consequently we expect the CDP to win the election, but with a smaller majority than in the past.

  INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS: The political crisis in neighbouring Mali-where an uprising in the country's north has undermined political stability and sent more than 100,000 refugees into Burkina Faso-has shaken the authorities in the Burkinabè capital, Ouagadougou. As the designated mediator of the Economic Community of West African States, Mr Compaoré will play a central role in efforts to restore peace there. The developments in Mali have also compounded fears that the political unrest in North Africa may make it easier for Islamist terrorist groups such as al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) to expand their operations in the Sahelian countries, including Burkina Faso. Relations with France, the country's main trading partner and closest Western ally, will remain good, and economic, political and military ties with the US will continue to develop as part of regional efforts to combat the rise of AQIM.

  POLICY TRENDS: With the 2011 wave of protests still fresh in the mind, economic policy will remain geared towards measures designed to defuse some of the economic causes of public discontent, including tax cuts for ordinary citizens. Despite a recent reduction in fuel subsidies, the government will remain ready to intervene with further subsidies to keep staples such as rice and maize affordable in the event of reduced cereal harvests. The country has a US$124.3m Extended Credit Facility with the IMF, covering 2010-13, which seeks to bolster macroeconomic stability and boost real GDP growth. It also aims to reduce the poverty rate to less than 35% of the population by 2015, from 43.2% at the end of 2009-an overoptimistic objective. A key initiative underpinning these efforts is the 2011-15 Stratégie de croissance accélérée et du développement durable, which seeks to diversify the economy, increase investment and implement structural reforms, including efforts to improve governance in the natural resource sector. A new Fund programme is likely to be agreed upon following the expiration of the current one in mid-2013, but no major policy changes are expected. Progress on the government's long-delayed privatisation programme is expected to continue at a slow pace. Preparations for selling a minority share in the fuel importation and distribution company, Société nationale burkinabè d'hydrocarbures, are expected to begin following the December elections. Ongoing efforts to phase out fuel subsidies could make the enterprise more attractive to potential investors, although the authorities are likely to be reluctant to adopt an automatic pricing mechanism for fear of stirring public discontent. The government has agreed to reduce gradually state involvement in the cotton-ginning company, Société burkinabè des fibres textiles, and is also planning to privatise the management of Ouagadougou's international airport. The Fund will continue to urge radical reform of the restrictive business environment-which is ranked 153rd out of 185 economies worldwide by the World Bank in its 2013 Doing Business report-insisting that more must be done to promote private-sector growth and tackle corruption. The cabinet adopted an expansive draft budget for 2013, aimed at boosting public investment. However, lower than expected revenue growth and bureaucratic constraints will hinder implementation.

  ECONOMIC GROWTH: Real GDP growth rose to an estimated 6.2% in 2012 following a rebound in agricultural output and an increase in mining production, further supported by a scaled-up public investment programme. The agricultural sector's prospects in 2013 will depend largely on favourable weather patterns (owing to the persistent lack of irrigation and reservoirs). Cotton output is expected to rise moderately, helped by government subsidies for fertilisers and enhanced seeds, as well as continued high domestic cotton prices (which are fixed by the authorities and partly disconnected from international prices). Along with services such as mobile telecommunications and banking, mining-in particular the gold subsector-is set to be a major driver of growth as new mines come into production and output rises at existing mines. We expect that, helped by higher mining revenue, the government will increase capital spending on public works and agricultural development, in order to increase resilience to external shocks, stimulate demand and provide employment opportunities at a time when social tensions are still high. We forecast that real GDP growth will pick up, to 6.5% in 2013 and 6.9% in 2014. However, the threat of social unrest flaring up again, which would undermine investor confidence and lead to production shortfalls, combined with the troubled external outlook and the agricultural sector's vulnerability to poor weather conditions, poses significant downside risks to these forecasts. The government's reluctance to allow a fuller pass-through of global energy prices into domestic prices, coupled with falling international oil prices in 2013, will cause inflationary pressures to ease. Moreover, a higher than average domestic cereal harvest in late 2012, together with a fall in global food prices in 2013-14, will also contribute to declining inflation. Nevertheless, a weaker CFA franc, the pressure to maintain above-inflation pay rises for public-sector workers and strong growth in private consumption-stimulated by continued high economic growth-mean that inflationary pressures will persist throughout 2013-14. Overall, we expect inflation to decline from an average of 4.5% in 2012 to 2.8% in 2013, before edging up to 2.9% in 2014 as fuel prices rise slightly.

  EXTERNAL ACCOUNT: The external accounts will continue to receive strong support from gold exports, underpinned by high prices and rising production. Although global cotton prices will remain below their 2011 peak, they will rise moderately over 2013-14 and export earnings will be boosted by a continued rise in production. Food and fuel imports will decrease in 2013 following lower international prices and, in the case of food, increased domestic production. Growth in imports should pick up slightly in 2014 in line with world oil prices, while imports of capital goods are expected to increase briskly, in line with strong public and private investment in infrastructure and mining projects. The rapid expansion in the gold sector will continue to suck in services imports, although the expansion of GDP means that the deficit on the services account will narrow slightly to an average of 7.3% of GDP in 2013-14. The surplus on transfers will remain above 5% of GDP, reflecting continued donor support for this aid-dependent country. The income deficit will widen as foreign-owned mining and services firms repatriate an increasing level of profits, but will remain below 1% of GDP. Overall, we expect the current-account deficit to narrow from an estimated 5.6% of GDP in 2012 to 4.4% of GDP in 2013 and further to 3.7% of GDP in 2014. These deficits should be financed by strong inflows of foreign direct investment on the capital account, particularly to the mining sector, and concessional loans from multilateral lenders.

  November 05, 2012

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Country Briefing

Land area

274,122 sq km

Population

17.3m (2012 CIA World Factbook estimate)

Main towns

Population, 2012 (World Gazetteer estimates):

Ouagadougou (capital): 1,626,950

Bobo-Dioulasso: 537,728

Banfora: 93,750

Koudougou: 91,181

Ouahigouya: 86,569

Pouytenga: 84,156

Climate

Tropical

Weather in Ouagadougou (altitude 302 metres)

Hottest month, April, 26-39oC; coldest month, January, 16-33oC; driest month, December, 0 mm average rainfall; wettest month, August, 277 mm average rainfall

Languages

French, Moré, Gurma, Fulfuldé, Tamasheq and others

Measures

Metric system

Currency

CFA franc (franc de la Communauté financière africaine, the common currency of the Union économique et monétaire ouest-africaine, UEMOA); fixed to the euro at a rate of CFAfr656:EUR1

Time

GMT

Public holidays

Fixed: January 1st (New Year's Day), January 3rd (anniversary of 1966 coup), March 8th (International Women's Day), May 1st (Labour Day), August 4th (Revolution Day), August 5th (Independence Day), August 15th (Assumption), October 15th (anniversary of 1987 coup), November 1st (All Saints' Day), December 11th (Proclamation of the Republic), December 25th (Christmas)

Moveable: Islamic New Year, Easter Monday, Mouloud (Birth of the Prophet), Ascension Day, end of Ramadan, Tabaski (Feast of the Sacrifice)

February 01, 2013