CIAO DATE: 05/01

Détente and Confrontation: The 1973 Israeli-Arab October War

Introduction

Soviet-American relationship in the 1970’s entered a new phase of controversial complexity. The 1970’s were expected to mark a rupture with the antagonism of the cold war period. It was expected to be an era of détente₁ where no efforts would be spared to avoid East-West confrontations. The two superpowers manifested their intentions to expand areas of cooperation and to reduce international tension. Both the US and the Soviets were eager to start a new promising, less volatile relationship. But this exuberance was soon to fade out with the explosive crises that were to occur in the periphery.

Despite exaggerated rhetoric and spectacular summit meetings, the era of détente failed to bring an end to hostility. The expected relaxation of tensions and confrontation did not materialize. Cooperation, faith, trust and security were sporadic. "Soviet-American relations in the aftermath of the Moscow summit" as Marian Leighton stated, "hovered closer to the pole of confrontation than to that of negotiation" (Leighton 13). The erratic nature of US-Soviet relationship during the détente era witnessed major setbacks. The optimism that characterized the early 1970’s phase declined with the tribulations that were to occur in the Middle East, Portugal, and even Africa throughout the seventies. The ultimate reason for the inability of détente to produce the results expected of it is due primarily to flaws inherent in its initial design. Détente was predicated upon a joint sum game between the contestant parties, yet the reality proved otherwise. Détente was a zero-sum game where both the US and the USSR continued their pursuit of gains at the expense of one another.

This paper addresses détente in view of the strong tension it went through during the 1973 Israeli-Arab war₂. It argues that the failure of détente was expected because the policy as it was initially conceived was flawed. Détente called for a degree of cooperation between the US and the Soviets that proved to be wishful thinking for it stood as a barrier to the two superwars policies of achieving gains at the expense of one another. This paper examines the 1973 October War in light of the tension exerted upon the two superpowers to preserve détente without sacrificing their regional influence.

The International Political Context

The changing international political context paved the way for the advent of the policy of détente. The emergence of strategic nuclear parity between the US and the USSR; the movement in Europe toward East-West détente in the late 1960’s; the development of a delicate Sino-Soviet conflict in parallel with potential Sino-American rapprochement are all events that prompted the creation of a policy of détente between the two major powers.

For the United States, the changes that have occurred in the international order called for détente. As Kissinger₃ noted in an essay entitled "Central Issues of American Foreign Policy": "In the year ahead, the most profound challenge to American policy will be philosophical: to develop some concept of order in a world which is bipolar militarily but multipolar politically" (Litwak 78). This necessity for the creation of a new policy that took into account the political multipolarity and the continuing bipolarity in military affairs constituted the basic tenet of the Nixon-Kissinger strategy₄.This strategy called for the creation of a stable multipolar international structure. "This structure would maintain and stabilize the nuclear peace by making the status quo palatable to the major powers." (Melanson A. Richard 65).

Given the challenges of a New World order characterized by nuclear parity, the US devised a new policy to face these challenges. The US tried to exploit the existent asymmetries between the two powers in domains other than military strength to its benefit. The American Administration tried to develop a new perspective to the notion of power. Power for the Nixon administration came to mean more than political-military strength. The new concept of power had to include economic strength. The Soviets economic system was suffering from enormous deficiencies. The US capitalized on Soviets economic needs to gain political advantage. The United States found it relevant "to translate the power asymmetries which it enjoyed vis-à-vis the Soviet Union into political advantage–that is, a favorable balance of power as opposed to mere equilibrium" (Litwak 90). This new strategy evolved from the concept of linkage₅. The US would use its economic strength to negotiate political settlements in other contending areas from a position of strength.

The Soviets, on the other hand, saw détente as the best possible means to help make their superpower status recognized. They wanted to make the nuclear parity they have managed to achieve officially known. There are of course other basic reasons that incited the Soviets to seek détente with the United States. Most important of all was the deterioration of Soviet-Sino relationship. The Sino-Soviet conflict prompted the Soviets to seek a relaxation with the west "in order to avoid being caught in the worst corner of the international power triangle of the 1960’s and 70’s" (Gati 9). The Soviets were aware of the danger they might face if they do not reduce tensions in their Western borders. The soviets, as Gati argues, "could ill afford to pursue a high-tension policy along its Western borders" (9).

Another matter that incited the Soviets was the staggering economy they had to redress. Soviets economy suffered from "erratic growth rate, chronic shortages in agricultural and consumer goods." It had "little or no chance to compete with the West in the much-advertised scientific-technological revolution" (Gati 9). The Soviets saw that the infusion of Western goods and technology into their economy could boost their stagnant production.

The Tumultuous Road to Détente

In this new context of international world order, both powers saw détente as beneficial to their own national interests. The exuberance for détente manifested by the two powers culminated in the two summit meetings held in Moscow in May 1972, and in Washington in June 1973. The two meetings focused heavily on means to curb the continual proliferation of strategic arms and to prevent conflicts in the periphery from degenerating into a confrontation between the two superpowers. "In the age of thermonuclear weapons and strategic equality," stated Henry Kissinger, "the relaxation of tensions is the only responsible course and the only policy that can be pursued by any Administration charged with the responsibility for the lives of Americans" (Cited in Gati 16). Similarly, Leonild I. Breshnev said that "the struggle to assert the principles of the lives of peaceful coexistence, for lasting peace and détente and, in the long term, to prevent the risk of a new world war has been and still is the main element in our relations with capitalist states" (16). Both superpowers were intent on preventing any escalation of conflicts into a confrontation between them. They went as far as trying to cooperate to reduce tensions. The US, for example, involved Moscow in the settlement of Vietnam, and the Soviets hoped that the US would also involve them in the settlement of the Middle East.

However, the initial zeal manifested by the two superwars for détente was soon to diminish. Hostility between the US and the Soviets continued right after the conclusion of the agreements on détente. Both parties pursued their unilateral search for gains. This competition for the attainment of more leverage anywhere in the globe was to cause at many instances a confrontation between the two superwars. The most threatening event where the two powers were on the brink of clash was the 1973 October War. The outbreak of the Israeli-Arab war plainly demonstrated that competition between the two contestant parties could not cede way for cooperation. No party was ready to sacrifice its regional interests for the sake of détente. The Middle East, with its strategic importance, was one of those places where the two parties were actively engaged to gain leverage at the expense of one another. They had their clients in the area whom they supplied with munitions and all kinds of destructive weapons to maintain a balance that each superpower saw fit. It is, however, this blind pursuit for self-interest that contributed to the degeneration of the Middle Eastern conflict.

Détente and Competition: The October War, 1973

The deterioration of the situation in the Middle East prior to the eruption of the 1973 October war severely affected the policy of détente that the US and Soviets have started with the signing of the first strategic arms limitation agreement (SALT I) in Moscow in May 1972, and had worked to bolster in late June 1973 in the US with the agreement on a "code of conduct" that stipulated that the two powers should coordinate their actions in the event of contingencies that threaten the stability of world order. The agreement on the prevention of war signed in June 1973 stated that the two powers "agree that they will act in such a manner as to prevent the development of situations capable of causing a dangerous exacerbation of their relations, as to avoid military confrontations, and as to exclude between countries not parties to this agreement appear to involve the risk of nuclear war." It also stated that "if relations between countries not parties to this agreement appear to involve the risk of nuclear war…(the two Powers) shall immediately enter into urgent consultations with each other and make every effort to avert this risk" (Garthoff 435).

But détente was not strong enough to subdue hostilities between the two powers. It failed to narrow their divergent differences. It did not succeed in subduing their thirst to expand their national interests at the expense of one another. The pursuit of mutually exclusive goals and interests has remained a prominent feature of Soviet-Americans relations. Such conduct did not help solve the predicament of the Middle East. On the opposite, it worsened it. Both powers are indeed to be faulted for not doing much to solve the Arab-Israeli conflict.

US-Soviet Conduct and the Outbreak of the War

Both the United States and the USSR grossly underestimated the importance of local actors in the determination of political outcomes along the periphery. Both superpowers must have thought that they could exercise control on their clients without facing any resistance. But the unfolding of events subsequent to the agreements on détente proved the contrary. Client States were wary of the repercussions that might be engendered by the rapprochement of the Soviets and the US. Israel and Egypt were two of those dependent states whose objectives could not be attained without the assistance of their patrons. That is why, they were greatly concerned by the US-Soviet rapprochement. Egypt was disappointed by the Soviets conduct following the new rapprochement policy that the two superpowers agreed on. The Soviets were seen as sacrificing their commitment to the Egyptians for the sake of détente with the US. The same can be applied to Israel. It feared that this rapprochement would lead the two powers to bargain on the fate of the whole region to its detriment. As such, both antagonistic parties were reluctant to follow what their patrons tried to impose on them if they saw that this was to their disadvantage (Indyk 171). The October war is a good case in point. It plainly demonstrated how client states could resist the control of their patrons.

Both powers can be faulted for not doing much to subdue the long-standing enmity between Israel and the Arabs. The Arab-Israeli conflict threatened to drive the whole Middle East region to the abyss of calamity. The tensions between the antagonists was high and explosive. The continual arms race of the warring sides was alarming and no possible peaceful deal could be struck between the two sides without the intervention of the two superwars. But to the dismay of all, the US and USSR did not exhaust all means available to prevent such conflict from happening. They did not meet their "special responsibility…to do everything in their power so that conflicts or situations will not arise which would serve to increase international tensions" (cited in Garthoff 435-36). It is true that neither power instigated the conflict, but it is equally true that neither power worked enough to resolve the problem. Instead of addressing the major underlying grievances of the conflict, they kept supplying their clients with arms of destruction. Each superpower tried to empower its client states, for in their empowerment is an empowerment to itself. Both the US and the USSR were mainly preoccupied by preserving or strengthening their position in such a strategic place as the Middle East. "Both the United States and the Soviet Union also had other objectives in their arms supply and various unilateral actions that did not contribute to crisis prevention, even if those actions were not intended to incite conflict or prolong tension" (Garthoff 436).

Both the US and USSR maneuvered for political advantage. Neither side complied with the basic principles agreed upon. Each sought to obtain unilateral advantages at the expense of the other. Neither side was prepared to forgo the advantages it can reap from the Arab-Israeli conflict for the sake of détente. Rhetoric aside, as Simon Serfaty said, "both the United States and the Soviet Union viewed the conflict as one in which some degree of superpower confrontation was permissible and even desirable to shape the postwar political situation in the region to their respective advantage" (Serfaty 259). Kissinger candidly acknowledged that détente was not to inhibit his country’s pursuit of leverage in particular strategic places such as the Middle East. In his memoir Kissinger remarked that "détente was not a favor we did the Soviets. It was partly necessity; partly a tranquilizer for Moscow as we sought to draw the Middle East into closer relations with us at the Soviets’ expense; partly the moral imperative of the nuclear age." US policy to contain Soviet influence in the Middle East was "in fact making progress under the cover of the détente," he says. The same objectives can be applied to the Soviets policy. Soviets wanted to expand their influence in the Middle East region under the disguise of détente. They aspired to an equal status with their rival in dealing with the problems of the region. They sought joint collaboration with the US to solve the Israeli-Arab conflict. Such role would bolster their position in the region and would certainly elevate them in the eyes of their client states.

The US, however, wanted to thwart any Soviet attempt to fortify its position in the region. Any deal struck under the auspices of the two powers would have raised the Soviets status in the Middle East, and this was unacceptable to the US. "Coexistence to us," Kissinger warned Moscow in the midst of the 1973 war in the Middle East, "continues to have a very precise meaning: we will oppose the attempt of any one country to achieve a position of predominance either globally or regionally" (Cited in Serfaty 245).

In the June 1973 summit meeting between the two superpower leaders, Breshnev warned of the gravity of the Middle-Eastern problem and called for a joint American-Soviet coordinate action to find a peaceful settlement to the problem. Kissinger and Nixon averted any discussion of the issue. They did not want to negotiate the matter with the Soviets. Nixon said that the Soviets were aware that "if America was able to contribute toward a peaceful settlement of Arab-Israeli differences, we would be striking a serious blow to the Soviet presence and prestige in the Middle East" (Nixon 885). The Soviets want to "bulldoze us into solving their dilemmas without paying any price" Kissinger added (Kissinger 409). What can be inferred from these statements is that the primary concern of the US was not to settle the perennial Israeli-Arab conflict, but rather to prevent the Soviets from gaining any advantages in the region. A settlement of the issue was of course desired but not at the expense of the US dominant position in the area. "We were not willing to pay for détente in the coin of our geopolitical position" (299). The Soviets nevertheless continued to call for urgent intervention of the two powers to subdue the tensions until the war erupted. In his address to the UN General Assembly on September 25, Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko warned, "that the fires of war could break out at any time and who would tell what consequences would ensue" (Gromyko 366).

US Dilatory Tactics were Ill-Considered

Kissinger thought that the longer the Middle Eastern crisis lasted, the more frustrated the Arab States aligned with Russia would become. It was expected that such stalemate would reduce the Soviets clout in the region. The Arabs were so desperate to get their occupied territories back and the Soviets were not doing much to realize their aspirations, and hence redress the balance. This tactic worked to a certain extent. It made the Arabs furious with the Soviets role in the crisis. Anwar al-Sadat realized that he could no longer rely on Soviets military, economic and political backing to help Egypt recover its occupied territories by Israel since 1967. Soviet presence in Egypt as William Quandt stated "prevented Sadat from dealing with the United States, it worried the conservative Saudis, and it exposed Sadat to severe domestic criticism, especially from within the army" (Quandt 5-6). The Egyptian’s despair with the Soviets policy reached its peak in July 1972 when Anwar al-Sadat decided to expel Soviet military advisors and technicians from Egypt₆. The Soviets were seen as incapable of solving Egypt’s grievances. Anwar al-Sadat came to the conclusion that only the US held the keys to a solution to the Egypt-Israeli conflict. Sadat, however, was to be disappointed by the US reaction to his bold act. He thought the US would welcome this move for it certainly was a blow to Soviets policy in the Middle East.

The US did indeed welcome his move. Kissinger was elated by Sadat’s act for it served and seemed to confirm his objectives. The US was the key to any solution in the Middle East. "Time was working in our favor; nothing could happen without our cooperation; those who relied on Soviet support were bound to become progressively disillusioned. The way to an increased and more balanced American role was beginning to open" (Kissinger 205). But the US did not do much to solve the heart of the problem. It did not exert its influence on Israel to withdraw from the territories it occupied in the 1967 war. "Kissinger made no serious attempt to force Israel to compromise; indeed, he looked the other way as Israelis began building permanent settlements in the occupied territories" (Ambrose & Brinkley 260). Although the US promised to negotiate a settlement to the Middle Eastern problem, it continued in empowering Israel by supplying it with more military weapons. Egypt pleas for a settlement to the problem was not taken seriously or at least was not dealt with with the expediency required.

Dilatory tactics in dealing with the crisis resulted in a further exacerbation of the conflict. President’s al-Sadat’s protests that "everyone had fallen asleep," and his warning that "the time had come for a shock," were not taken seriously (Serfaty 260). "A war? Egypt? I regarded it as empty talk, a boast empty of content," Kissinger later told Prime Minister Golda Meir after his meeting with Sadat’s security advisor Ismail in March 1973. Sadat’s was held in contempt, and his threats were a subject of ridicule. When Ismail warned that if "there were no agreements then there would be war", Kissinger said "in my heart I laughed and laughed." Instead of addressing the whole problem that Ismail was raising, Kissinger said "I talked with Ismail about the weather…just so we wouldn’t get to the subject. I played with him…" (Cited in Ambrose & Brinkley 260) The Egyptians must have felt scorned by the US conduct, insulted even. Right after Ismail left Washington, the US declared that it is providing Israel with forty-eight additional Phantom jets.

At no instance did the US believe that Egypt could dare go to war against Israel, and even if it did that would result in its humiliating defeat. Israel was militarily superior to all its foes. In response to Soviets warnings that war was to break out if no solution was to be found, Kissinger admitted that "we dismissed this as a psychological warfare because we did not see any rational military option that would not worsen the Soviet and Arab positions" (Kissinger 461). Breshnev, he added, "must have heard the same Egyptian threats as we had and may have shared our own estimate that such an attempt was bound to end in Arab defeat. He knew that our ally was militarily stronger and that we held the diplomatic keys to a settlement." (280).

A frustrated Sadat soon gave up all hope that a diplomatic solution could be found to his grievances. As such, he swallowed his pride and turned to the Soviets to help him in the military adventure he intended to wage against Israel. On the 6th of October 1973, Egyptian and Syrian troops attacked Israel.

The Outbreak of the War

The 1973 crisis of the Middle East is the most perilous event that brought the two super powers to the brink of confrontation since the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962₇. Both countries were committed to assist their respective warring clients. The Soviets were wary that a major Arab defeat would be embarrassing to them and would certainly affect badly their stature worldwide. The US, too, was concerned about an Israeli defeat. Such occurrence would endanger its position in the area. This crisis put the Soviets and US prestige as superpower patrons of the Arabs and Israelis on the line. Any damage to this prestige ran the risk of confrontation between the superpowers. Both countries were driven by their desires to maintain their credibility as superpowers capable of defending the interests of their clients, and to avoid direct military confrontation.

The crisis took scary dimensions with Soviets threats of intervention, a worldwide US military alert, an oil embargo, and large-scale supplies of arms by the two superpowers to their clients in the midst of the war. The US and USSR active embroilment in the conflict revealed that the antagonistic superpower relation forged during the cold war was stronger than the rhetoric of the SALT agreements. Each power sought to maneuver events in a way that best fit its goals and those of its clients. Each power sought to extend its sphere of influence in the region at the expense of its rival. Détente played a limited role in the crisis. Even Soviet-US joint diplomatic endeavor to bring an end to hostilities changed with the evolution of the military situation, and not as a result of détente.

During the whole period that extended from October 6 to 20, the US and the USSR stand oscillated between urgent calls for a cease-fire and dilatory tactics to procrastinate one. All depended on who was wining on ground. With the swift advances that the Arabs made in the first days of the war, the Soviets hurried to call for a cease-fire fearing an expected Israeli counteroffensive that would shift the tide of the battle. When the Israelis failed to mount an immediate counterattack, the Soviets dropped their previous call for an end to the hostilities until Israel regained its strength and launched a strong counteroffensive. The US, however, could not allow the Arabs to steal a victory that would have affected her influence in the region and would have discredited her in the face of her client. It was not until October 20 that the US called for a cease-fire. By that time, the evolution of the war was turning against the Egyptians and the Syrians. The two superpowers as, Kissinger pointed out, "were, in fact, pursuing comparable strategies, each seeking to enable its friends to gain the upper hand on the battlefield" (Kissinger 519). Thus, despite détente, the two superpowers, as Victor Israelyan put it in Inside the Kremlin during the Yom Kippur War, "were disposed to take extreme steps in order to prevent the other superpower from gaining political and military advantage in the region" (Israelyan 218).

It was made clear throughout the whole crisis that no party would allow its rival to strike a military victory in that war. It is true that both the United States and the Soviets tried to coordinate their actions to bring an end to the crisis, and on two occasions efforts were made by the two powers to sponsor a joint cease-fire, which culminated in U.N. Resolution 338 of October 1973. But, when Israel refused to observe the cease-fire of October 22, the Soviets threatened to intervene unilaterally in the war for fear that the Israeli military destroys the besieged Egyptian third army. The US response was a worldwide military alert. Both the US and Soviets were determined to avoid military confrontation with each other in so far as their credibility in the eyes of their clients remained intact. Luckily, the Arab-Israeli crisis subsided with the reimposition of the cease-fire on October 25.

US-Soviet policy in the October 1973 War Contested

Soviet conduct in the 1973 war generated a considerable degree of contention. There were contending arguments as to whether the Soviets abided by the principles of détente. Most Americans blamed the Soviets for instigating the combined Egyptian-Syrian attack against Israel on October 6, 1973. Soviets were blamed for supplying their clients with the arms to mount the offensive attack, for doing nothing to avert the war, for rushing arms to their protégées in the midst of war, and for backing the Arabs imposition of the oil embargo on the US and on some other European countries who sided with Israel. But the evidence available does not support the basic contention that the Soviets instigated the war. The Soviets as, Quandt stated, "adapted their actions to the crisis as it unfolded" (Quandt V). The Soviets at several instances tried to dissuade the Egyptians from engaging in a risky war that they were likely to lose. But once the Egyptians and Syrians decided to go to war, the Soviets could not do otherwise but back them. The Soviets found themselves in the obligation of supporting their client states with arms sufficient to make their need for intervention less probable and to prevent any likelihood of confrontation with the US (Quandt).

Soviet behavior during the October 1973, as Quandt stated, "was neither a model of the new politics of détente, nor conduct aggressively aimed at exploiting a regional crisis to the maximum" (Quandt V). No wonder the Soviets tried to use the crisis to its benefits, but they "seemed very attentive to shifts in the equilibrium of forces and adapted their policies quickly to the unfolding regional situation" (Quandt Vii). They displayed great caution to maintain their credibility as defenders of the Arabs just cause of recovering their occupied land while at the same time shunning a confrontation with the US. The Soviets saw force and diplomacy as "complementary". In the Soviets views, as Quandt put it, "it is not inconsistent to follow a policy of favoring a ‘political settlement,’ while at the same time delivering the means to launch a war; nor is it inconsistent to work for a ceasefire while mounting an airlift and sealift of military equipment to clients engaged in actual hostilities" (39).

The US conduct in the 1973 October war was also subject of criticism. The US was blamed by the Soviets and the Arabs for not doing much to solve the conflict. Some critics went so far as to say that the US policy instigated the conflict. US dilatory tactics to find a quick peaceful settlement to the long-standing Arab-Israeli conflict exacerbated the problem. US was also blamed for empowering its client to attain a level of unquestionable military superiority. With the military power that Israel was acquiring thanks to the US military hardware, it was unlikely that Israel would cede the territories it occupied since 1967. The US was blamed for the biased position it took with regard to the Middle East conflict. The US was mainly preoccupied with entrenching its strong position in the Middle East. The USSR and by implication its clients should be prevented from gaining any leverage in that strategic area by any means, though if that meant depriving the Arabs from getting their legitimate right (their occupied land). The critics of the US policy in the Middle East blamed the United States for not complying with the principles of détente. But as the evidence reveals, the US could be held accountable for not doing much to solve the conflict but not to the extent of instigating the conflict. The US wanted to negotiate a settlement to the perennial Middle East problem, but not at the expense of its position in the region. The war was used as a means of buttressing its dominant position. It was also used as a means to negotiate a way out to the crisis that only the US would set its terms.

The US had used the war to gain more and more leverage. As is candidly stated by Kissinger in his memoirs, the US manipulated the war in a such a way to prevent the Arabs from scoring any gains on the battle so as to appear to have "repulsed an attack by Soviet weapons," while "trying to win Arab confidence so we could both emerge as mediator and demonstrate that the road to peace led through Washington." This could only be achieved by a "restored self-respect on the Arab side and a new Israeli recognition of the need for diplomacy." The US goal was designed to start the peace process "with the Arabs on the proposition that we had stopped the Israeli advance and with the Israelis on the basis that we had been steadfastly at their side in the crisis" (Kissinger 468,470,471,476,487). For Kissinger the US strategy in dealing with war paid dividend. By the time of the cease-fire, "we had achieved our fundamental objectives: We had created the conditions for a diplomatic breakthrough. We had vindicated the security of our friends. We had prevented a victory of Soviet arms. We had maintained a relationship with key Arab countries and laid the basis for a dominant role in postwar diplomacy" (Kissinger 544).

Conclusion

The October war of 1973 showed the limitations of détente to inaugurate a new era of negotiations and peaceful coexistence. It is true that a nuclear confrontation between the two superpowers was averted, but the outbreak of the Israeli-Arab war had proved the weakness of détente. The policy was doomed to fail because it was flawed in its initial design. US views of détente were at variance with the views held by the Soviets. The US saw détente as a means to contain the Soviets during an age of nuclear parity. The Soviets, however, saw détente as an opportunity to gain equal status with US and to regenerate their staggering economy. Both the United States and the USSR tried to capitalize on the possibilities offered by détente.

It is true that both superpowers were interested in forging a durable peace in one of the most troubled regions in the world. Détente was expected to create a fit atmosphere for effective collaboration between the US and the Soviets to prevent conflicts anywhere in the globe from degenerating into explosive crises. The joint communiqué that the two superpowers issued after the two summits they held in Moscow and the US respectively attest to this will. But the problem as Israelyan put it was that "each of the superpowers wanted to impose its own version of peace in the region: the Kremlin an anti-American peace, the White House an anti-Soviet peace" (Israelyan 217). No party was ready to make any concessions or compromises for the sake of peace. "They had all the power and influence and the world community’s broad support needed for implementing that great mission" (218). The two superpowers could have imposed a fair and long lasting peace process that could have spared the region the troubles it has been entangled into after the 1973 October War.

In summary, the 1973 crisis demonstrated the vanity of the accords signed by the two superwars. The policy of détente agreed upon did not survive the antagonistic nature that shaped the Soviets and US relationship during the cold war. The reality of this antagonism proved stronger than the rhetoric of the reached agreements. Nowhere were the concluded agreements to supplant the fierce competition or to guarantee against renewed confrontation.

Works Cited

Ambrose E. Stephen & Brinkley G. Douglas. Rise to Globalism: American Foreign Policy Since 1938. Eighth Revised Edition. New York: Penguin Books, 1997.

Garthoff, L. Raymond. Détente and Confrontation: American-Soviet Relations from Nixon to Reagan. Washington D.C: The Brookings Institution, 1994.

Gati, Charles & Gati T. Trister. The Debate over Détente. New York: Foreign Policy Association. Headline Series, No. 234, February 1977.

George, Alexander L. Bridging the Gap: Theory and Practice in Foreign Policy. Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace, 1993.

Gromyko, Andrei. Address to the Twenty-Eighth Session of the U.N. General Assembly. Pravda, 26 September 1976.

Indyk, Martin. "Détente and the Politics of Patronage: How the October Middle East War Started." The Australian Outlook (August): 171-96, 1976.

Israelyan, Victor. Inside the Kremlin during the Yom Kippur War. Pennsylvania: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1995.

Kissinger, Henry. Years of Upheaval. Boston: Little, Brown, c1982.

Kissinger in Litwak, S Robert, ed., détente and the Nixon Doctrine: American Foreign Policy and the Pursuit of Stability, 1969-1976. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984

Leighton, Marian. The Deceptive Lure of Détente. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1989.

Melanson, Richard A. American foreign policy since the Vietnam War : the search for consensus from Nixon to Clinton. Armonk, N.Y. : M.E. Sharpe, c1996

Nixon, Richard. RN: The Memoirs of Richard Nixon. New York: Grosset and Dunlap, 1975.

O’balance, Edgar. No Victor, No Vanquished: The Yom Kippur War. California: Presidio Press, 1978.

Serfaty, Simon. American Foreign Policy in a Hostile World Dangerous Years. New York: Praeger, 1984.

Quandt, William B. Soviet Policy in the October 1973 War. Santa Monica, Calif.: Rand Corporation, 1976.

Endnotes

Note 1: Détente as defined by Alexander George "may be accompanied by reduction of hostile behavior but does not settle the prevailing disagreements or remove the underlying conflicts of interest" (George 64). Back

Note 2: Israeli scholars often refer to the October War as the Yom Kippur War, and the Arab scholars often call it the Ramadan War. Yom Kippur and Ramadan are religious feasts for Jews and Muslims respectively. They coincided with the 6 October, the day the war started. Back

Note 3: Henry Kissinger was born in 1923. He was the most influential foreign policy figure in the administrations of United States presidents Richard Nixon and Gerald Ford. Among his achievements in foreign policy were initiating strategic arms limitations talks in 1969, the policy of détente with the Soviet Union, establishing formal diplomatic relations with the people’s republic of China, resuming diplomatic relations with Egypt, and negotiating the withdrawal of American forces from Vietnam. Back

Note 4: The Nixon-Kissinger strategy hoped to promulgate "a new philosophical framework–a resultant of ‘the new period of creativity’" that "would allow the United States to transcend the image of bipolarity and the disastrous policy of undifferentiated globalism which it had sustained" (Litwak 3). Back

Note 5: Negotiated issues would be linked to each other so that progress in one area would have a similar effect on other areas. Back

Note 6: Numbering approximately 20,000 in all, about 15,000 Soviet soldiers were manning and guarding fifty SAM-3 sites; about 4,000 others were distributed among various headquarters, formation and units; and there were over 200 pilots with their supporting ground crews (O’ballance 18). Back

Note 7: The Cuban Missile Crisis of October 1962 was one of the turning points of the Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union. At that time the two superpowers came close to war, possibly with nuclear weapons; after it, both countries began to seek ways to adjust to each other, in particular, to prevent the use of nuclear weapons. Back