CIAO DATE: 07/01

Decision-Making and Crisis Management in The Cuban Missile Affair

Introduction

In what was the most serious "clash" during the Cold War, the United States and the Soviet Union came dangerously close to cataclysmic confrontation when the Soviets in an unprecedented dangerous move had begun a clandestine effort to establish a major offensive military presence in Castro’s Cuba in October 1962. This potentially dreadful incident brought policy makers on both sides to seriously question their use of diplomacy and military force. Had it not been for the wisdom of the leaders of the two antagonistic countries, the US and the Soviet Union, no one could have speculated the harm that could have been inflicted on the whole world. This paper will therefore try to examine how the Cuban Missile Crisis came about and how well it was managed by the US and the Soviets political leadership. It will address the importance of the national security decision making in preventing this crisis from degenerating into a tragedy.

I. Missile Deployment — Khrushchev’s Gamble

The Soviets had never before installed their missiles outside Soviet territory, and accounts vary as to the principal motivation for their risky deployment of ballistic Missiles in Cuba. First among these was a personal assessment of US president by Soviet’s Premier Nikita Khrushchev. The failure of the Bay of Pig invasion of Cuba in April 1961 had revealed the hand of a president unsure of himself. In the 1961 meeting of Vienna, Kennedy naively stated that "we regard...Sino-Soviet forces and the forces of the United States and Western Europe as being more or less in balance." These two incidents sent the wrong signal to the Soviets Premier. The latter came to see President Kennedy as young, weak, and "not prepared well for decision making in crisis situations" (Kagan 475-476). Khrushchev’s actions over the next year ─ new threats over Berlin and the building of the Berlin Wall, and the decision to arm Cuba ─ reveal Khrushchev wrong assessment of Kennedy’s personal failings.

The Soviets might have thought that they could get away with their mischievous act of deploying missiles in Cuba even if uncovered. Khrushchev, as Ray Cline argued, "knew that the deployment would cause a world wide political storm, but evidently thought Kennedy would simply be obliged to get used to the idea of having missiles in substantial numbers pointed at the united States" (Cline 194). A successful surreptitious installment of ballistic missiles in Cuba would redress the stark nuclear imbalance that favored the US and "would alter the psychological and political perceptions of the balance of power" (194).

The public announcement of the reversal of the missile gap that was thought to be in favor of Moscow by the US put the soviets in discomforting grounds. No only had the military balance swayed heavily in favor of the US but so had the political balance. The Soviet leadership fretted over this newly discovered fact. The whole world came to believe at a certain point that the Soviets were gaining ground on military capability on the US. The US leadership itself warned repeatedly of a missile gap in favor of the Soviets. In the late 1950s, the CIA warned at several instances that the Soviets were to outclass the Americans in military power. John F. Kennedy and the Democrats made of this projected missile gap issue one of their top priorities in the election campaign of 1960, and this helped them in their victory. But when the fact of the matter came to be known that this whole story of missile gap was not true, a whole lot changed in the political scene.

An urgent solution had to be found to regain Moscow’s clout in world decision-making. The sagging Soviet side in the strategic military balance was alarming. The missile gap that was publicly revealed to favor the US was sure to prompt the Soviets to redress the balance. The Soviets position in world power needed shoring up. No matter what the Russians claim, their main point behind the introduction of those ballistic missiles into Cuba was mainly strategic. A successful deployment of missiles into Cuba was a quick, less expensive move to counter the US supremacy in world order. It might also be true that the Russians emplaced those missiles to protect the Cuban communist regime against a US threat. "The main thing was that the installation of our missiles in Cuba would, I thought, restrain the United States from precipitous military action against Castro’s Government," Khrushchev stated to the Supreme Soviet after the crisis (Talbott 493). But this installation of missiles in Cuba to protect it from an imminent American invasion might have served, if it does at all, as a secondary objective of the Soviets. Khrushchev himself acknowledged that a deterrence of a US invasion of Cuba was not the sole objective of his act. "In addition to protecting Cuba, our missiles would have equalized what the West likes to call ‘the balance of power’" (Talbott 494).

The deployment of some 40 soviet medium and intermediate-range missile launchers in Cuba during the late summer and early fall of 1962 was an attempt by the Soviets to redress a serious imbalance in the strategic nuclear balance. It was to double the total first strike capability available to the Soviet Union. Such bold move was a means of strengthening the socialist camp in the global correlation of force. The soviets hoped that this move would bolster their strategic military power and diplomatic-political strength. A more favorable status quo would give them new impetus and leverage to stem American exploitation of the missile superiority in the many political contests that the two powers were involved in. An improvement of the Soviet military position would help them boost their leverage on Berlin; it would help them foil the rivalry of the Chinese communists; it might even entice Latin Americans to embrace Soviet Communism.

Although the deployment of these missiles would not offset the strategic gap, it was expected to help curb American actions until the development of a more reliable deterrent. It could be used as a means of exerting some pressure on the US in the several issues under contentions between the two superpowers. At the time, there was no other conceivable way of righting the balance than the installation of those missiles in Cuba. Available ICBM’s (Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles) were in no way to match US intercontinental Missiles. The Soviets, however, had plenty of medium-range missiles that could be of great utility if installed near the US, in a somewhat similar fashion as those based in Turkey. The successful introduction of those missiles in the Cuban ground would then have helped the Soviets solve their missile weaknesses, though to a limited extent.

The Soviet Premier thought it legitimate to install the Soviets missiles in Cuba. Why, he mused, should the Americans have the right to put missiles on our doorstep, and we not have a comparable right? The installation of these missiles in Cuban ground is simply a countermove to the one undertaken by the US.

The Americans had surrounded our country with military bases and threatened us with nuclear weapons, and now they would learn just what it feels like to have enemy missiles pointing at you; we’d be doing nothing more than giving them a little of their own medicine (Talbott 494).

Nobody took notice of the Soviets protests when medium-range nuclear missiles were installed by the US across their territory. They were a serious assault and affront to the Soviets. But these installations were claimed to be only for defensive measurements against any assault by the Soviets on the West hemisphere. The same can be applied to the Soviets case, Khrushchev thought. The missiles were deployed there to contain the US threat against the Soviet Communist Block. They were meant to deter a probable American attack on socialist Cuba. They were not meant to commit any aggression on the US.

II. Kennedy’s Strategy in Dealing with Crisis

The US, however, did not see the Soviets deployment of missiles in Cuba in this light. Moscow’s action in Cuba was seen as a flagrant violation of international law. The Soviets acts were in no way similar to those of the US for the latter did not seek at any instance to hide their deployment of offensive missiles in Turkey and other sites. The Soviets contention lost legitimacy and stripped them of claiming any legal right for the introduction of those missiles in Cuba for their act was surreptitious, the US claimed. "Our own strategic missiles," Kennedy declared, "have never been transferred to the territory of any other nation under the cloak of secrecy and deception…" (Cited in Leighton 27)

The deployment of ballistic missiles in Cuba constituted a serious blow to the US. It was a deliberate political challenge to the US leadership. The president was committed by his public warnings to Moscow on September 4 and 13 to act decisively if offensive weapons were introduced into Cuba. On September the 4th, Kennedy warned the Soviets that if any missiles were sneaked into Cuba then "the gravest issues would arise." Likewise, he delivered the same warnings to the Soviets on his September 13th statement. If Cuba should " become an offensive base of significant capacity for the Soviet Union, then this country will do whatever must be done to protect its own security and that of its allies" (Brune 45). His reaction to the discovery of these missiles in Cuba was then expected to be tough; otherwise, he would have undermined the legitimacy of the US, and particularly that of his own.

Prior to the discovery of the missiles, Kennedy rebuffed all claims that the Soviets were sneaking missiles into Cuba. He made two public announcements to reassure the American public that there were no Soviets offensive arms in the Island.

There is no evidence of any organized combat forces in Cuba from any Soviet Bloc country; of military bases provided to Russia; of a violation of the 1934 treaty relating to Guantanamo; of the presence of offensive ground-to-ground missiles; or of other significant offensive capability either in Cuban hands or under Soviet direction and guidance (Brune 45).

Thus, the surreptitious introduction of Soviets ballistic missiles into Cuba was to create a serious crisis between the two superpowers.

Kennedy was deceived by the Soviets who made him believe by their September responses that they had not the slightest intention to install any offensive armaments in Cuba. The Soviet ambassador to the United States, Anatoly Dobrynin, had told Robert Kennedy and Theodore Sorensen, the president’s special assistant, at separate instances in early September that the military equipment being shipped to Cuba was "defensive in nature and did not represent any threat to the security of the United States." On September 11, 1962, in a public, official statement, the Soviets said that there was "no need for the Soviet Union to shift its weapons for the repulsion of aggression, for a retaliatory blow, to any other country, for instance Cuba." Other public statements denying the true intentions of the Soviets were being made till their deceptive

public and diplomatic machinations was uncovered. It was a serious blow for the American administration.

Kennedy was so infuriated by this blow. "He can’t do that to me" a startled and infuriated Kennedy said when he heard of the news. He felt he had to act quickly (Leighton 9). He had to stand up to the Soviets to regain his prestige as the president of the first superpower in the world. Congressional elections were on the horizon, and such news would undermine Democrat’s legitimacy in preserving the country’s security. As Roger Hilsman, head of the intelligence bureau at the State Department and later assistant secretary of state, acknowledged, "the United States might not be in mortal danger but…the administration most certainly was" (Hilsman 196). Kennedy had vowed to redress the threatening situation in Cuba during his campaign for the presidency. He reiterated that when he was elected. Any tolerance of the Soviets might have been very costly in the upcoming congressional elections. It might even have caused Kennedy’s impeachment.

But Kennedy felt compelled to act firmly and quickly not merely because of the domestic and political pressure he found himself in, but also to prevent a destabilization of the balance of power. Decisive actions had to be undertaken to get those missiles out of Cuba. President John F Kennedy had to compel the Soviet Union to withdraw the missiles to defend the balance of power, preserve NATO, and convince Nikita Khrushchev and the world of American resolve. He worried that the Soviets would become emboldened by a successful missile deployment. If they get away with it, the president warned the Executive Committee (ExComm) on the first day of the crisis, "then they would start getting ready to squeeze in Berlin" (ExComm meeting). The President told the White House Aide Arthur Schlesinger that he believed the move offered the Soviet Union several political advantages in its global struggle with the United States. It would deal the United States a blow to its international prestige and simultaneously strengthen the Soviet position in the Communist world and provide leverage for an eventual confrontation with the West over the status of Berlin (Schlesinger 811). Kennedy also emphasized this concern in his televised speech announcing the imposition of the quarantine, comparing Khrushchev’s testing of American resolve to Adolf Hitler’s testing of France and Britain on the eve of World War II. The 1930’s, he told the American people, "taught us a clear lesson: aggressive conduct, if allowed to go unchecked and unchallenged, ultimately leads to war" (Schlesinger 683).

The transcripts of the ExComm tapes and the writings of administration officials indicate that Kennedy also worried about the impact of Khrushchev’s challenge on public opinion in Europe and Latin America. If he did not act against them, the Russians might think he would not act elsewhere. "It would create grave problems in Latin America, where there would be a feeling that the balance of power in this hemisphere was shifting away from us, that the Russians could throw their weight around right on our own doorstep." There was a big difference between the missiles in Cuba and those in Turkey and Italy. "Ours are an attempt to redress the balance of power in Europe…But what is happening in Cuba is far different–a provocative change in the delicate status quo in this hemisphere…" (Cited in Beschloss 479). Arthur Schlesinger conceded that

While the missiles might not have much effect on the overall US-Soviet military balance, they had considerable effect on the world political balance. The emplacement of nuclear missiles in Cuba would prove the Soviet ability to act with impunity in the very heart of the American zone of vital interest–a victory of great significance for the Kremlin, which saw the world in terms of spheres of influence and inflexibility guarded its own. (Cited in Lebow)

Kennedy had no choice but to oppose the missiles. "Soviet long-range missiles in Cuba," Theodore Sorenson affirmed, "represented a sudden, immediate and more dangerous and secretive change in the balance of power, in clear contradiction of all US commitments and Soviet pledges." (Sorensen 187)

Kennedy, in his televised speech to the American people, characterized "their (Soviets) sudden, clandestine decision to station strategic weapons for the first time outside of Soviet soil" as "a deliberately provocative and unjustified change in the status quo which cannot be accepted by this country" (Garthoff 35). Unless Khrushchev takes a quick decision to "halt and eliminate this clandestine, reckless, and provocative threat to world peace," the US threatened to respond with all the means it deems adequate to repel the Soviets act (35). A quarantine was announced as an initial step to hamper further introduction of offensive arms into Cuba. Other steps were also taken in parallel, amongst which the call for a convening of the OAS, and an emergency meeting of the United

Nations Security Council to back the US in its attempt to seek "the prompt dismantling and withdrawal of all offensive weapons in Cuba, under the supervision of United Nations observers" (Leighton 29). If a quarantine failed to dissuade the adversary, "further action will be justified" (29). American forces were ready "for all eventualities", Kennedy warned (29). Kennedy was clear in his speech. There was to be no compromise or concessions on this issue with the Soviets. He refused to resort to sheer diplomatic options to resolve the conflict. "That son of a bitch (Khrushchev)," he (Kennedy) had once said, "won’t pay attention to words. He has to see you move" (12). Khrushchev had to recognize that the US is ready to go to any length to get those missiles out of Cuba.

III. Quarantine combined force and diplomacy

The imposition of a quarantine exerted maximum pressure on the soviet while incurring the minimum risk of war. It was the most flexible of any of the responses that the US examined to take. Unlike an air strike or an invasion, a quarantine left more room for the Soviets to reconsider their stand and remove all offensive military equipment from Cuba. "The missile crisis was a triumph, a triumph of flexible response," according to Arthur Schlesinger (Schlesinger 528). The imposition of the Quarantine was a judicious means to solve the problem. It was thought that it was better to start with limited action as a first step before the move to more stringent measures that the US intended to implement had the quarantine imposed failed to make the Soviets back down. It started at the very lowest level of forceful coercion, with the possibility of a step-by-step escalation towards the use of force, leaving ample room for the diplomatic enterprise to function. It granted both sides time to weigh their decisions before the move to the next step. It kept at a minimum, in President Kennedy’s phrase, the possibility of a "spasm reaction." (Hilsman 102)

The genius of the blockade was "that it required Khushchev to initiate military action." (Medland 51) The US had taken the initiative, and it was up to Khrushchev to comply with the quarantine that the US imposed with the full approval of all members of OAS or challenge it. "It had the psychological advantage of a deterrent as opposed to a compellent threat (to use Schelling’s terms) by stopping (though only in part) the adversary’s offending action without coercion, placing upon him the onus of further escalation" (Leighton 19). In short the imposition of a quarantine as McNamara, secretary of defense, said left the options open. If the Soviet premier displays a bit of rationality and caution, he would not try to break up the quarantine for that would escalate the crisis to a confrontation between the two powers. Khrushchev knew by that time that there is no way out but to succumb to Americans demands. Kennedy and behind him all the American people were adamant to stand firmly to the Soviets.

Khrushchev protested vehemently against the quarantine decrying it as an act of piracy and International law violation. "It is an act of aggression, pushing mankind toward the abyss of a world missile-nuclear war" (Cited in Medland 18). If he United States continued in its "piratical action", the Soviet Union, Khrushchev warned, would be in the obligation to take all "measures…necessary and adequate in order to protect its rights…And for this we have all that is necessary" (18). But he did not dare challenge it in the end. He knew that any challenge would have escalated the tensions between the

two powers, an escalation that might have led a disastrous confrontation that neither power wanted. Khrushchev was not foolhardy, and he did not succumb to the military’s demand for challenging the US. He tried to gain the maximum of benefits from the situation while eschewing a confrontation by all means. He yielded in the end to the US demands. Some saw in this a defeat for the Soviets; others regarded it as a victory. The soviets claimed that they have installed those missiles in Cuba to protect it against a US invasion, and they managed to fulfill that. Kennedy pledged not to invade Cuba if the

Soviets took all their offensive weapons from the Island under the supervision of the United Nations.

Other reports that were not imparted to the public till lately stated that a secret deal between Kennedy and the Soviets Premier was established concerning US missiles in Turkey. The US promised to take them off after the crisis would come to an end, a thing that they did six months after the Cuban crisis. In short, what counts most is not who won or lost but rather the results of the conflict. Both presidents displayed a great deal of wisdom and containment. To the relief of all, the Cuban missile crisis came to a peaceful end.

IV. Special Tribute to Kennedy and Khrushchev

Special tribute should be paid to the people who contributed to the peaceful settlement of the crisis. The whole world was on the brink of disaster. Were it not for the wisdom, restraint and determination of the two countries leadership, a nuclear war could have erupted. The withdrawal of the missiles required courage on the part of both leaderships. Courage did not mean foolhardiness for both Kennedy and Khrushchev. Both had to stand to the strong pressure waged by the hardliners to act boldly. Anti-American hardliners in the Soviet Union and "Russo-phobes" in the US tried to exert

much weight on the two leaders to resort to force. Neither leader, however, succumbed to the irrational demands of the hard-liners and the military. Kennedy stated right after the settlement of the Cuban crisis, "the advice I would give to my successor is to watch the generals and to avoid feeling that just because they were military men their opinions on military matters were worth a damn" (Leighton 230).

Kennedy was successful because he skillfully made use of coercion to achieve a diplomatic breakthrough. "He applied his pressure upon Khrushchev forcefully but adroitly" (Lord199). Force, as was judiciously employed by Kennedy, was used as a coercive discreet element to push the Soviets to back down without humiliation. His resolve was clear and unshakable. The missiles had to be taken out of Cuba by any means available. The genius of the policy he adopted resided in his skilful use of toughness with flexibility, and coercion with caution. To Arthur Schlesinger, the Cuban missile crisis displayed "the ripening of an American leadership unsurpassed in the responsible management of power…a combination of toughness…nerve and wisdom, so brilliantly controlled, so matchlessly calibrated that it dazzled the world." (Nathan 20)

Likewise, Khrushchev was successful because he did not surrender to the whimsical demands of his opponents in the Kremlin. He knew that the use of force would culminate in a catastrophe, no matter who won. Robert Kennedy writes after the end of the missile crisis: "Kennedy respected Khrushchev for properly determining what was in his own country’s interest and what was in the interest of mankind" (Kennedy 128).

Conclusion

The Cuban Missile Crisis, the most acute and war-threatening confrontation of the Cold War, offers one of the best examples of crisis management. The handling of this situation by President John F. Kennedy with sustained involvement by officials at the highest level was to become the model for "crisis management". Crisis management in this sense required an unprecedented sensitivity to and cooperation with the adversary in a situation in which both sides had more to lose than either had to gain.

The merger of politics and force marked the beginning of a new era, an era where recourse to sheer force to resolve disputes was no longer deemed the most viable option. Force came to be seen as a means to serve diplomatic ends. The peaceful termination of the Cuban Missile conflict gave rise to a new nexus between force and diplomatic maneuvers. This is the morale that can be inferred from the ending of the frightful event that could have transformed the whole world into an abyss of calamity. This union of force and diplomacy was the harbinger for a more benign world predicated on organizational effectiveness between states.

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