CIAO DATE: 05/01

A Two-level Game Analysis of the Complexities of Interstate Rivalry in the Maghreb

Abstract

By drawing on current scholarly models of two-level game theory in the arena of international negotiations, I attempted to provide insight not only into the "why" of the current impasse in the Maghreb, but also into the "how" of resolving these issues. Putnam’s celebrated two level game metaphor was the intellectual inspiration in this project. Despite its limitation, it was a useful model that provided some useful language for sorting out the current complexities and deadlock of the Maghreb.

In the Maghreb, politics at the domestic and international levels are fundamentally interdependent, and to explain the policies of states in the international arena one must pay serious attention to domestic and international forces. The conclusion of a fair and durable accord within the constraints of this "double edged diplomacy" is hard to achieve when the prospects of its acceptance at home are dim. No deal that compromises Moroccan territorial integrity will ever be accepted by Moroccans. Similarly, a pledge from the Algerians to stop their support to the Polisario-front is hard to conceive as long as domestic issues are "heterogeneous. Negotiators are then constrained by the domestic and international implications of their actions, and must choose policies based on their expectations of both what the other player will accept and what their (and their opponents) constituencies will be willing to accept. To achieve a successful agreement then, the leader must locate the intersection, if any, between his/her constituency’s win-set and what the other level 1 negotiators will accept (that is, the level 1 "win-set"). By monitoring strategies and tactics at each, it becomes possible to understand superficially puzzling developments.

Introduction

The Maghreb in the late 1980’s₁ entered a new phase of controversial complexity. This phase was expected to mark a rupture with the antagonism of the past. It was expected to be an era of entente where no efforts would be spared to promote cooperation and avoid confrontation. The leaders of the five countries that compose the Maghreb region manifested their intentions to expand areas of cooperation and to reduce international tension. They were eager to start a new promising, less volatile relationship.

The path to Maghreban integration has been far tortuous, with many treaties, associations, and alliances/counter-alliances being formed and broken (Deeb 20-33). All endeavors for cooperation in the Maghreb failed because of boundary disputes, diplomatic rivalry (especially between Algeria and Morocco), and differing economic philosophies and domestic political systems. Ever since the independence of the countries of the Maghreb various shocks from inside and outside the region set back the process of political and economic integration. 1963 saw a three-week war, the so-called "Sand War", between Algeria and Morocco. In 1979, an attack on the Mauritanian mainland by Algeria-backed Polisario front was carried out. In 1980, a severe crisis exploded between Libya and Tunisia when dissident elements of the Tunisian regime trained in Libya perpetrated an attack on the Tunisian city of Gafsa. In 1985 Tunisian residents were expelled from Libya, the borders were closed and a spate of mutual accusations of attempts at internal destabilization were exchanged. Amidst this antagonistic struggle for survival, cooperation has proved to be elusive, even when the potential benefits of the payoffs are universally recognized.

But in 1989 a promising era of collaboration between the five states loomed on the horizon. It seemed as if decades of political disagreements might find an institutional form capable of preventing conflicts amongst the states from degenerating into wars. The creation of the Arab Maghreb Union (UMA) fostered hopes of the creation of a concerted regional block that would stand guard against the complexities of a more and more interdependent world. The UMA was expected to foster co-operative relations capable of transcending conflicts generated by a world pervaded by anarchy. The Maghreb was expected to evolve from a Hobbesian anarchy₂ to a Deutschian security community.₃ It was also expected to overcome problems of collective action that could only be solved by coordinating the behaviors of the five states.

The aim of the Maghreb Union was thus to facilitate mutual cooperation between all member states on a large spectrum of issues. The establishment of the UMA was to keep political-military issues from festering and eventually erupting into conflict by ensuring they are addressed in a pro-active, systematic manner. The UMA put in place machinery for the prevention, management, and resolution of conflicts that could thus ensure that issues do not boil over and erupt into conflicts. Article 3 stipulates that all five countries come up with coordinated policies with regard to defence, diplomacy, economy, and culture. Article 14 stipulates that all diplomatic relations will be built on reciprocal dialogue and a mutual defence pact. Article 15 urges all countries not to permit any activity or organization in their territory which could harm the security, territorial integrity or political system of any other member states.

Despite exaggerated rhetoric and spectacular summit meetings, the era of entente failed to bring an end to hostility. The expected relaxation of tensions and confrontation did not materialize. Cooperation, faith, trust and security were spasmodic. All exuberance was soon to fade out with the explosive crises that were to occur. Algeria slided into a deep political crisis. The UN Security Council decided to introduce sanctions against Libya because of the terror action over Lockerbie. There are of course other basic reasons conducive to the failure of Maghreban Unity, and that I will tackle in depth.

This paper seeks to analyze the complex dynamics that avert countries of the Maghreb from integrating. Integration has always been a principal objective of all five states that compose the Maghreb region but this integration, however, was occurring at a reduced level and scope and that only fragmented issue linkages could be discerned in the Maghreb’s collective decision-making. In investigating the failure of Maghreban integration, I base my analysis on Putnam’s two level game metaphor. My contention is that the linkage between domestic politics and international politics offers an explanation of the struggles and challenges that the Maghreb has undergone. The major insight of the 'two-level' metaphor is that states act on two arenas simultaneously, viz. the domestic as well as the international. Strategies in one arena must be conceived with the other arena in mind - as an example, an international agreement between the two big rivals of the Maghreb, Morocco and Algeria, may need national endorsement, and it is thus necessary to gain support for it at home. Likewise, if the state commits itself to an international agreement that imposes policies that are difficult to realize at home, the state may welcome this opportunity to have policy imposed on oneself. Depending on the relative strength of the state vis-à-vis domestic groups and on its position in the international negotiation, states may play various 'games', offensive or defensive (Putnam, 1988).

Two Level Game Methaphor

In the Maghreb, politics at the domestic and international levels are fundamentally interdependent, and to explain the policies of states in the international arena one must pay serious attention to domestic and international forces. It is the interaction between domestic politics and international politics that ultimately shape how the international game is played out and therefore the extent of cooperative endeavors. While it is intuitively obvious that internal politics have an effect on international agreements, linkage politics stresses the need to explore the extent to which domestic politics itself is derived from external phenomena. Obviously, one can not understand a two-level game by only looking at one game. This linkage between the two levels necessitates that that they should be analyzed simultaneously.

An important way to frame the connection between domestic and international politics involves Putnam’s notion of the "two-level game".The theoretical approach of "two-level games" has attempted to go beyond purely realist or liberal interpretations cast in terms of either domestic causes and international effects ("second image") (Waltz 1959) or of international causes and domestic effects (" second-image-reversed") (Peter Gourevitch 1978) and "aim instead for ‘general equilibrium’ theories which account simultaneously for the interactions of domestic and international factors" Putnam (1993). Compared with 'one-level' games where the starting-point is the state and a given interest, the state in the 'two-level' metaphor is functioning as ´gate-keeperª between the international and the domestic level. The crucial theoretical link between the two levels is the requirement of domestic ratification of the international agreement.

The two-level game theory developed by Putnam emphasizes the interactive process that occurs when a national leader finds himself negotiating international agreements simultaneously: the international negotiation (level 1), wherein the leader tries to reach an agreement with other leaders; and a domestic negotiation (level 2), wherein the leader tries to get the agreement be accepted by the legislation. This simultaneous game at both levels tends to slide the negotiators of both camps into an imbroglio where they have to conciliate intense domestic pressure with international pulls and pushes. The two types of pressure are fundamentally different, and the constraints imposed would not be encountered in the first place if the negotiations were held in a pure national or international game.

Putnam's two-level game centers around the range of agreements for Level I, the international set, that are acceptable to a majority at Level II, the domestic constituency. This range is known as the win-set for the particular country on which the analysis is focused. The "win-set" is defined as "the set of all possible Level I (international) agreements that would ‘win’ _ that is, gain the necessary majority among the constituents" (Putnam 439). By analyzing the international negotiations from the perspective of one country through win-sets, Putnam argued that it is possible to estimate the impact of the domestic politics on the success of the international negotiation. From this model, then, Putnam hypothesized that larger win-sets make Level I agreement more likely and, conversely, the smaller the win-set the more likely the negotiations will break down. Also, the relative size of the Level II win-sets will affect the distribution of the joint gains at Level I. A smaller win-set at Level II can be a bargaining advantage for a country at Level I. Along the same lines, the successful international agreement must fall inside the Level II win-set. The larger the Level II win-set, the more likely there will be a successful agreement reached. However, the larger Level II win-set increases the likelihood that the Level I negotiator will be challenged by other countries.

Putnam’s conjecture, however, is debatable. A small win-set might boost the negotiator’s bargaining power, by allowing the leader to press for a favorable agreement on the grounds that any other agreement would not be ratified domestically, but this runs the risk of not achieving any agreement on the first place. In the presence of severe internal constraints, the bargaining set may be reduced so much as to exclude a Pareto efficient solution from consideration. The result is that the agreements reached will not recognize the greatest possible gains for all actors. A large win-set, however, does not necessarily undermine the bargaining capacity of the chief negotiator. It might instead make it easier to strike a deal with one’s adversary. A large win-set demonstrates a strong alignment existent between the chief negotiator and his domestic constituents, and this might be a great asset in international negotiations. It shows the great consensus revolving around the issues under contention.

While the size of the win-sets is important for the development of the international agreements, the nature of the domestic and international constraints placed on the international agreement is critical to understanding the bargaining outcome. No categorical statements can be made with regard to the effects of domestic or international politics on the international agreement, but there are several key factors that can be helpful in predicting the outcome of international negotiations.

The International Game: Pressure and Compromise

The international level is comprised of sovereign states seeking to negotiate a treaty that best maximizes their own ability to satisfy domestic pressures, while minimizing the adverse consequences of foreign developments. The logic posits that states negotiate and sign treaties at the international level that can make it through the rigors of domestic politics. No international agreement between Morocco and Algeria is possible if does not bear the print of domestic approval. Any agreement between the two sides has to have large domestic acceptability sets.

Decisions in the international game, however, are influenced by additional factors other than domestic politics. International pressure, for example, has proven especially important in bringing about improvement in the Western Sahara issue.₄ Late King Hassan II felt pressed to moderate his country’s firm position on Western Sahara. The kingdom’ tough posture moved from one extreme to the other. Morocco moved from a categorical opposition to the Sahrawis right of self-determination to a grudgingly approval of holding a referendum on the fate of the disputed territory. Morocco even accepted to hold private talks with the Polisario-Front, an organization it does not recognize. The King’s moves spurred domestic disapproval of the policy of concessions he undertook. But it is widely believed that he had no other alternative but to soften his country’s position in the face of mounting international pressure. Algeria itself is pushed to find a solution with its neighbor Morocco apropos of the Western Sahara issue. The US, France and the United Nations have publicly manifested their support for the Moroccan’s proposition of finding a political solution to the conflict. The Algerian side has so far refused to embrace this new approach. But it is widely believed that the American and French mediation within the framework of the UN will be able to break the deadlock. In the face of international pressure the Algerians might soften their stand, as did the Moroccans before them.

The Domestic Level: Actors and Influences

The domestic level is comprised of a number of actors, processes and influences that have a strong impact on the final international agreement. A basic part of understanding the nature of domestic politics in the Maghreb revolves around identifying the types of actors involved in domestic political game. I distinguish four types of actors that shape how the domestic game is played: The military, the mass public, mass media and political opposition.

The Military

The military is an actor in every political system and as such it seeks to influence the processes and outcomes of decision or policy-making. Military officers use whatever political skills and resources they can muster to achieve their goals. "Who will guard the guards themselves" remains a central question, just as when it was posed by the Roman author Juvenal two millennia ago.Authoritarian countries face particularly onerous challenges in making their military establishments politically neutral and subject to the types of control necessary for meaningful democracy. The Algerian Army is a case in point. It is the decisive player on the Algerian political scene and the real shadow power in Algeria. It is an institutionalized actor that is very influential in national politics. Military leaders have asserted themselves as key players in Algerian domestic politics by imposing a high cost on politicians who fail to take sufficient account of their agenda. Civilian contenders for political power are actively courting army support. The Army is the institution that gives support to presidential candidates and that allows a president to stay in his post.

The military in Morocco got an increasing place in government right after independence. It was the guarantor of the stability of the country and the continuation of the Monarchy in a newly inherited dangerous environment. The military acting under the command of a young but powerful monarch had to resort to brutality to put down urban protest movements (in particular Casablanca in March 1965) and to eliminate staunch opponents of the regime. But unlike the preponderant role that the military in Algeria plays, the Moroccan military saw many of its prerogatives reduced by a smart king who mastered a political game he crafted himself. After the failed military coups of the early 1970’s, the king managed to distance the military from the domestic political game. Most of armed forces have been preoccupied with defending the territorial integrity of the country. This served the cause of the monarch who was able to increase his authority by strengthening measures designed to control the military.Its role is nevertheless clearly defined and its functions within the state controlled, especially as it has no powers of decision, questions of security and defence now being the exclusive province of the monarch. The Moroccan military might not be as influential as its Algerian part but it still has say in foreign policy when it comes to matters of territorial integrity. Amongst the members that the king has appointed to handle the Western Sahara issue is a military general. This testifies to the important role that military officers can play in the domestic game.

The Mass Public

There are a variety of theories that explore the role of the mass public in international decision making. Authors such as Bueno de Mesquita and Siverson (1995) have made arguments concerning the role of the electorate in limiting leaders options. In a democracy, the mass public plays a pretty important role in foreign policy issues. Chief executives can not simply ignore the public opinion because their continuation in power is contingent upon the way the public gauges their performance while in office. Leaders have to be wary about the consequences of their foreign policies for as Bueno de Mesquita, et al. (1992) states they will be held accountable by their constituents for the success or failure of their foreign policies. In non-democracies, too, the public has a say in leaders continuation in power. A non-satisfied citizenry might revolt against the blunders of repressive rulers. The protests and riots that took place in Algeria in 1988 are a clear example of what a disgruntled public can do.

The mass public in the Maghreb as in any other part of the world usually tend not to be too much concerned with problems of foreign policy in as much as those problems do not affect their daily life. As Roseneau suggests, an ordinary citizen tends to see foreign policy as dealing with "remote and obscure matters that, if they are kept under control, seem too distant from the daily needs and wants of most citizens to arouse concern." (Roseneau 475). Similarly, Powlick and Katz characterize public attitudes toward most foreign policy issues as disengaged or uninformed, and "more latent than real." Opinions are thought to be aroused "only by events that impinge on one’s interests, activities or aspirations" (Powlick & Katz 31-33). But, if the governments’ foreign policies affect badly the daily life of their citizens, then at that time the public will react.

The deepening of economic and social tension in Algeria resulted in a series of protest movements against the incumbent regime in 1988. The October 1988 riots in Algeria included attacks on the Polisario headquarters in Algiers, apparently as a result of resentment of the costs of financing the war while Algeria's economy deteriorated. People voiced their discontent of the policy that their government was pursuing. So much money was squandered on procuring advanced military hardware to achieve a long sought military edge over Morocco capable of making Algeria the strongest country of the Maghreb. Military over spending and the backing of the Polisario proved a great burden to the country. Algeria possesses enormous resources that are badly exploited. The Algerian mass public protest pushed the regime to review its policies. The President at the time, Chadli Bendjedid, responded to popular anger by proposing a broad series of political reforms. The constitution was amended by popular referendum to allow political parties, ending the National Liberation Front's 30-year political monopoly.

Mass Media

On the surface, research on the effect of the media on policymakers' attention seems to have reached contradictory conclusions. After reviewing the literature, Rogers and Dearing state that "the media agenda seems to have direct, sometimes strong, influence upon the policy agenda of elite decision makers." (Rogers & Dearing 91) Yet, according to Kingdon "one can find examples of media importance . . . but such examples are fairly rare . . . The media report what is going on in government, by and large, rather than having an independent effect on government agendas" (Kingdon 58-9).

The media may influence attention by policymakers in less direct ways, however. The public's familiarity with political matters is closely related to the amount and duration of attention these affairs receive in the mass media. In order to truly understand the role the mass public plays as a domestic constraint, one must understand the role of the media as a conduit of information concerning international events. This wide range of coverage is important because the media coverage impacts the public’s level of concern over foreign policy or events in the international arena. Studies such as those conducted by Iyengar et al (1982) and Graber (1978) suggest that the news coverage has a substantial impact on what viewers see as the most important problem facing the country.

The Western Sahara issue, for example, receives extensive amount of coverage in the Moroccan media. For decades, the media stressed the "Moroccaness" of Western Sahara to the extent that the greatest majority in the kingdom wholeheartedly believes that Western Sahara is Moroccan, and any attempt to cede this territory is viewed as ultimate betrayal. When the late King decided to accept the idea of a referendum, it came as a shock to many people. Western Sahara in the public eyes is Moroccan. After all this is what they were taught and exposed to. The media has contributed greatly in shaping the public’s thought with regard to the Western Sahara issue. The term "Western Sahara" issue has never been used in any media channel. The term used is Moroccan Sahara. Government’s policies with regard to the Western Sahara issue is strongly influenced by elite opinion as brought to the public's attention in the mass media.

Political Opposition

The opposition party can lend additional credibility to a government's foreign policy by publicly supporting it in a crisis. The decision to support the government reveals that there are political incentives to carry through on that policy. Hence, the opposition can bolster the government's signal with a "confirmatory signal" of its own.Assumptions that opposition parties are not strategic actors but a passive source of costs obscure the fact that opposition politicians can and do make choices about whether to support the government in its conduct of foreign policy. Moroccan experience, for example, offers the contrast between the Moroccan-Polisario War, in which the opposition party helped push the government toward an intransigent stance, and the crisis leading up to the Gulf War, in which many Democratic representatives publicly opposed the government decision to dispatch Moroccan forces to the gulf to join the coalition force against Iraq. There is no question that the political opposition in Morocco is an important agenda setter.

Synergistic Linkages between the International and Domestic Level

Having identified the important domestic actors that play a role in shaping governmental foreign policies, it is now important to see the interaction between the domestic and international game. Combining the two leads to an emphasis on the "circular" character of the relations between national and international politics. In other words, while it is accepted that domestic politics, in varying degrees, can explain foreign policy, linkage politics stresses the need to explore the extent to which domestic politics itself is derived from external phenomena. What happens at one level of the negotiation "reverberates" at the other. This reverberation means that strategies and outcomes at different levels of the game simultaneously affect one another. As Putnam notes, "the political complexities for the players in this ... game are staggering. Any player at the international table [or at the Community table] who is dissatisfied with the outcome may upset the game board [by failing to ratify the agreement], and conversely any leader who fails to satisfy his fellow players at the domestic table risks being evicted from his seat"(Putnam 33). Putnam goes on to say that "if national preferences were exogenous from the point of view of international relations, then the domestic political game could be modeled separately, and the 'outputs' from that game could be used as the 'inputs' to the international game.... But if international pressures reverberate within domestic politics, or if issues can be linked synergistically, then domestic outcomes are not exogenous and the two levels cannot be modeled independently."(34) In sum, Putnam defines synergistic linkages as the type of issue linkage at the international level (and in this case, the Community level) that alters the feasible outcomes at the domestic level. Reverberation implies that international pressure expands the domestic win-set and facilitates agreement.

This complexity of each level makes it hard for decision-makers to ignore either of the two levels. Heads of state must coordinate actions at two bargaining "tables," which correspond to domestic politics and international negotiation. By monitoring strategies and tactics at each, it becomes possible to understand superficially puzzling developments. More specifically, initiatives in one domain may be a function of constraints or opportunities imposed by the other. To achieve a successful agreement, the leader must locate the intersection, if any, between his/her constituency’s win-set and what the other level 1 negotiators will accept (that is, the level 1 "win-set"). The negotiation is complex because each negotiator is playing a similar two-level game. Putnam's contribution lies in his emphasis on the interactive nature of the international and domestic processes.

Societal Demands and International Bargaining

One important implication of the two level game metaphor is that each negotiator in the international game is constrained by the size of the win-set of his/her domestic constituency. A chief executive is unlikely to sign an international agreement outside of his/her domestic win-set because of the low probability that such an agreement would be ratified domestically. Domestic pressure matters regardless of the type of government at place. Most heads of state in the Maghreb have not usually worked in a political vacuum or had unlimited resources at their disposal in pursuing security policies. They may have been autocratic in their rule, they may have wielded power on their subjects but they have nevertheless often been constrained by groups that oppose a particular policy goal or have political access that contradict the rulers’ main paradigm of ruling. As Hagan (1933) suggests, both democratic and authoritarian governments face important domestic political constraints. Similarly, Putnam (1988: 436-37) emphasizes that the domestic portion of his model applies for both democratic and authoritarian states.

Most leaders in the Maghreb face strong opposition or resistance from their subordinates when it comes to national security matters. Ben Bella was overthrown when he considered ceding disputed territory to Morocco.₅ President Mohammed Boudiaf paid the prize in 1992 for his pro-Moroccan position in settling the question of the Western Sahara. Of course there are other matters that contributed to his assassination.₆ Late King Hassan II was strongly opposed for accepting to cede territory believed to be historically Moroccan (Mauritania, and some parts of Eastern Algeria). Various forces in Morocco maintained that colonial France had cut off the eastern part of the country's territory. In the name of "Greater Morocco", which included Mauritania, the rightwing parties in Morocco - Istiqlal₇ in particular — laid claim to some parts of Eastern Algeria. Late king Hassan II had always had hard time in convincing his people to adopt or at least accept his approach of dealing with foreign policy.

Even when leaders come to prefer a negotiated settlement to the issues under contention their hands are tied by stringent domestic actors. The military in Algeria still holds those grandiose aspirations of dominating the Maghreb and refuses to succumb to the realities of the present. Some of the elements of the military still harbor feelings of antagonism for the monarchy. Perceptions of Morocco as "reactionary and feudal", terms late President Boumedienne enjoyed using while describing the Kingdom, still exist. Any attempt to deviate in an accommodative direction is highly likely to be punished. The military believes that the Moroccan- Algerian crisis can be won by the employment of a coercive strategy that credibly demonstrates the State’s superior resolve and capabilities. Algeria a pretender to hegemonic control has tried to induce or coerce its neighbors to support a system that fits its ambitions. Hence, all attempts for rapprochement have been plagued by this "free rider" syndrome.

These hard-line strategies reduce the government’s policy of flexibility, and sometimes immobilize it completely. Military officers still do not grasp that those cold war mentalities are no longer viable, that policies that were in the recent past feasible are now obsolete. New policy strategies need to be devised and a new vision to the problems at stake is required. "The culture of hatred which circumstances have sown to the detriment of the higher interests of the peoples of the area", as President Bouteflika once said in an interview granted to the Middle East Insight, has to be eradicated, but his prerogatives are very limited.

President Bouteflika is restricted in exercising his functions. He is aware that no agreement can be reached on the Western Sahara issue without the blessing of the military. The latter perceive Western Sahara as "their private domain"… "and the first one to show any moderation would be disqualified" (Addi 1999). The military in Algeria has a profound influence on policymaking, and is implicitly responsible for the President’s continuation in power. Boutfelika must be very much concerned with the consequences of his foreign policy decisions. Any accommodative move towards Morocco would result in his automatic removal from power. He has "very little room for maneuver so long as the generals who named him as the regime's candidate remain in office." He certainly is not willing to put his life in danger or jeopardize his chances of remaining in power by pursuing policies that he sees fit for the national interests of the country. History in fact tells the story of those who dared challenge the mainstream order laid out by the military.

During the first weeks of his tenure in office, President Bouteflika has shown signs of willingness to forge a new rapprochement with Morocco. King Mohammed VI has shown the same interest in developing a new entente with Algeria. But this aura of hope was soon to fade out with a sudden change in President Bouteflika position. He started accusing Morocco openly of helping the militants. He even accused Morocco with being an international Narcotic drug trafficker country. This sudden change is believed to be due to the pressure of the military. "It seemed that since Western Sahara has always been the chasse-gardee of the military institution, Bouteflika had stepped over the red line by getting involved in this issue"(Kharouby 2000).

The great constraints that the president in Algeria is subject to complicate the international game. The complexity at the international level takes another dimension because domestic issues are "heterogeneous" - that is, domestic constituents are divided in their preferences such that negotiated agreements that increase utility for some decrease it for others. The Algerian case again offers a clear example of how internal divisions within a state bear negatively on international bargaining.

Algeria is deadlocked between forces favoring and opposing rivalry termination with their neighbor Morocco. Some wish the rivalry to persist till the long sought preponderance of Algeria over the whole Maghreb materializes, others, however, express their wish that the hostilities between to the two great countries of the Maghreb cease. This division in preferences is best portrayed in the most powerful organization of the country: the military. Fractions of the military expressed their will to see an end to the hostilities between countries of the Maghreb. In 1995, leading military figures submitted a report to the then President, Liamine Zeroual, recommending rapprochement with Morocco. That report is a clear manifestation of the existent rift between military officers. The fact that the recommendations presented in that report never crystallized is due to the staunch opposition of a faction in the military that is hostile to any rapprochement with Morocco. The chasm between proponents and opponents of rapprochement has contributed to the current deadlock in negotiations between Algeria and Morocco.

This division in preferences is also seen in the public. Part of the Algerian public opposes the Algerian government support of the Polisario-Front. This opposition was clearly manifested in the 1988 riots in Algiers where the public clearly voiced their anger at the government persistence in helping the Polisario-Front at the expense of the national interests of the country. The attacks perpetrated on the Polisario headquarters in Algiers is a clear sign that part of the public is sick and tired of paying the cost of an ill-conceived governmental policy. Civilian policy makers have also expressed their desire to see rivalry between the two countries come to an end. Through the workshops and conferences they have organized, these associations have raised the visibility of such issues as the fraternity between the all people of the Maghreb. The people of the Maghreb share a common history, language and religion. It is high time that they capitalized on these commonalties to forge a unified front and to cast aside all divergences.

With the superheated atmosphere surrounding the Western Sahara issue, particularly in the exchanges between the generation of officers who were directly involved in the liberation movement on the one hand, and the younger generation on the other, and between the government public belligerent stand to prevent Morocco from integrating Western Sahara into the mainland and the public desire to see this rivalry come to an end, little has been accomplished internationally, because the domestic interests within Algeria have almost no common ground for compromise between themselves. This contradicts Putnam’s argument that the more heterogeneous the conflict, the more likely it is that the government will be able to strike a deal internationally. Putnam defines heterogeneous conflict as factional conflict and argues that "a government that is internally divided is more likely to be able to strike a deal internationally than one that is firmly committed to a single policy."(41) The Algerian case in anomaly to Putnam’s argument.

Because of the domestic stalemate, Algerian chief of government goes to negotiations with very little leeway in negotiating an agenda that might suit all contestant parties. The presidency in Algeria is unlikely to sign any agreement with Morocco outside of its domestic win-set, because of the low probability that such an agreement would be accepted by the relevant domestic actors. The small win-set that negotiators enjoy constrains them. This again contradicts what Putnam suggested. For Putnam, a smaller win-set increases bargaining power, by allowing the negotiator to press for a favorable agreement on the grounds that any other agreement would not be accepted domestically. The position of the Algerian government at the bargaining table was not boosted though the "win-set" is small. Their positions are not sold to their adversary. It is not even sold to the international community. More and more countries are withdrawing their recognition of the Algerian backed Polisario Front.₈ The idea that a political solution to the problem should be found generates much more approval from many parts of the world. So it is highly expected that the influence exerted at Level I might have some impact domestically.

The case of Morocco is the total opposite of Algeria. There is general agreement amongst all components of the Moroccan society vis-à-vis all international problem matters that are under contention. All Moroccans headed by their monarch unanimously agree that Western Sahara is Moroccan and any claims by Morocco’s opponents to the opposite are unacceptable. The only disagreement between the monarch and all domestic actors resided in the way policy regarding the territorial integrity of the country was pursued. The public, political leaders and military commanders are loath to any compromise or concessions on the Western Sahara issue. They steadfastly maintain that Western Sahara belongs to the mainland. Late King Hassan II king was strongly opposed when he decided to accept the idea of holding a referendum on the Western Sahara under UN auspices. And it took the whole force of his personality to bring his opponents to the idea of holding a referendum on Western Sahara. The king was of course sure that the referendum would confirm Moroccan’s position; otherwise, he would not have taken that dire step which might have cost him his throne. In February 1998, a Moroccan official stated in Le Monde: "If the vote goes in favor of Western Sahara's independence, the Moroccan monarchy is done for. Morocco's present regime has invested too much at all levels - political, economical and military — in trying to keep the Saharan provinces within its sphere of influence. Morocco simply can't afford to be beaten". It is indeed widely believed that if the kingdom lost his stakes in Western Sahara, the monarchy would lose its legitimacy.

The monarchy in Morocco is perceived as the sole protector of the nation. Mohammad V is seen as the liberator of the kingdom from the French colonizers. His successor, Hassan II, is seen as the re-unifier of the whole nation. He is accredited with regaining Western Sahara from the Spanish rule. Mohammad VI who ascended to the throne in 1999 is entrusted with the responsibility of consolidating what his ancestors have accomplished. The stakes are very high in Western Sahara. The new king is expected to decisively end this conflict, and the public trusts that he has the credentials to consolidate the territorial integrity of the kingdom.

The great specificity of the kingdom of Morocco is the total congruence between the public and decision-makers’ preferences. This large win-set boosts the kingdom’s position at the international level. Domestic constituents may have disagreed with the king on the way he handled the Western Sahara issue but the kingdom’s preferences remain the same. Western Sahara is believed to be part and parcel of Morocco. Morocco’s opponents are pretty much aware of this fact.

A large domestic win-set might nevertheless create some problems for the chief negotiators. It might in fact lead to the paradox brought by Putnam. While a large win-set might increase the chances of cooperation, it might result in a relatively less favorable outcome for the country with the large win-set. This indeed could have been the case for Morocco had their chief negotiators maintained steadfastly their positions without showing any signs of flexibility. If Morocco refused a referendum or refused to negotiate with the Algerian backed Polisario-Front, the costs could have been high for the country. But the Moroccan chief negotiators have so far been successful in dealing with domestic and international pressure. Today, all the steps that the Moroccan chief negotiators undertake are being fully accepted by all the domestic components of the society (Level II). There is a high probability that they might even be accepted at the international level too (Level I).

International Pressure and Domestic Processes

Two-level game approaches assume that state interests cannot be entirely reduced to societal demands. The balancing of international and domestic concerns in a process of "double-edged diplomacy" (Evans, Jacobson, and Putnam 1993) allows state executives to increase their autonomy vis-à-vis their domestic constituencies in pursuing their own interests (Moravscik 1994). The Moroccan King used elements of the game at level I to influence the preferences of the domestic coalition and manipulate this win-set through mobilization and insulation strategies.₉ The King believed that if he pursued an accommodation strategy, his government’s policy of flexibility might be reduced and the kingdom could have slid into a regional war that would have generated feelings of resentment and strong opposition from the international community. Despite the large win-set the king could have generated domestically if he decided to persist in claiming lost territories, he opted for a foreign policy that in was in contrast with what factions of the domestic coalition wanted.

Level 1 is important for us to understand how the two-level game works in the Maghreb. Without consideration about Level 1, we cannot tell how the game was played in Level 2, and why the game was played in that way. Strategies in one arena must be conceived with the other arena in mind - as an example, the attainment of a cooperative agreement may need national approval as well as international approval. Foreign pressure may shift the outcome from, say, the mid-point of the win-set to the end closer to the foreign demands, and it may at times actually expand the win-set to include outcomes that were not domestically viable prior to international negotiations.

The pressure the Moroccan King felt at level I certainly pushed him to seek compromise and to soften the Moroccan position. He renounced Moroccan’s claims to some parts of Eastern Algeria and Mauritania. He even decided to accept a referendum on the faith of Western Sahara. The king felt that the kingdom had to make some painful concessions to reach a compromise on the hot issues under contention. He also hoped that the concessions he made would expand his negotiating partner’s win-set without reducing the win-set he enjoyed at home. The king was careful to manipulate the negotiations with the adversary towards some personally preferred outcome in so far as the outcome in question lied within the domestic win-set.

Algeria also felt pressed by the pressure exerted on it at the international level to adopt a new policy and strategy in order to find a solution with Morocco to their long-standing conflict. The chief executives in Algeria were pretty much aware that they had to counter the pressure imposed from the military to be able to strike a fair and tenable deal with Morocco. The latter had shown some sort of flexibility by accepting a referendum on the future of Western Sahara. Morocco even accepted to sit at the same table with representatives of the Polisario Front, an organization the kingdom does not recognize. So Algeria had to come with another alternative to its stringent policy. In 1995, it seemed that a resolution to the conflict was on the horizon when the leading military officers presented a written document to the newly elected president of the time Liamine Zeroual recommending a new strategy for resolving the discord with Morocco apropos of Western Sahara. The new approach suggested giving the Polisario Front a large measure of internal autonomy under Moroccan sovereignty. But to the dismay of all "this confidential report has never been made public, both because of internal tensions within the army and because of the wider political situation (The Algerian Crisis: Not Over Yet 2000). But there is still strong hope that the influence exerted at the international level will bring Algeria to ultimately accept a political solution to the Western Sahara problem. The chief negotiators might influence the military to succumb to the will of a whole region.

Political leaders can presumably gain or lose bargaining advantages in these two simultaneous games, depending on their management of the interface between the two. A skilful leadership is one that responds to foreign pressure only to the degree that foreign demands fall within the range of deals that are deemed acceptable domestically. A powerful monarchy in Morocco skillfully adopted daring moves that have responded to foreign pressure and domestic exigencies. A weak presidency in Algeria adopted a defensive strategy that has responded so far only to the strong domestic pressure exerted on it. Depending on the relative strength of the state vis-à-vis domestic groups and on its position in the international negotiation, states may play various 'games', offensive or defensive (Matlary, 1993; Putnam, 1988).

Conclusion

By drawing on current scholarly models of two-level game theory in the arena of international negotiations, I attempted to provide insight not only into the "why" of the current impasse in the Maghreb, but also into the "how" of resolving these issues. Putnam’s celebrated two level game metaphor was the intellectual inspiration in this project. Despite its limitations as pointed out above, it was a useful model that provided some useful language for sorting out the current complexities and deadlock of the Maghreb.

The conclusion of a fair and durable accord within the constraints of a "double edged diplomacy" is hard to achieve when the prospects of its acceptance at home are dim. No deal that compromises Moroccan territorial integrity will ever be accepted by Moroccans. Similarly, a pledge from the Algerians to stop their support to the Polisario-front is hard to conceive as long as the military there still harbors plans of dominating the whole Maghreb. Negotiators are then caught between succumbing to domestic pressure and promoting the national interest. They are constrained by the domestic and international implications of their actions, and must choose policies based on their expectations of both what the other player will accept and what their (and their opponents) constituencies will be willing to accept. To achieve a successful agreement then, the leaders must locate the intersection, if any, between their constituency’s win-set and what the other level 1 negotiators will accept (that is, the level 1 "win-set"). By monitoring strategies and tactics at each, it becomes possible to understand superficially puzzling developments.

In sum, any agreement between Morocco and Algeria becomes possible only when their win-sets overlap. This overlap represents the zone of potential agreement. As such, the range of the acceptability set for each party needs to be widened. An agreement between the potential adversaries might be concluded if both parties were to agree to a wider range of possible settlements that would still maintain the status quo but save the region from the resumption of hostilities. Morocco’s recent acceptance to grant the Sahrawi people large internal autonomy under Moroccan sovereignty is a step forward, a step that the international community welcomed. The ball is in the Algerian camp at the time. Will the Algerian executive have the courage to free itself from the domestic constraints and succumb to the will of the international community? Will president Bouteflika or his successor cast aside the Algerian dream of dominating the whole Maghreb in favor of a durable peace whose payoff will be beneficial to the whole people in the region?

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Endnotes

Note 1: In February 1989, the five countries Morocco, Tunisia, Algeria, Mauritania and Libya signed the regional treaty on the Arab-Maghreb union UMA (Union de Maghreb-Arabe). Back

Note 2: Thomas Hobbes personifies the realist approach to international relations in a world of anarchy and self-help, in which individual man and men aggregated into states seek to maintain or to increase power Back

Note 3: Security communities are often thought of as group of states between which war has become unthinkable. As Karl Deutsch, et.al. put it over forty years ago, " a security community , therefore, is one in which there is real assurance that members of the community will not fight physically, but will settle their disputes in some other way" (Deutsch et.al. 5). Back

Note 4: Western Sahara represents one of the basic contentious issues that prevent Maghrebean countries from integrating. The absorption of the territory into Morocco triggered the dismay and hostility of the Algerians. The Algerians have always aspired to play the role of the hegemon in the Maghreb, and the Moroccan’s absorption of a large territory that they strongly assert as theirs upset the Algerians plans for dominating the whole Maghreb. Back

Note 5: Algerian revolutionary leader. Active in the Algerian nationalist movement after World War II, he became independent Algeria's first Prime Minister (1962) and its first elected president (1963) but was ousted in a coup (1965). Back

Note 6: The assassination of Muhammad Boudiaf can be considered as an actor from outside who tried to achieve a degree of autonomy from the system. He was an inconvenience both to the Islamic extremists by his rejection of compromise and to the civilian and military technocrats by speaking out against corruption, not to mention his pro-Moroccan position in settling the question of the Western Sahara. Back

Note 7: The Istiqlal (PI), Morocco’s eldest political party, was founded in 1944 and helped lead the fight for independence from French and Spanish colonial domination. Back

Note 8: Benin, Guinea-Bissau, Equatorial-Guinea, Togo, Congo, Sao-Tome et Principe, Swaziland, Burkina-Faso, Liberia and Tchad (Africa), Paraguay, Peru, Salvador, Honduras, Guatemala, Dominique, Saint-Lucie and Costa-Rica (Latin America), Salomon Isles (Océanie), and India (Asia), have all withdrawn recognition of the Polisario Front. Back

Note 9: Mobilization as defined by Hagan (1993) is an attempt by the leader to convince the constituency to accept his policy preferences, without bargaining or pursuing a compromise solution.
Insulation involves an attempt to separate the policy decision from public debate, typically by suppressing opposition or by co-opting the opposition with side payments. Back