CIAO DATE: 4/99

Interview with Mark Edmond Clark

What are the short-term effects of the bombing campaign?

While I was in Belgrade and Pristina in the beginning of March, the officials of the Yugoslav and Serbian Governments, with whom I spoke, made it clear that once the bombing campaign began, they would initiate a full blown counter-terrorist campaign in Kosovo. Efforts of the Yugoslav Army and Ministry of Interior forces would be directed against the KLA and its infrastructure. The campaign would be focused on the area that was part of the KLA's "Strategic Trapezoid" in the center of Kosovo, which the KLA had declared to be their area of strongest influence. They also informed me that they would strike at KLA positions in Albania and possibly Macedonia. This is precisely what those forces have been doing.

As for the bombing campaign, Operation ALLIED FORCE, I understood that initially, NATO and U.S. policy makers sought to use air strikes and cruise missile strikes to persuade President Milosevic to sign the Rambouillet Agreement and to cease all operations against the Kosovo Liberation Army and Albanian separatists in the province of Kosovo. There was never any indication from President Clinton that this would entail a bombing campaign designed to destroy Yugoslavia, or, as it has been recently suggested by some retired U.S. generals, an invasion of Yugoslavia by heavily armed forces of NATO, driving in from Hungary and Macedonia. The current operation essentially entails the use of force in support of diplomatic efforts.

Unfortunately for the Clinton Administration, none of their objectives for the bombing campaign have been realized to this point. Even before the end of the first week of the campaign, although maintaining its level of concern over events in Kosovo, the Administration seemingly lessened its objectives when senior officials began to state over the airwaves that the bombing campaign actually served to maintain NATO's credibility. In other words, it served to prove that no one should be led to believe NATO will not bomb when it says it will bomb. In addition, the Clinton Administration stated that it sought to degrade the capabilities and size of Yugoslav military and police forces. It would seem best, at this point, to leave it at that.

In my opinion, there is too much talk about things that the President never really promised. Yes, more could be done, but, let us be honest. The Clinton Administration and NATO never promised, publicly, to serve as the allies of the KLA and Albanian separatists in Kosovo. No open Security Assistance arrangement was made. It is clear that the type of air campaign currently underway over Yugoslavia will at best serve as show of support for KLA and Albanian separatists, but it will not save them. NATO may take the step of redirecting some of its efforts at Yugoslav forces in Kosovo, but this also will not save the KLA and Albanian separatists. As things look now, there may be very few KLA and Albanian separatists left to save if the Yugoslav military and police forces continue their campaign at the current tempo. We should not get ahead of ourselves. I am really concerned about new statements being made over the airwaves about ground troops and other alternatives to the air campaign.

With NATO forces continuing the attack, how likely are the Serbs to return to negotiations? As a corollary: Will we be able to negotiate with Milosevic again?

Among the Serbs, I have learned, threats of the use of force, no matter how many times they are made, are only taken as seriously as the individuals who make them. In the post Cold War world, officials at the State Department must accept that titles alone will not be enough to give their diplomats standing to present certain positions among opponents such as Milosevic. I have observed that standing, especially among the Serbs, is given to an individual based on nature of their experience and their bearing. Thus, for Ambassador Richard Holbrooke, standing was acquired among the Serbs during the negotiations for the Dayton Agreement, not only because he was the Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian Affairs and the former Ambassador to Germany. The Serbs knew of Holbrooke's reputation for being tough which stemmed from his tenure in the Carter Administration, when he dealt with notables such as President Ferdinand Marcos and General Fabian Ver. Holbrooke also has a certain bearing and way of expressing himself which could be appreciated in Belgrade. Unfortunately, as some officials in Belgrade explained to me in February, much was done to destroy that standing when, in the United States, negative information surfaced following Holbrooke's nomination as UN Ambassador, which served to discredit him. Apart from Ambassador Holbrooke, the Clinton Administration has hardly put forward the type of diplomat who would be best qualified to cope with Milosevic. The last two Republican Administrations were replete with individuals who could meet this challenge.

As for Milosevic, I do not believe that we will be able to push him out through the bombing campaign. If we are not able to do so, we better be prepared to talk with him again. A final point is that the Yugoslav and Serbian Governments have learned more about the United States throughout this entire process than U.S. policy makers have learned about them. As we continue to misjudge the Serbs, this point becomes more and more apparent. It seems as if they will continue to have this analytical edge.

Short of landing ground forces, what can be done to maintain peace for the people of Kosovo? Do we now have to deploy ground forces as some have suggested?

These questions are being asked too late in the game. The real question is "What can we do to help ourselves as Americans?" Although U.S. and other NATO pilots are flying at tremendous risk over targets in Yugoslavia, Operation ALLIED FORCE is essentially a punitive action against Yugoslav President Slobodan Milosevic. It falls just short of being a limited war. Limited war is what we will have if ground troops are introduced. We should really put a lot of thought into this issue before we take that step.

There are rules concerning limited wars for nations like the United States. Although the commitment of our resources and our emotional commitment may be limited, this could be viewed as total war to the Serbs, and in the long run their resolve might exceed ours. This was the case in Korea and Vietnam. Limited wars can be costly and prolonged. The American public may not be willing to support a war against Yugoslavia, especially since our true national security interests are indirect, and given the Serbs apparent will to fight, we could incur high casualties. Whenever the United States fights in a limited fashion, it tends to cut itself down to a size that allows its opponent to find some advantages and raise our costs. This was the case in Korea and in Vietnam. Zoran Andjelkovic, the President the Executive Council of Kosovo Province guaranteed me on March 4, that the Serbs would do everything in their power in Kosovo to "make it worse than Vietnam" for U.S. ground troops.

We could easily stumble into a war with Yugoslavia. My advice to policy makers would be to think of this year as 1964. With the history of Vietnam in mind, perhaps they should consider what alternatives might allow us to avoid a repeat of events. Once they have completed the analysis, they could perhaps apply any approaches formulated to the Kosovo situation. Absent limited war or total war, we should consider some new approach to dealing with Yugoslavia. There are too many resources in the United States, especially intellectual resources, for me to accept that the Clinton Administration cannot find a palatable solution.

There is also an issue concerning other national minorities in Kosovo. There are communities of Muslims, Turks, Romanies, and Goranies of considerable size in the province. These national minorities fear losing the rights that they enjoy as national minorities in Serbia, in the event an Albanian state is created. The leaders of the Turkish Democratic Union, with whom I met in Prizren, explained to me that their community actually has nearly 200,000 members, and they speak Turkish as their primary language. However, only 40,000 are registered as Turks. They claim the rest have been pressured into declaring themselves as Albanians, during the period in which Kosovo was directed primarily by the Albanian community. They also dispute the ninety- percent figure for the Albanian community, which was established under the 1981 Census during the same period of rule. The Muslims, Turks, Romanies, and Goranies all had representation in the Serbian negotiation team at Rambouillet. The Albanian separatist team, however, was all Albanian. According to leaders of the Turkish Democratic Union, this also sent a signal to those other national minority communities that they would have little influence in an Albanian state. Thus, without the Serbs and Montenegrins in Kosovo, some struggle may take form between the Albanian community and other national minorities there. There has been almost no discussion on the national minority issue. Perhaps it should have some place in discussions about future autonomy or independence for Kosovo.

Why haven't the Serbs regularly engaged NATO forces? Does this lack of response represent a weapons-saving tactic, or some grander strategy?

In military operations, there is an action-reaction cycle. In that cycle each commander attempts to act in a manner which should disrupt an opposing commander's plan of action and cause that commander to react in a manner which is not in his or her interest. In this struggle, both sides, NATO and the Yugoslav military and police forces have a plan of action. The Yugoslavs apparently will not allow themselves to be disrupted or diverted by NATO's actions. They use the air defenses sparingly, and continue to execute what they have declared to be a counter-terrorist plan. Interestingly NATO, under the request of civilian authorities, has altered its bombing campaign plan to cope with the actions taken by Yugoslav forces.

Furthermore, I am of the opinion that some of the actions allegedly taken by Serbian paramilitary organizations in Kosovo may not only be designed to oust members of the Albanian community. These acts of violence, which the Yugoslav Government may or may not support, might also serve as a lure for policy makers in the United States and NATO to place ground troops in Kosovo, thus providing those paramilitary units with the opportunity to combat them. It was explained to me while I was in Pristina that there are certain forces positioned in Kosovo, which, as their main objective, seek to engage U.S. forces on the ground. They want to get to U.S. troops any way that they can. Given the push for ground forces, I sense that the United States and NATO may take the bait.

There is a partisan tradition in Yugoslavia when it comes to war fighting. Partisans, for the most part, are guerrilla fighters, who rely upon concealment, deception, and surprise. This tradition, linked with former Warsaw Pact doctrine, makes for a powerful mix.